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Abstract 
Boundary algebra [BA] is a simpler notation for Spencer-Brown’s (1969) primary algebra 
[pa], the Boolean algebra 2, and the truth functors. The primary arithmetic [PA] is built 
up from the atoms, ‘()’ and the blank page, by enclosure between ‘(‘ and ‘)’, denoting the 
primitive notion of distinction, and concatenation. Inserting letters denoting the presence 
or absence of () into a PA formula yields a BA formula. The BA axioms are “()()=()” (A1), 
and “(()) [=⊥] may be written or erased at will” (A2). Repeated application of these axi-
oms to a PA formula yields a member of B= {(),⊥} called its simplification. If (a)b [dually 
(a(b))] ⇔ a≤b, then ⊥≤() [()≤⊥] follows trivially, so that B is a poset. (a) has two intend-
ed interpretations: (a) ⇔ a′ (Boolean algebra 2), and (a) ⇔ ~a (sentential logic). BA is a 
self-dual notation for 2: () ⇔ 1 [0] so that B is the carrier for 2, and ab ⇔ a∪b [a∩b]. The 
BA basis abc=bca (Dilworth 1938), a(ab)= a(b), and a()=() (Bricken 2002) facilitates clausal 
reasoning and proof by calculation. BA also simplifies the usual normal forms and 
Quine’s (1982) truth value analysis. () ⇔ true [false] yields boundary logic. 
 
Keywords: G. Spencer Brown, boundary algebra, boundary logic, primary algebra, 
primary arithmetic, Boolean algebra, calculation proof, C.S. Peirce, existen-
tial graphs. 
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1.  Introduction. 
“No one should fear that the contemplation of characters will lead us away from the things them-
selves; on the contrary, it will lead us into the interior of things. For nowadays our notions are 
often confused because the characters we use are badly arranged, but with the aid of characters we 
will easily have the most distinct notions, for we will have at hand a mechanical thread of medita-
tion, as it were, with whose aid we can easily resolve any idea whatever into its components.” 
           Leibniz (1969: 193).1 
“…to unfold all truths of mathematics down to their ultimate grounds, and thereby provide all 
concepts of this science with the greatest possible clarity, correctness, and order, is an endeavour 
which will not only promote the thoroughness of education but also make it easier.” 
Bolzano, Considerations on Some Objects of Elementary Geometry, written in 1804 and 
republished in Ewald (1996: 172). Emphasis in original. 
“Symbols have the same importance for thought that discovering how to use the wind to sail 
against the wind had for navigation. Thus, let no one despise symbols! A great deal depends on 
choosing them properly… without symbols we would scarcely lift ourselves to conceptual think-
ing.”           Frege (1972: 84), writing in 1882. 
“By relieving the brain of… unnecessary work, a good notation sets it free to concentrate on more 
advanced problems, and in effect increases the mental power of [humanity].” 
     Whitehead (1948: 39), quoted in Roberts (1973: 118). 
"...a proper notation is like a live teacher, gently guiding us into the clear and keeping us from 
error and wooliness. A real effort should be made to express [logical] principles in as perspicuous 
a notation as possible."            Martin (1978: 41). 
In his Laws of Form2 (hereinafter LoF), in print since 1969, George Spencer-Brown3 pro-
posed a minimalist formal system, called the primary arithmetic, arising from the primi-
tive mental act of making a distinction. He reached the next rung on the ladder of 
abstraction by letting letters denote, indifferently, a distinction or its absence, resulting 
in the primary algebra. The primary arithmetic and algebra featured a single primitive 
symbol ⎯‘ ’ in LoF and ‘()’ here⎯ indicating the boundary between the two states gen-
erated by a distinction. Boundary algebra (BA), a phrase coined in Meguire (2003), unites 
the primary arithmetic and algebra and modifies the notation somewhat. BA has two in-
tended interpretations: the Boolean algebra 2 (i.e., one whose carrier has cardinality two; 
cf. Halmos and Givant 1998: 55) and classical bivalent sentential logic (hereinafter the 
                                                          
1. Letter to Tchirnhaus, dated May 1678, quoted in translation by Ishiguro (1990: 44). 
2. Page numbers and the like refer to the 1972 American paperback edition. 
3. George Spencer-Brown entered Cambridge in 1947, the year Wittgenstein resigned his Chair; 
hence he cannot have studied under Wittgenstein (who only taught advanced classes), as some 
claim. Graduated with Honours in philosophy and psychology, then taught philosophy at Ox-
ford, 1952−58, from which (as well as from Cambridge) he obtained an M.A. Published Prob-
ability and Scientific Inference in 1957. Taught mathematics in the University of London’s 
extramural program, 1963−68, and has held visiting appointments at Maryland, Stanford, and 
Western Australia. Source: http://www.lawsofform.org/gsb/vita.html . 
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calculus of truth values4, CTV). The latter interpretation I call boundary logic, a phrase 
Bricken apparently coined in the 1980s. This paper stems from my admiration of the 
simplicity and elegance of boundary logic. 
The primary algebra, as set out in LoF, consists of 2 axioms, 11 consequences in the form 
of equations, the usual rules governing uniform replacement and the substitution of 
equals for equals, and 9 “canons.” There are 18 (meta)theorems, including but not limit-
ed to the standard metatheory of the CTV: soundness, completeness, and postulate inde-
pendence. Definitions are informal. All this fills less than 55 small pages of large type.5 
The balance of the book consists of 20pp of front matter, a chapter claiming that certain 
recursive Boolean equations have “imaginary” solutions, and 60pp of notes and append-
ices relating the primary algebra to the CTV as it was understood circa 1940, and to ele-
mentary Boolean algebra and syllogistic logic. Much of this peripheral material is frank-
ly speculative and digressive. I do not evaluate here LoF‘s claim that one can usefully 
think of certain recursive Boolean equations as having “imaginary” solutions. 
I take it as given that notational innovation can facilitate the teaching of extant mathe-
matics, and the invention of new mathematics. Since the dawning of modern logic in 
1847, three notations for the truth functors have acquired a significant following: 
• The notation begun by Boole, revised by C. S. Peirce, and systematised by Schröder 
in the 1890s. This became the Boolean algebra 2, with the following arithmetic/set 
theory/logic interpretations: a+b-ab / a∪b / a∨b, a×b / a∩b / a∧b, and 1-a / a  / ~a. 
Boolean algebra can be cast in terms of equations and inequalities (‘≤’ interprets the 
conditional) with unknowns. A classic treatment is Lewis (1918: chpts. II, III); for a 
thorough modern exposition, see Rudeanu (1974);6 
• The binary prefix (Polish) notation introduced by Lukasiewicz in the 1920s. Fully ex-
ploiting the fact that formulae are ordered trees, this notation is free of the ambigui-
ties that plague its infix rivals and so enjoys the advantage of requiring no brackets; 
• The standard notation for first order logic, originated by Peano and modified by 
Whitehead and Russell in their Principia Mathematica (PM). While the notation of PM 
                                                          
4. Synonyms for the CTV include Bostock’s (1997) logic of truth functors, sentential calculus 
(Kalish et al 1980), logic of connectives (LeBlanc and Wisdom 1976), propositional calculus 
(Church 1956; Mendelson 1997; Halmos & Givant 1998; Cori and Lascar 2000), propositional 
logic (Smullyan 1968; Epstein 1995; Wolf 1998; Hodges 2001), statement calculus, (Stoll 
1974), Propcal (Machover 1996), truth functional logic (Hunter 1971; Quine 1982), the theory 
of deduction (Whitehead and Russell 1925; hereinafter PM). 
5. Smullyan (1968: chpts. I, II) covers the same ground as LoF in 27 pages. Nidditch (1962), 
Goodstein (1963: chpt. 4), and Mendelson (1997: chpt. 1) require 81, 17, and 35 pages, res-
pectively, and include the Deduction Theorem. Hunter (1971: §§15-36), Cori & Lascar (2000: 
chpt. 1, §§4.1-2), Stoll (1974: §§2.1-4, 3.5), Machover (1996: chpt. 7), Epstein (1995: §§II.J-
L), and Schütte (1977: chpt. I) require 79, 62, 43, 40, 31, and 12 pages, respectively. Some 
treatments include compactness as well as consistency and completeness. 
6. Boolean algebra is distinct from Boole’s “algebra of logic,” on which see Kneebone (1963: 
184-88) and Lewis (1918: §I.V), in good part because Boole’s alternation was exclusive, not 
inclusive. Hailperin (1986: 140) argues that Boole’s algebra is a “commutative ring with unit, 
having neither additive nor multiplicative nonzero nilpotents.” On Boolean algebra, see the 
references in the Bibliographic Postscript. 
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had canonical status during much of the 20th century, a variant due to Hilbert, 
Tarski, and their students, one employing ‘∧’, ‘→’, and ‘↔’ in place of  the ‘.’, ‘⊃’, and 
‘≡’, and brackets instead of the dots of Peano and PM, has largely displaced it. I make 
free metalinguistic use of this notation herein.7 
Boundary algebra is, arguably, a notational innovation of the same order as the above. 
The notation of LoF, however, cannot be reproduced using standard word processing 
software. Hence I employ an alternative notation employed by Bricken and others to 
discuss LoF, a notation in which Latin letters, ‘()’, and the blank page are atomic. I be-
lieve that Croskin (1978: 187) was the first to employ this notation, a mild variant of one 
in Peirce (4.378-383, 1902).8 The syntax of the primary arithmetic consists of balanced 
parentheses strings. Inserting Latin letters into a primary arithmetic formula yields a 
primary algebra formula. 
The domain of analysis is the numbers, real and complex; that of geometry, space, Eu-
clidian and otherwise. Algebra studies mathematical structure without commiting to a 
specific domain. Logic studies the mathematical structure of statements and deductive 
systems so that, as Peirce and Halmos and Givant (1998: §§35-39) have maintained, logic 
can be viewed as an application of algebra. Boundary logic is very much a case in point. 
My discussion comes under four headings: syntax, semantics, proof, and the history of 
ideas. My purpose is mainly expository, in that much of what I say has already ap-
peared somewhere in the literature. LoF was written as if the mathematics it advocates 
were wholly new, when in fact, Spencer-Brown was reinventing the syntactic wheel. 
Kauffman (2001) shows how the notation of LoF was anticipated by C. S. Peirce⎯in pa-
pers written in 1886 but not published in full until 1993⎯and Nicod (1917). Kauffman 
also touches on Peirce’s alpha existential graphs, discussed in §6, whose semantics and 
proof theory are very much in the spirit of BA. In §7, I give possible reasons why the 
mathematics and logic of LoF have made no headway since LoF was first published 
nearly 40 years ago. 
This paper includes a “Precis of Mathematical Logic” (hereinafter “Precis”), for the ben-
efit of readers lacking prior exposure to formal logic. I assume the reader has an intui-
tive grasp of elementary set theory, including the notion of function. LoF, however, is 
utterly innocent of set theory, other than a brief mention, near the end and free of all 
rigor, of the Boolean algebra of sets. 
2.  The Primary Arithmetic (PA). 
“The theme of [LoF] is that a universe comes into being when a space is severed or taken apart… 
By tracing the way we represent such a severance, we can begin to reconstruct… the basic forms 
                                                          
7. On the importance of Peano’s notational innovations, see Quine (1995: §28). Kneebone (1963: 
49-51, §6.4, 87) discusses Polish notation and the notation of Frege (never emulated). The 
notations ‘∀x’ and ‘∃x’ descend from the ‘∏x’ and ‘∑x’ of Peirce (W5: 162-90) and his student 
Mitchell, a notation the Poles adopted. While Prior (1962) and Zeman (1973) adopted Polish 
notation, and texts still mention it, it appears to have died out. The syntactic (‘?’) and semantic 
(‘?’) turnstiles should be seen as part of the standard metalanguage. 
8. To Bricken I owe my awareness of Croskin’s work. Here and elsewhere, I cite Peirce’s Col-
lected Papers (Peirce 1931-35) in the following standard manner: x.y, z refers to a passage, 
first published or written in year z, reprinted in section y of volume x of the Collected Papers. 
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underlying linguistic, mathematical, physical, and biological science, and can begin to see how 
the familiar laws of our experience follow inexorably from the original act of severance.” 
        LoF, p. v. 
"A common image schema of great importance in mathematics is the Container schema [hav-
ing] three parts: an Interior, a Boundary, and an Exterior. This structure forms a gestalt, in the 
sense that the parts make no sense without the whole. There is no Interior without a Boundary 
and an Exterior, no Exterior without a Boundary and an Interior, and no Boundary without 
sides. The structure is topological in… that the Boundary can be made larger, smaller, or dis-
torted and still remain the Boundary of a Container schema."        Lakoff & Núñez (2001: 33).9 
In the beginning there is a space, normally a plane surface, that is featureless but upon 
which symbols (a primitive notion) may be inscribed. We are notably interested in the 
symbols ‘(‘ and ‘)’. Acting in tandem, they divide the space into two parts, one inside or 
between ‘(‘ and ‘)’ and the balance being outside ‘(‘ and ‘)’. A sign is one or more 
symbols representing some human intention. The sign ‘()’ marks the boundary between 
these two parts of the space. Letting x be a token or marker, x can be inside a boundary, 
as in ‘(x)’, or outside, as in ‘()x’. Each side of a boundary forms one of a pair of mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive entities. ‘()’ can also indicate either member of this pair of enti-
ties, in which case ‘()’ signifies a boundary’s content as well as its fact. A boundary ‘()’ 
has meaning to the extent one wishes to distinguish that which is inside ‘()’ (which may 
be nothing) from the remainder of the space. 2.0.1 attempts to codify these admittedly 
enigmatic ruminations: 
 
2.0.1. Definition. The sign ‘()’ inscribed in some space both signifies a boundary and de-
notes the marked state. Any space on which ‘()’ does not appear represents the unmarked 
state. 
 
The unmarked state can also be called “not ()”, “nothing”, “the void”; I will grant it a 
symbol shortly. The formal system whose sole atoms are ‘()’ and “the void” is the prima-
ry arithmetic (LoF also employs the term “calculus of indications”), which I abbreviate to 
PA. Boundary logic begins by interpreting ‘()’ as one of true or false. (I will often refer to 
the usual notation for first order logic as conventional logic.) 
Now consider a plane surface, of indefinite extent, on which the following four symbols 
(not necessarily interpreted or related to each other) are inscribed, in the pattern shown: 
 
#  ∴ 
         ∋ 
       ∴  ♦ 
          Figure 1. 
 
Note that ‘∴’ appears twice. If one wished to represent Figure 1 more concisely, one 
could assert that the symbols in that Figure form a list and write ‘#∴∋∴♦’, without sepa-
rators such as commas. Note that multiple instances of the same object, namely ‘∴’, are 
allowed. One could also depict Figure 1 as a set and write {#,∋,∴,♦}, keeping in mind 
                                                          
9. Container schema and image schema are terms of art in cognitive science. 
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that a set cannot have multiple instances of any of its members; hence the set corres-
ponding to Fig. 1 has four members but the list has five elements. 
Recall that for both lists and sets, the order in which elements are listed is immaterial. 
Hence when using list or set notation, the elements can be permuted at will without af-
fecting meaning, consistent with the symbols having no necessary relation to each other. 
BA should be thought of as consisting of spatial arrangements such as Figure 1. In order 
to save space, and deferring to typographical custom in mathematics and conventional 
logic, I represent such arrangements as lists. 
A boundary can be depicted by any closed curve that does not intersect itself, and with a 
distinguishable ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. Boundaries can also be nested at will. The objects 
of BA should be seen as inscribed on a surface of dimension at least 2. All objects on a 
given side of a boundary, other boundaries excepted, have equal status. Hence bounda-
ry purists deem jejune the algebraic notions of commutativity and associativity when 
these are applied to BA. I do invoke these notions, but only as metalinguistic manners of 
speaking, doing so mainly out of deference to readers accustomed to conventional nota-
tions for logic and Boolean algebra. I revisit this syntactic curiosity in §3.2.10 
2.1.  PA: Syntax. 
‘‘Although some material may be very familiar, it should be remembered that one of our main 
themes is the development of new perspectives for familiar concepts. Hence… these concepts 
[should] be re-appraised, and explicit discussion be provided of things that to many will have 
become second nature.”          Goldblatt (1984: 4). 
 
2.1.1. Definition.  A PA symbol is an instance of ‘(’, ‘)’, ‘⊥’, and ‘=’. ‘Symbol’ is otherwise 
undefined. The symbol ‘⊥’ is improper; the remaining symbols are proper. 
2.1.2. Definition.  A PA string consists of a single symbol, or of two or more symbols 
juxtaposed.11 A PA formula is a string constructed recursively as follows: 
 
Base case.   Any atomic formula. These are the string ‘()’, the blank page, and the space 
between symbols. 
Recursive rule.  If ‘α’ and ‘β’ are formulae, ‘(α)’ and ‘αβ’, i.e., ‘α’ and ‘β’ juxtaposed, are 
formulae. This rule may be repeated any finite number of times.12 
                                                          
10. Kauffman (2001) uses the term boundary mathematics to refer to formal systems with one or 
more syntactical boundaries, having mathematical as well as logical interpretations. Bricken 
(2001), building on James (1993), uses boundary notation to explore analysis (e.g., by repre-
senting ex as (x) ) and the integers, rationals, reals, etc. ‘Boundary,’ as employed herein, is un-
related to the use of that term in topology. At the same time, I do not wish to deny possible 
links among boundary mathematics, topology, and the mereotopology of Simons (1987: 
§2.10) and Casati and Varzi (1999: chpts. 4,5); see fn 60. By grounding BA in the “mental 
act” of drawing a distinction I distance boundary logic, for good or ill, from Kneebone’s 
(1963: §12.2.1) reading of PM, in which “…logic deals with propositions, not with mental 
acts; and it follows that… mathematics likewise is essentially propositional.” 
11. ‘Juxtaposition’ (a term I appropriate from Hehner 2004) and ‘concatenation’, terms which I 
deem synonymous even while not defining them, are not mathematically trivial; see Halmos 
and Givant (1998: §12). 
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I revisit the blank page as formula in §2.2. 2.1.2 introduces an important notational con-
vention: Greek letters are metalogical symbols standing for arbitrary formulae or strings. (N.B. 
LoF also invokes this convention, albeit silently.) 
 
2.1.3. Definition.  If the formula ‘α’ can be obtained by applying the recursive rule in 
2.1.2 to the formula ‘β’ one or more times, then ‘β’ is a proper sub-formula of ‘α’. A sub-
formula of ‘α’ is either ‘α’ itself or a proper subformula of ‘α’. 
 
LoF has no synonym for subformula, a lacuna giving rise to occasional awkward peri-
phrases. ‘String’ and ‘formula’ are not intrinsic to BA. I employ these words mainly to 
facilitate expositing BA to those who have learned standard formal systems. ‘String’ and 
‘formula’ are synonyms for ‘arrangement’ and ‘expression,’ which LoF employs without 
defining. I will write ‘arrangement’ only when quoting LoF. 
In everyday language, a formula must satisfy the rule: reading from left to right, any left 
parenthesis must eventually be paired with a right parenthesis. A string satisfying this rule is 
known as a balanced parenthesis string. The following algorithm determines whether a 
given string is balanced and hence a formula. 
 
2.1.4. Algorithm. 
a) Let d be a counter variable, and initialise it to 0. 
b) Starting from one end of the string and working towards the other end, increase d by 
1 for each ‘(‘ and reduce d by 1 for each  ‘)’. 
c) IF d is ever positive [negative], it must always be nonnegative [nonpositive]. 
d) ELSE the string is not a formula. STOP 
e) ELSE IF d is nonzero when the end of the string is reached, the string is not a 
formula. STOP 
f) ELSE the string is a formula. 
End of Algorithm 
 
2.1.4 is required only because not all possible strings involving only ‘(‘ and ‘)’ are well-
formed. This is a (minor, I trust) drawback of the notation I propose. This problem does 
not arise with the notation of LoF, its signal virtue. That notation is based on the symbol 
‘ ’, called the mark, and placed to the right and over that which ‘()’ encloses. For in-
stance, ‘ ’ in LoF corresponds to ‘((()())())’ here. All possible concatenations and nest-
ings of ‘ ’ are well-formed, as long as the upper part of any ‘ ’ extends over the left 
extremity of all ‘ ’ under it. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
12. I crafted 2.1.2 so as to resemble the recursive formula definitions in conventional treatments 
of logic and other formal systems; e.g., Bostock (1997: 21) and Machover (1996: §7.1.2). In 
linguistics and computer science, 2.1.2 defines a Dyck language of order 1 with a null alpha-
bet, the simplest instance of a Chomskian context-free language (Davis et al 1994: §10.7). 
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2.1.5. Definition.  When applying 2.1.4 to ‘α’, the absolute value of the counter d at any 
point inside ‘α’ is the depth of ‘α’ at that point. Henceforth, d refers to this absolute value. 
The place in ‘α’ where d attains its largest value is the greatest depth, *dα , of ‘α’.13 
 
2.1.6. Definition.  Corresponding to every value of d is a subspace sd. The subspace sd 
pervades any sub-formula situated at depth d. Given some formula ‘α’, the subspace of 
depth 0, s0, is the pervasive space of ‘α’. Let ‘β’ be a sub-formula occurring at depth d of 
‘α’. Then the subspace sd pervades ‘β’ (is the pervasive space of ‘β’). 
 
‘()’ marks the boundary between the subspace “inside” and the pervasive space “out-
side.” Each subspace sj contains all subspaces sk, for which i<k≤d*. Hence a formula 
creates a system of d* nested subspaces. (The terms space and subspace are also funda-
mental to analysis and linear algebra, but this is coincidental.) A subspace can pervade 
more than one sub-formula, a fact giving rise to the following definition: 
 
2.1.7. Definition. Given a formula of the form ‘…((β)(γ)…)…’, the sub-formulae ‘(β)’, 
‘(γ)’, etc. constitute divisions of the subspace containing ‘(β)’, ‘(γ)’, etc, and these sub-
formulae are said to divide the subspace. 
 
I now explicate ‘⊥’: 
 
2.1.8. Definition. The symbol ‘⊥’ represents the null formula and designates “the 
unmarked state”, “nothing”, “the void”. 
 
‘⊥’ is a sub-formula of every formula, so that the null formula is a formula in the same 
sense that the empty set is a set.14 
 
2.1.9. Definition. () and ⊥ are the primitive values of BA. B={(),⊥}. 
 
B is the defining set of BA. In Boolean algebra, B is known as the carrier. 
LoF invokes the Principle of Relevance (cf. §3.1) to argue that there is no need for a sym-
bol to denote the unmarked state or the null formula: “...a recessive value is common to 
every [PA formula] and... by this Principle, has no necessary indicator there” (LoF, p. 43). 
Although LoF is silent about the null formula, it (pp. 15-18, 37, 47-48, 56-57) repeatedly 
employs ‘n’ to refer to the unmarked state; the semantics of ‘n’ and ‘⊥’ are identical. The 
counterpart to ‘n‘ is ‘m’, denoting the marked state. n and m are presumably metaling-
uistic. 
By including the symbol ‘⊥’ in BA, I defer to established usage in logic and Boolean alge-
bra, which all feature a symbol akin to ‘⊥’. Moreover, ‘=’ with nothing to one side (and 
strings of this form do occur in LoF) leaves the mind guessing at a possible typographic-
                                                          
13. A BA formula can be seen as a finite ordered tree (Smullyan 1968: 4-5), whose level corres-
ponds to depth in the sense of 2.1.5. LoF operationalizes formula depth in a different manner. 
14. ‘T’ (‘top’) and ‘⊥’ (‘bottom’) are standard notation for the lattice bounds (3.3.5), and are the 
primitives of Hehner’s (2004) binary algebra. ‘⊥’ is also analogous to Bostock’s (1997: 12-
13) empty sequent, false by definition. 
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al problem. ‘⊥’ is a placeholder like the number 0; I created it in good part simply out of 
respect for the dyadic character of ‘=’. The controversy surrounding the role of ‘⊥‘ in BA 
is analogous to that surrounding a possible role for the null individual in mereology, the 
formal theory of the relation of part to whole. For a review of this controversy, see the 
Appendix titled “The Controverted Ontology of the Null Individual.” It would seem 
that both controversies stem from assuming that a name necessarily refers to at least one 
thing, when in fact the null individual and ‘⊥‘ are names that do not denote. They refer 
not to things, but to “nothing” and “the unmarked state,” respectively. 
2.2.  PA: Axiomatics, Simplification, Semantics. 
“I have for a long time been urging… the importance of demonstrating all the secondary axi-
oms… by bringing them back to axioms which are primary, i.e., immediate and indemonstra-
ble…”            Leibniz (1996: 408). 
The LoF axioms are: 
 
A1. ()()  =  () A2. (())  =  ⊥. 
 
In Spencer-Brown’s inimitable Zen-like words (LoF, pp. 1-2): 
A1.  The value of a call made again is the value of the call.    Calling 
A2.  The value of a crossing made again is not the value of the crossing. Crossing 
 
A2 is arguably self-evident, A1 perhaps less so. I ignore the distinction LoF draws be-
tween “axiom,” meaning Calling and Crossing (also referred to as Number and Order) 
stated in natural language, and the corresponding “arithmetic initials” ()()=() and (())=⊥. 
A1 and A2 reveal that ‘()’ has an “inside” distinguishable from its “outside” by virtue of 
what each does to another instance of ‘()’ with which it is in contact. A1 lays down that 
the exterior is idempotent; A2, that the interior is nilpotent. A1 and A2 can also be seen 
as defining ‘(‘ and ‘)’ as the two halves of a single operator, with A1 [A2] being the de-
fining property of the convex [concave] side of a parenthesis. When a pair of parenthe-
ses enclose a sub-formula, the pair functions as an (unary) operator; the subformula⎯ 
which may be no more than an instance of ‘()’⎯is the corresponding operand. Note that 
‘(())’ has an interior while the constant ‘⊥’ does not. This is the sense in which ‘⊥’ is not a 
mere redundant synonym for ‘(())’. 
Pp. 104-06 of LoF, perhaps the most sweeping and poetic pages of the book, were written 
to lead the reader to a deeper understanding of the plausibility of A1 and A2. These 
pages include the following enigmatic passage: 
 
“It seems hard to find an acceptable answer to the question of how or why 
the world conceives a desire, and discovers an ability, to see itself, and ap-
pears to suffer the process. That it does so is sometimes called the original 
mystery. Perhaps, in view of the form in which we presently take ourselves 
to exist, the mystery arises from our insistence on framing a question 
where there is, in reality, nothing to question. However it may appear, if 
such desire, ability, and sufferance be granted, the state or condition that 
arises as an outcome is, according to the laws here formulated, absolutely 
unavoidable.”          LoF, pp. 105-06; emphasis in original. 
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Spencer-Brown apparently saw A1 and A2 as ineluctable features of the universe, mater-
ial as well as abstract, and of how humans interact with it. 
Croskin (1978) concludes that A1 and A2 assert a one-to-one mapping between B and 
‘()()’ and ‘(())’, the two simplest nonatomic formulae. I prefer to see A1 and A2 as in-
stances of the sort of arbitrary defining choices that ground all formal systems. ‘()()’ and 
‘(())’ could just as well be mapped onto any member of {⊥, (), ()(), (())}, giving rise to 
42=16 possible pairs of axioms, one pair being (A1, A2) and four pairs consisting of the 
same axiom iterated. Exploring the mathematical significance of the 11 remaining axiom 
pairs I leave to future research. 
A1 and A2 do not make explicit what value to assign to a formula containing both ‘⊥’ 
and parentheses. LoF is not to blame for this lacuna, because it has no null formula and 
so blithely states A2 with nothing to the right of ‘=’. I propose to remedy this omission 
in either of two ways: 
 
1. Invoke a third axiom making explicit that when ‘⊥’ is combined with ‘()’ in any way, 
nothing is altered: 
 
A3.  ⊥() = (⊥) = ()⊥ = (); ⊥⊥ =  ⊥. 
 
  Or, in the Zen-like manner of LoF: 
 
A3.  The void can only be a sign of itself. 
2. Restate A2 as follows: An instance of ‘(())’ or ‘⊥’ may be written anywhere or erased at 
will. I submit that a generous reading of LoF points to this definition. The four cases 
covered by A3 above then all follow. 
 
Under either approach, ‘⊥’ can appear anywhere in a formula without affecting its 
meaning or value. ‘⊥’ is a synonym for ‘(())’ and as such is, in all essentials, optional. 
Hence parentheses alone suffice to build any PA formula. A2 as restated above has a 
curious and deeper consequence. Since ‘(())’ aliases with the blank page, and since by 
2.1.9 ‘(())’ is a primitive value, the following three things stand for the same atomic 
formula and can denote the same primitive value: the “space” between any two juxta-
posed symbols, an entire blank page, and any blank part thereof. We shall see in §6.1 
that Peirce reached a related conclusion at the end of the 19th century while devising a 
related formal system. 
Table 2-1 summarises the discussion thus far, with each cell in that Table giving one of 
the six possible ways of forming pairs from ‘()’ and ‘⊥’, keeping in mind that ‘()’ has 
both an “interior” and “exterior”. Table 2-1 and definition 2.1.2 essentially define the 
PA. A1 and A2 each yield the value of one cell. The remaining four cells contain the 
string “A3”, which stands for either of the two paths proposed above: either invoke a 
new axiom, A3, or alter A2 to allow ‘⊥’ to be erased at will. Henceforth, I will take the 
latter course, so that A2 includes the four equalities in the cells labelled A3. The cell ‘⊥⊥ 
=⊥’ implies that strings consisting of iterated instances of ‘⊥’ all refer to the null formula. 
Once I define Boolean algebra (§3.3), it will be clear that Table 2-1 defines the corres-
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ponding Boolean arithmetic. A numerical interpretation of that arithmetic is that 1, 1−α, 
and α×β interpret (), (α) and αβ, respectively.15 
 
Table 2-1. 
Axiomatic PA operation table, 
With a numerical interpretation. 
1a. Juxtaposition  1b. Enclosure 
()() = ()      A1 
0×0 = 0 
⊥() = ()       A3 
1×0 = 0 
 (()) = ⊥       A2 
1−0 = 1 
()⊥ = ()       A3 
0×1 = 0 
⊥⊥ = ⊥       A3 
1×1 = 1 
 (⊥) = ()       A3 
1−1 = 0 
 
A1, A2, and Table 2-1 may appear trivial. However, in 3.3.2 we shall see that A1 and A2 
imply that B is a partially ordered set. Ordered sets are rich in mathematical (cf., e.g., 
Davey and Priestley: 2002) and logical (Curry 1963: chpt. 4) content. 
Table 2-1 implies that a pair of parentheses can serve as either an operator or an oper-
and. In a subformula of the form ‘⋅(⋅)⋅’, the parentheses can be seen as denoting a three-
place operator (functor), such that one or more of ‘⋅’ can be left blank. Leaving all three 
places blank takes us back to the boundary sign ‘()’, a primitive value and hence an 
operand. Sections 3 and 4 will say more about ‘()’ as operand and operator. In the PA, 
the distinction between operator and operand is purely contextual and has effectively 
degenerated, a situation to which LoF (p. 88) refers as the “partial identity of operator 
and operand.”16 Any notation proposed for the PA must do justice to this degeneration. 
I chose parentheses with this degeneracy uppermost in mind. 
Definitions 2.2.1, 2.2.2, and 2.2.4 lay out the principle use of Table 2-1, and the meaning 
of the symbol ‘=’. 
 
2.2.1. Definition. A step is any alteration of a formula justified by invoking the contents 
of a cell in Table 2-1. Steps are of two kinds: slimming and expansion. Let α be some PA 
formula. To replace ‘()()’ with ‘()’, or to erase an instance of ‘(())’ occurring in α is to slim 
α. To replace an instance of ‘()’ with ‘()()’, or to insert ‘(())’ anywhere in α, is to expand α. 
 
                                                          
15. Since the two cells in Table 2-1b form a dual pair (4.1.3), duality suggests that only one of 
these cells is strictly necessary. Another numerical interpretation of Table 2-1 is: ⊥⇔−1 < 
1⇔(), αβ ⇔ max(α,β) [min(α,β)], and (α) ⇔ −α. Obtain the dual (cf. §4.1) of this interprêt-
ation by interchanging the numerical interpretations of ⊥ and (), and applying the operation in 
square brackets. The dual of the interpretation in Table 2-1 is obtained by setting αβ ⇔ 
(α+β)−(α×β). A Boolean interpretation of the PA is: ()⇔1, ⊥⇔0, (α)⇔−α, and αβ⇔α∪β 
[α∩β]. In this case, A1 is 1∪1=1; A2, −1=0, 0∪1=1∪0=1, 0∪0=0, −0=1. Given this interprêt-
ation, A1 and A2 are (3b) and (7b) in Shannon (1938). For other arithmetical axiomatizations 
of Ba and sentential logic, see fn 82. 
16. LoF (p. 88) asserts that this partial identity characterizes Ba as well, albeit in disguised form. 
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A1 (A2) justifies the first (second) action mentioned in the last two sentences of 2.2.1. 
Slimming and expansion can be thought of as an inverse pair of operations, whose argu-
ments are formulae. 
 
2.2.2. Definition. To simplify a formula ‘α’ is to slim ‘α’ one or more times until the result 
is a member of B. That member is the value of ‘α’, denoted ‘|α|’.  
2.2.3. Algorithm. The following algorithm operationalises what is meant by simplifying 
the formula ‘α’ with greatest depth *dα : 
1. Go to the subspace of ‘α’ whose depth is *dα −1. 
2. IF this subspace pervades one or more sub-formulae of the form ‘()()’, THEN invoke 
A1 and replace every ‘()()’ with ‘()’. Repeat this step until only one ‘()’ is left. 
3. ELSE go to the subspace at depth *dα −2, which must pervade one or more sub-
formulae of the form ‘(())’. Invoke A2 and eliminate all instances of ‘(())’.  
4. IF what remains of α is ‘()’ or ’⊥’, THEN STOP. 
5. REPEAT 2 through 4, decrementing the depth of the subspace by 1 each time.17 
End of Algorithm 
Remark. The simplification of ‘α’ is the value of α when the algorithm 2.2.3 terminates. For 
more about on simplification and expansion see §2.3, specifically T3, T4, and the Hypo-
thesis of Simplification. 
 
I now define the symbol ‘=’ (the ’equal sign’) as follows: 
 
2.2.4. Definition. The string ‘α=β’, called an equation, signifies that the formulae ‘α’ and 
‘β’ have the same simplification and hence are equivalent.18 
 
Corresponding to the adjective ‘equivalent’ is the noun ‘equivalence.’ I revisit equival-
ence after 2.3.8. Following LoF, I denote equivalence by the mathematician’s common-
garden ‘=’. The equation ‘α=β’ implies nothing whatsoever about the literal appearance 
of ‘α’ and ‘β’. 
The semantics of the PA are an elusive aspect of LoF, and perhaps the greatest obstacle 
to a wider appreciation of BA. LoF leaves the PA uninterpreted, saying little more about 
the possible semantics of the PA than what can be found in the first few paragraphs of 
its Appendix II, barely hinting at what I say in §2.0 above. Could the degeneracy of the 
PA extend even to the distinction between syntax and semantics? Setting this possibly 
deep question aside, I intend by “semantics of the PA” no more than some asserted 
interpretation of the PA, defined as: 
 
2.2.5. Definition.  An interpretation of the PA is a one-to-one correspondence between B 
and another two-member set. 
 
                                                          
17. Compare this algorithm to that on p. 13 of LoF. After devising 2.2.3, I discovered the follow-
ing related definitions in Machover (1996): degree of complexity of a formula (§§7.1.7, 8.1.8), 
weight of a string (§§7.1.9, 8.2.1), parity of a formula (§8.8.3). 
18. Synonyms for ‘α=β’ include ‘α↔β’ (common in conventional logic), and ‘α?? β’ (Bostock 
1997: 36). 
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One such two-member set is {1,0}, containing the Boolean primitives in Table 2-1. Other 
possibilities include {V,Λ} (set theory), {top ‘T’, bottom ‘⊥’} (lattice theory), {True,False} 
(logic), and the everyday meaning of {On,Off}. Hehner (2004) even proposes the numer-
ical reading {∞,-∞}. I cannot claim that these minimalist semantics necessarily do justice 
to the philosophical intent of LoF. 
A Technical Digression on PA Semantics. 
Given some standard notions from mathematical logic, the following argument renders 
plausible interpreting ‘()’ and ‘(())’ as the classical bivalent truth values. Let the extension 
of an n-place atomic formula be the set of ordered n-tuples of individuals that satisfy it 
(i.e., for which it comes out true) (Carnap 1958: §10b). Let a sentential variable be a 0-
place atomic formula; its extension is a classical truth value by definition. An ordered 2-
tuple is known as an ordered pair, whose standard set theoretic definition is 〈a,b〉 =df  
{{a},{a,b}}, where a,b are individuals. Ordered n-tuples for any n>2 may be constructed 
from ordered pairs in a well-known recursive way (cf. Stoll 1963: §1.6). Dana Scott has 
argued (Bostock 1997: 83, fn 11, 12) that the extension of a sentential variable can also be 
seen as the empty ordered pair (ordered 0-tuple), {{},{}}, equal to {{}} by elementary set 
theory. Hence T interprets {{}}. Reading {} as F follows naturally, if the curly braces of set 
notation are given a boundary reading. 
One can go much further. Angell (1960) showed how to notate denial, conjunction, 
quantified variables, and set membership using only parentheses. Angell’s notation re-
quires setting A1 and A2 aside. Angell codes the first quantified variable as ‘()’, the sec-
ond as ‘()()’, and so on. Letting φ and ϕ be metalogical notation for formulae, the truth 
functional part of Angell’s notation is (φ) ⇔ ~φ and (ϕφ) ⇔ φ∧ϕ. The outer parentheses 
of (ϕφ) are needed only because of peculiarities of Angell’s notation for quantification 
and membership, not described here. Because his notation allows for set membership, 
Angell unwittingly showed that PA syntax suffices for set theory. Angell supplied no 
axioms or proof theory, as he only wished to show his notation capable of expressing 
the system of Quine (1951), whose primitives were the Sheffer stroke, universal quantifi-
cation, and set membership. 
2.3. PA: Canons and (Meta)theorems. 
“The more important structures of command are sometimes called canons. They are the ways in 
which the guiding injunctions appear to group themselves in constellations, and are thus by no 
means independent of each other. A canon bears the distinction of being outside (i.e., describing) 
the system under construction, but a command to construct (e.g., ‘draw a distinction’), even 
though it may be of central importance, is not a canon. A canon is an order, or set of orders, to 
permit or allow, but not to construct or create.”            LoF, p. 80. 
 “…the primary form of mathematical communication is not description but injunction… Music 
is a similar art form, the composer does not even attempt to describe the set of sounds he has in 
mind, much less the set of feelings occasioned through them, but writes down a set of commands 
which, if they are obeyed by the performer, can result in a reproduction, to the listener, of the 
composer’s original experience.”            LoF, p. 77. 
 
The Six Canons. 
LoF includes nine canons, which Spencer-Brown intended to serve mainly as injunctions, 
i.e., directives (see quote above). The PA canons and theorems establish protocols for al-
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tering, and reasoning about, PA formulae. They are about boundary algebra, hence meta-
mathematical. The PA is too elementary for logical/mathematical proof as conventional-
ly understood to apply to its formulae. In a sense, the canons and theorems stand in for 
the absent PA proof theory. 
As best as I can determine, the mathematical and philosophical literatures include no 
counterpart to LoF’s concept of canon. I list below the PA canons in the order in which 
they appear in LoF, referring to them by the names LoF gives them. In what follows, I 
have taken the liberty of replacing the LoF term “expression” by the term “formula.” 
Letting X be some word or phrase, any sentence below of the form “X is undefined” (or 
words to that effect) is shorthand for “LoF does not define X with the precision that 
generally characterizes mathematics, mathematical logic in particular.” 
Convention of Intention 
What is not allowed is forbidden. 
Remark: I trust no reader has so misunderstood my purpose as to take BA as a basis for 
political philosophy! 
Contraction of Reference 
Let injunctions be contracted to any degree in which they can still be followed. 
Remark: “Injunction”, “contract”, and “degree” are not defined. LoF (p. 8) states that this 
canon is shorthand for the following list of instructions: 
1. Write ‘()’ in some space. 
2. Mark ‘()’ with a name, eg, a. 
3. Let a be the name of ‘()’. 
4. Let the name a indicate ‘()’. 
Expansion of Reference 
Let any form of reference be divisible without limit. 
Remark: I take “form of reference” to mean “space or subspace” in the sense of 2.1.6, and 
“divisible without limit” to mean that divisions of a subspace in the sense of 2.1.7 can be 
created at will, using A1. More generally, this canon permits expanding a formula, with 
each step justified by A1 or A2. 
Convention of Substitution 
In any formula, any subformula can be replaced by an equivalent subformula. 
Remark: LoF wrote “arrangement” and “changed” where I write “subformula” and “re-
placed.” This canon is: 
• An important example of what is meant by a “step”; 
• The first LoF canon or theorem to mention “equivalent,” a term LoF does not discuss 
until 13 pages later. I shall revisit “equivalent” below when discussing T5-T7 and 
2.3.8. 
 
LoF distils the sense of 2.2.1–3 into the following canon: 
Hypothesis of Simplification 
Suppose the value of a formula, |α|, to be its simplification. 
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Remark. Thus LoF defines “simplification.” 
Rule of Dominance 
If a formula α shows a dominant value, then |α|=(). Otherwise, |α|=⊥. 
Remark: This canon introduces “dominant value” without defining it. 
 
The canons would seem to be assertions of the sort requiring proof; in fact, they are in-
formally motivated at best.19 The canons sometimes serve as definitions; e.g., the Hypo-
thesis of Simplification and the Rule of Dominance effectively define the value of a 
formula. Curiously, for a work of logic/mathematics, LoF contains only one sentence 
preceded by the word “definition”. That sentence, the third one in the body of LoF, sim-
ply reads: Distinction is perfect continence. What this sentence purports to define is less 
than obvious. §3.1 presents three more canons, bearing on the primary algebra. 
The Seven Meta-Theorems of the PA. 
2.3.1. Definition.  A theorem is metalinguistic statement asserted true because it is the 
last of an ordered finite sequence of metalinguistic statements known as an informal 
proof. 
 
All theorems about the BA are proved informally in the metalanguage, the academic 
dialect of contemporary written English, using devices that tacitly draw on the reader’s 
previous mathematical experience. (Those lacking such experience will find LoF and BA 
challenging.) An informal proof may draw on concepts that, strictly speaking, are not 
defined or proved within BA as of the point at which they are invoked. In particular, an 
informal proof relies strongly on natural language, and may invoke informal reasoning 
and mathematical concepts that are not part of BA. “Informal proof” is in contrast to 
“formal proof,” defined in the Precis. 
Following LoF, I number BA theorems consecutively, with the mth theorem denoted Tm. 
The proofs are freely adapted from LoF. 
Establishing Consistency 
2.3.2 (T1).  Any string composed of finite instances of ‘(‘ and ‘)’, and satisfying the 
formation rule 2.1.2, is a formula. 
Remarks. 
1. A formula must be finite in order for the algorithm 2.1.4 to terminate. 
2. I state T1 only out of loyalty to LoF; the formula formation rule 2.1.2 renders it 
unnecessary. T1 in LoF (p. 12) says that, starting from ‘()’, “any conceivable ar-
rangement” can be contructed by repeated application of A1 and A2. This version 
of T1 sounds trivial because it is predicated on LoF’s ‘ ’ notation, in which all 
possible strings are formulae. LoF does not articulate the operational meaning of 
“conceivable.” LoF (p. 22-24) unaccountably invokes T1 in the proofs of J1 and J2, 
to justify asserting that the only values a pa variable can take on are ‘()’ and ‘⊥’. 
                                                          
19. LoF (pp. 40-41) calls T14 and T15 ‘canons,’ thereby sowing terminological confusion. 
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2.3.3 (T2).  If any space pervades the formula ‘()’, the value indicated in the space is the 
marked state. Notation: ()α=(). 
Proof. If |α|=(), then ()α is ()(), which simplifies to () by A1. If |α|=⊥, then ()α 
simplifies to () by A2. ? 
 Remark. T2 is the PA version of the primary algebra consequence C3 (§3.1). LoF 
makes frequent use of T2, which arguably defines the “marked state.” 
2.3.4 (T3).  The simplification of a formula is unique. 
 Proof. Review the algorithm 2.2.3. This algorithm systematically reduces a formu-
la, starting from its greatest depth. Each step has only two possible outcomes: ()α 
or (()). By T2, ()α reduces to (); by A2, (()) can be erased. Given each outcome, the 
next step is unambiguous. Hence there is only one possible simplification. ? 
 Remarks. Let A be the set of all possible PA formulae. Simplification can be repre-
sented by the mapping f: A→B⊂A. T3 implies that f is a homomorphism (Halmos 
and Givant 1998: §27) and an isotone function (Rudeanu 1974: §11.3), whose fixed 
points are ‘()’ and ‘⊥’. 
2.3.5 (T4).  The value of a formula constructed by taking steps starting from a primitive 
value is that same primitive value. 
Proof. Let α be a formula constructed by taking steps starting with the primitive 
value x. The steps can be retraced back to x, so that x is a possible simplification of 
α. By T3, all possible simplifications of α must yield x, hence x is also the simplifi-
cation of α. Hence we can write |α|=x. ? 
Remark. T3 [T4] says that the value of a PA formula is invariant under simplifica-
tion [complication]. T3 and T4 together imply that every PA formula has a unique 
value. Hence the PA is consistent, and LoF refers to T1-T4 as the “theorems of 
consistency.” 
Procedural Theorems 
2.3.6 (T5).  Identical formulae express the same value. Notation: α=α. 
Proof. Use 2.2.3 to simplify the formula α to some member of B; call that member 
x. By T3, x exists and is unique. Hence α is equivalent to x, so that we write α=x. 
Beginning with x, we reverse each step in the simplification of α, recreating α. By 
T4, the value of this recreated α will also be x, so that we can write α=α. ? 
 Remark. The verb “express” in T5 is undefined. 
2.3.7 (T6).  Formulae having the same value can be equated. Notation: Let x∈B. If α=x 
and β=x, then α=β. 
Proof. Identical to the proof of T5, except that we proceed by steps from x to β 
rather than α, by reversing the simplification of β. ? 
Remark. T6 in effect means “if |α|=|β|, then α=β.” 
T7 requires some preliminary definitions. 
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2.3.8. Definition (Wolf 1998: §§6.1-2; Stoll 1974: §1.7).  Let A be a set. A binary relation R 
whose field is A is a subset of A×A. Hence R is a set whose members are all ordered 
pairs. The notation xRy denotes that the ordered pair (x,y) is a member of R. R is Euclidi-
an iff (aRc ∧ bRc) → (aRb). R is an equivalence relation iff ∀a,b,c∈A, (aRa)∈R (R is reflexive), 
aRb ↔ bRa (symmetric), and (aRb ∧ bRc) → aRc (transitive). If R is an equivalence relation 
whose field is A, an equivalence class is a set A*⊂A, such that ∀x,y∈A*, xRy comes out 
true.20 
 
2.3.9 (T7).  Formulae equivalent to the same formula are equivalent to one another. 
Notation: if α=ν and β=ν, then α=β. 
 Proof. Let |ν|=e. Then |α|=e and |β|=e, by hypothesis. Now simplify α to e, 
then retrace the simplification of β, starting from e and ending with β. Since by T3 
and T4, no allowed step alters value, |α|=|β|, so that α=β. ? 
Remark. T7 is T6 with ν replacing x. T7 can be recast as “the relation of logical 
equivalence is Euclidian.” LoF invokes T7 repeatedly, but invokes T5 and T6 only 
to prove the pa initials J1 and J2. 
 
I now invoke a result from the logic of relations.  
 
2.3.10. Theorem. R is an equivalence relation iff R is reflexive and Euclidian. 
Proof. Even though the proof is neither long nor difficult, I relegate it to A.2 as it em-
ploys features of BA not yet explained. 
 
Let A in 2.3.8 be the set of all possible PA formulae, and let R be logical equivalence, ‘=’. 
Then ‘=’ is reflexive (by T5) and Euclidian (by T7). Hence by 2.3.10, ‘=’ is an equivalence 
relation. T3 says that logical equivalence partitions A into two equivalence classes, each 
corresponding to an element of B. Hence T3 is but an instance of the very well-known 
result that an equivalence relation partitions its field into equivalence classes (Wolf 1998: Th. 
6.6). Let [α] denote the equivalence class of which α is a member. T4 can then be restated 
more formally as: ∀α∈A, there exists a one-to-many relation g: B→A, corresponding to 
expansion, such that [f(g(f(α)))] = [f(α)] = [α]. When one of True or False interprets ‘()’, 
‘=’ denotes logical equivalence. 
I denote equivalence by ‘⇔’ when one or both formulae linked by ‘⇔’ are not BA formu-
la. The sign ‘⇔’ is part of the metalanguage, and two formulae linked by ‘⇔’ form a 
sequent, a metalinguistic term. More generally, ‘⇔’ can be thought of as indicating a 
translation from one syntax to another. 
 
2.3.11. Recapitulation. The primary arithmetic (abbreviated PA) is a very elementary 
formal system whose primitive basis (cf. Précis) consists of: 
• The symbols ‘(‘, ‘)’, ‘⊥’, and ‘=’; 
                                                          
20. A slightly more general definition of relation goes as follows. If A,B are sets, a binary rela-
tion is a subset of A×B and its field is A∪B. The term Euclidian honors the first of Euclid’s 
“common notions” (Eves 1990: 35). Introductory logic texts usually do not mention relations; 
exceptions include Carnap (1958: §§29-38) and Suppes (1957: chpt. 10-11; 1960: chpt. 3). 
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• The operator-operand ‘()’, which can have itself as argument, resulting in the formu-
la (()). The defined constant ⊥ is a synonym for (()); 
• ‘()’ and the blank page as primitive values; 
• The definitions of a formula (2.1.2) and the null formula ‘⊥’ (2.1.8), and the algo-
rithms for verifying (2.1.4) and simplifying (2.2.3) formulae; 
• Table 2-1, taken as axiomatic; 
• Six procedural “canons”; 
• Equivalence of formulae, an equivalence relation by virtue of T5 and T7, denoted by 
infix ‘=’. Two formulae linked by ‘=’ form an equation. 
The PA is sound by virtue of T1-T4; its intended interpretation is Boolean arithmetic. 
3. The Primary Algebra (pa): Syntax. 
“It is… valuable to meditate on algebraic notation; the whole of the formal and symbolic part, 
having gradually broken away and developed immensely, is of great interest.” 
  Paul Valéry, quoted in Le Lionnais (1948: 10).21 
At any point in a PA formula, one can insert a marker that can take on either primitive 
value. Latin letters, termed (sentential) variables, will serve as such markers. The set of 
possible values a variable can assume is its domain; the domain of a pa variable is B. 
Thus the primary algebra (hereinafter abbreviated pa, by analogy with the abbreviation 
PA for the primary arithmetic) is born. Like the PA, the pa consists of formulae and 
equations, and includes canons, rules, and theorems. We begin by setting out the pa 
symbols: 
 
3.0.1. Definition. The notation of the pa consists of proper and improper symbols. The 
proper symbols are: 
• The PA proper symbols  ‘(‘, ‘)’; 
• Lower case Latin letters, ‘a’, ‘b’, etc., often called statement letters or sentential variables. 
A letter may have a positive integer subscript, so that the number of possible varia-
bles is denumerable. 
The improper symbols are ‘⊥’, the prime ‘′’, and the ellipsis ‘…’ combined with the sub-
script i ranging over some range of the positive integers. Improper symbols are merely 
convenient notational shorthand. Symbols are concatenated into formulae: 
 
3.0.2. Definition. The recursive definition of a pa formula is identical to 2.1.2, except that 
the atomic formulae include any single Latin letter. 
 
Definitions similar to 3.0.2, e.g., Bostock (1997: 21), are standard in the literature. 
Synonyms for formula include well-formed formula (wff) and schema (Quine 1982: 33). 
Because ‘()’ is an atomic formula, 3.0.2 implies that a PA formula is also a pa formula. 
The pairing rule for parentheses, and the algorithm 2.1.4, both hold in the pa as well as 
in the PA. A non-obvious implication of 3.0.2 is that inserting a string of Latin letters 
into a PA formula results in a pa formula. Subformulae, proper and otherwise, are de-
fined by obvious analogy with 2.1.3. Informally speaking, a subformula is any “part of” 
                                                          
21. From a letter to Pierre Honnorat, dated February 1932. The translation is mine. 
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a pa formula that is itself a formula. An atomic formula has no proper subformulae 
other than ‘⊥’, which is a proper subformula of all formulae other than itself. 
In this paper, ‘ =df ’ is part of the metalanguage and serves to define a new notation or 
concept. Let the string x contain an instance of some new symbol, and let the string y 
contain only familiar symbols. The notation ‘x =df  y’ defines the new symbol by assert-
ing that the strings x and y, however they differ in appearance, have the same meaning 
by definition. Let a, b, and r be pa formulae. I now define the improper symbols the 
prime, ‘′’, the ellipsis ‘…’, and the letter i subscript as follows: 
 
a′ =df  (a) ai… =df   a1a2…        1 2ia a a′ ′ ′=df… …          (air)… =df  (a1r)(a2r)…   
 
‘a′’ is nothing more than a synonym for ‘(a)’, in which case ‘a’ is said to be primed. Using 
‘a′’ in place of ‘(a)’ is purely a matter of convenience and aesthetics. The letter i subscript 
and the ellipse always appear in tandem. The improper symbols are not mentioned in 
3.0.2, and hence play no essential role in the syntax of the pa. Foremost among the 
virtues of the pa is its succinct syntax. The notation I propose for BA is more compact 
than that of LoF and requires only standard typographic symbols. 
Observant readers will have noticed that thus far, I have enclosed symbols and formulae 
between single quotation marks. I have done so hoping to steer clear of Quine’s bête 
noire: metadiscourse confusing use of a symbol with the mention thereof. Henceforth, I 
will rely on the following general rule, adapted from Conventions (I) and (II) in Suppes 
(1957: 125-26): all symbols and formulae from BA and conventional logic are to be taken as 
names of themselves. I deferred invoking this convenient rule until the syntax of BA was 
fully set out. 
3.1.  Consequences, Canons, Theorems. 
 “Algebra is a science of the eye.” Peirce (1.34).22 
 
3.1.1. Definition. T (true) and F (false) are the possible truth values. A statement is an 
object language formula, or piece of metalinguistic discourse, that can be assigned a 
truth value. 
Remark. An individual sentential variable is a trivial statement. The last paragraph of 
§4.0 operationalises the assignment of truth values to pa statements. 
 
3.1.2. Definition. An n-ary truth functor [or functor when ‘truth’ can be omitted without 
ambiguity] is a symbol combining n statements into a single statement (Bostock 1997: 
§2.2; Quine 1982: §§20, 45). A connective [operator] is a truth functor such that n≥2 [1]. () 
and ⊥ are 0-ary functors by convention.23 
                                                          
22. Sylvester wrote “mathematics” not “algebra” (Ewald 1996: 515), but Peirce’s misquotation is 
nonetheless apt. 
23. “A functor is a sign that attaches to one or more expressions of a given grammatical kind or 
kinds, to produce an expression of a given grammatical kind. [A functor] is grammatical in 
import but logical in habitat…” (Quine 1982: 129). ‘Statement’ is the only grammatical kind 
that concerns us here. ‘Functor’ in Carnap (1958: §18) denotes what other authors call a “first 
order logic operator.” I do not employ ‘functor’ in this sense. 
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Truth functors, such as ~, →, ∧, ∨, and ↔, make up the core of the CTV. BA consists of 
one unary functor, enclosure by parentheses, and one binary functor, juxtaposition. 
Table 4-2 gives BA translations of the usual CTV truth functors. 
 
3.1.3. Definition. An atomic valuation assigns a member of B to each of the n sentential 
variables appearing in a formula. Equivalently, an atomic valuation maps these n sen-
tential variables into a member of Bn. 
 
The PA definition of equation, 2.2.4, carries over to the pa, mutatis mutandis. 
 
3.1.4. Definition. If α evaluates to () or ⊥ for a given atomic valuation, that valuation 
satisfies α, and α is satisfiable. If all 2n possible atomic valuations satisfy α in the same 
way, then α and the equation α=() [or α=⊥] are both tautologies. If α↔β is a tautology, α 
and β are tautologically equivalent so that we may write α=β. 
 
The definition of tautology in 3.1.4 differs from the standard one, which defines a tautol-
ogy as a formula evaluating to T for all possible atomic valuations. α=β says nothing 
about the truth value of α or β taken in isolation. It does say that, given any atomic valu-
ation, α and β have the same value. Translating ‘=’ as ‘↔’ assumes that the biconditional 
can be seen as an equivalence relation. This is indeed the case; see §A.5. On occasion, I 
will refer to an equation as a tautology; strictly speaking, this is an abus de language. 
The preceding can be put a bit more formally. Let ℵ be the set of possible PA formulae, 
and let f be the simplification function defined in 2.2.3. T3 and T4 assure us that f maps 
every member of ℵ uniquely onto one of () or ⊥. We can then say the following about f: 
• The image of ℵ under f is B; 
• f is order preserving; 
• f partitions ℵ into two equivalence classes. 
The pa is a bit more complicated. Let A be the set of possible pa formulae. Letting the 
domain of f be A, f then partitions A into two non-empty subsets. The subset of A whose 
image under f is () or ⊥ consists of tautologous formulae; the complement of that subset 
consists of satisfiable formulae. 
I now turn to proof and related notions, beginning with the following definitions. 
 
3.1.5. Definition. A consequence is a tautological equivalence. An initial is a consequence 
proved via a decision procedure; hence an initial is a PA theorem. A demonstration 
formally verifies (“proves”) a consequence that is not an initial. 
 
A decision procedure can verify any consequence. The LoF decision procedure is expos-
ited in §5.1 and named truth value analysis (TVA). An initial is not an axiom, but can be 
invoked just like an axiom or consequence. Again, A1 and A2 in §2.2 are the only pa 
axioms. In conformity with standard mathematical practice, a demonstration consists of 
a sequence of steps, each relying on one or more BA axioms and theorems (especially the 
initials), canons, the rules of substitution/replacement (3.1.7-8), and consequences 
already proved. I revisit the notion of demonstration in §5.0 and the Precis. 
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Each step in a demonstration is justified by an annotation, enclosed in square brackets 
and formatted as follows: 
 α [annotation] = β [another annotation]. 
If a step requires more than one consequence, these and the substitutions they may 
require are listed sequentially, separated by semicolons. If a step includes a rearrange-
ment of subformulae, ‘OI’ annotates that fact. If symbols appearing in α are absent from 
β, I indicate that fact by underlining the relevant parts of α. If β contains subformulae 
absent from α, the additions to α are shown in bold. When a subformula in α is moved 
or copied to a greater or lesser depth in β, the part of β that is freshly moved or copied is 
also printed in bold. 
LoF numbers the initials and consequences consecutively, as is the case for theorems, 
using a letter (initials begin with J, consequences with C) followed by an integer. I adopt 
this system to facilitate cross-references to LoF.24 The LoF initials are: 
 
3.1.6. J1. (a′a) = ⊥  J2. ((ar)(br)) = (a′b′)r 
 
Verifying J1 is trivial. J2 is an easy instance of truth value analysis (§5.1). 
 
3.1.7. Theorem. J1 and J2 are tautological equivalences. 
Proof: 
J1: Let a=(). Then the lhs of J1 is ((())()) [A2] = (()) [A2] = ⊥. Now let a=⊥, so that the lhs of 
J1 becomes ((⊥)⊥) [A2] = (()) [A2] = ⊥. By T1, () and ⊥ are the only possible values of a. 
Hence J1 always holds. 
J2: By T2, α()=() for any formula α. Begin by setting r=(), in which case the lhs of J2 
evaluates to ((a())(b())) [T2,2x] = ((())(())) [A2,2x] = (). The rhs evaluates to (a′b′)() [T2] = (). 
If r=⊥, then simply erase r from J2. Both sides of J2 then amount to the same thing, 
namely (a′b′), for all possible values of a and b. By T1, () and ⊥ are the only possible val-
ues of r. Hence J2 always holds. ? 
Remark. This proof is, in all essentials, a truth value analysis. An immediate consequence 
of J1 is that the formula (α′α), α being any subformula, can be inserted at will anywhere. 
By repeated application of J1, the maximum depth of a formula can be increased at will, 
without affecting its value under any atomic valuation. 
 
In section 5, I argue that a trivial variant of J1, namely a′a=() which I call J0, is a bit more 
natural than J1. See A.1 for a demonstration of J0 from J1 and J2. Henceforth, I deem 
a′ab=() and (a′ab) = ⊥ to be instances of J0 and J1, respectively. Doing so largely renders 
C3 redundant. 
LoF demonstrates the nine consequences, C1-C9. I list them below, restated in the nota-
tion of this paper, with some indication of how they prove useful in LoF: 
                                                          
24. I number consequences as in LoF, even when I treat an LoF initial as a consequence or vice 
versa, as I am wont to do in §5.2 and later. LoF, Bricken, and Kauffman, following PM (p. 
xii), give Latinate names to the initials and consequences. I decline to follow their example, as 
the names they propose are not mnemonic. 
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Table 3-1. The Nine LoF Consequences. 
  How employed in LoF 
C1 ((a)) =df  (a′) = a Invoked in many demonstrations. 
C2 (ba)a = b′a            “ 
C3 ()a = () Algebraic form of T2. 
C4 (a′b)a = a Helps demonstrate C5. 
C5 aa = a Algebraic form of A1. Helps prove T13. 
C6 (a′b′)(a′b) = a Helps demonstrate C9. 
C7 ((a′b)c) = (ac)(b′c) Helps prove T14; crucial for normal form. 
C8 (a′r′)(b′r′) = ((ab)r′) Syntactic dual of J2. Invoked in the LoF 
 demonstration of C9 and proof of T15.  
C9 ((a′r′)(b′r)) = (ar′)(br) Helps prove T17. 
 
The purpose of C7 will become clearer in §4.4. C8 is the dual of J2 (cf. §4.1) and by 4.1.4, 
requires no demonstration; it also finds no application in this paper. C9 above is simpler 
than its LoF equivalent, because the simpler form suffices to prove T17, the only use LoF 
and this paper have for C9. For a CTV interpretation of J1-C9, see Table 4-3. 
pa: Canons. 
The pa features three canons in addition to the PA canons described in §2.3. As before, I 
deviate from the LoF wording of the pa canons in an attempt to reduce their Zennish 
ambiguity and enhance their perspicuity. 
 
Principle of relevance 
If a property is common to every indication, it need not be indicated. 
Remark. Could this be worded: “That which characterises everything distinguishes no-
thing”? 
Principle of transmission 
Let α be a sub-formula of the formula β, and let a be a variable appearing in α. Let the 
depth, relative to β, of α [a] be dβ(α) [dβ(α)+1]. When the value of a changes, the value of α either changes or does not change. If it changes, the pervasive subspace of α is said to 
be transparent relative to a. Otherwise, the pervasive subspace is opaque. 
Remark. The wording of this Principle differs from that in LoF, if only by employing 
“sub-formula” and “depth.” This canon is also closely linked to T16. 
Rule of demonstration 
A demonstation rests in a finite number of steps. 
Remark. Why did LoF say “rests in” rather than “consists of”? On “demonstration” and 
“steps,” consult §5.0 and the Précis. Chapter 11 of LoF shows how formulae with infinite 
depth may violate T1-T4. I do not elaborate on this, nor do I explore formulae with 
infinitely many symbols but finite depth, as I wish to steer clear of all infinities and Can-
torian paradoxes. 
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pa: Substitution 
“…there is [no] need for any other kind of proof than one which depends on the substitution of 
equivalents.”                 Leibniz.25 
An equational formal system is one whose axioms and consequences consist of pairs of 
formulae linked by equality, denoted by ‘=’. The inference rules for an equational sys-
tem are the substitutivity of equivalents, R1 below, and the uniform replacement of subformu-
lae by subformulae, R2 below. LoF (p. 26) states that “[R1 and R2] are commonly accepted 
as implicit in the use of the sign ‘=’.” Hence BA is equational, as is nearly all of mathe-
matics, with conventional numerical algebra being paradigmatically so. The vast majori-
ty of extant formal logics, on the other hand, are ponential, so-called because their 
fundamental inference rule is modus ponens (cf. §5.3).26 R1 and R2 are 3.1.7 and 3.18 
below. In the interest of clarity, I restate these rules in a manner that deviates somewhat 
from LoF. As always, Greek letters are a metalogical device. 
 
3.1.7. R1, Substitution. Let α〈ε〉 denote that the sub-formula ε appears at least once in 
the formula α. Let φ be a formula such that φ=ε. Let α〈φ//ε〉 be the formula 
formed by substituting φ for any (possibly 0) instance of ε in α. Then φ=ε → 
α〈ε〉=α〈φ//ε〉. 
Proof (adapted from Mendelson 1997: Prop. 1.4). The contribution of a subformula ε to 
the truth value of any formula α containing ε is fully determined by the truth value of ε. 
Hence the truth value of α is not affected by replacing ε by φ, whose truth value, by 
assumption, is identical to that of ε. ? 
Remark. α need not be a tautology but if it is, α〈φ//ε〉 is also a tautology. LoF (p. 26) does 
not prove R1, instead justifying it as an algebraic version of the PA Convention of Sub-
stitution, and as an “inference from” T1-T4. Because R1 is essentially Leibniz’s “identity 
of indiscernables,” R1 and the reflexivity of ‘=’ suffice to show that ‘=’ is an equivalence 
relation (Kneebone 1963: §4.1).  Some authors refer to R1 as the “substitutivity of the bi-
conditional or of equivalents.” R1 also answers to the familiar “substitution of equals for 
equals” of numerical algebra.27 
 
                                                          
25. Letter to Placcius dated 16.11.1687, translated and quoted in Ishiguro (1990: 17). 
26. Curry’s (1963: §2.D.1) relational-assertional dichotomy inspired the equational-ponential di-
chotomy. A relational system consists of formulae linked by an unspecified dyadic relation; if 
that relation is an equivalence relation, the system is equational in the sense of Curry. Curry 
contrasted relational to assertional, by which he meant a system characterized by formulae 
prefixed by the syntactic turnstile, for him the defining aspect of conventional logic. On equa-
tional logic, see also Meredith and Prior (1968). 
27. R1 also follows from ‘=’ being a congruence relation (Stoll 1963: 260). For other proofs of 
R1, see Quine (1982: 64), Mendelson (1997: Prop. 1.4), and Cori and Lascar (2000: Th. 1.24). 
After devising the ‘//’ notation, I encountered it in Simons (1987: 49). Quine (1982: 63f) re-
fers to Substitution as “interchange,” for which he proposes three laws, which I condense to 
two: (1) R1 holds if ‘↔’ replaces ‘=’, and (2) R1 preserves (in)equivalence, (un)satisfiability, 
(non)validity, and (non)implication. On ‘↔’ and ‘=’, see fn 18. A version of R1 is crucial to 
the system of Cole (1968). 
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3.1.8. R2, Replacement. Let α〈v〉 be a tautology. Let α〈ω/v〉 be the formula formed by 
replacing every instance of v in α〈v〉 by the formula ω (v and ω are not necessarily 
equivalent). Then α〈v〉=α〈ω/v〉. 
Proof (adapted from Mendelson 1997: Prop. 1.3). By definition, the value of a tautology is 
not affected by the value of any (or all) of its statement letters. Hence any statement let-
ter v can be replaced by some formula ω (with a value under any interpretation) without 
affecting the value of α, as long as this replacement applies to every instance of v. Hence 
R2 follows from α〈v〉 being a tautology. ? 
Remark. Stoll (1974: 124) refers to the result of applying R2 as an instance, making possi-
ble the following concise rewording of R2: “a tautology yields tautologous instances.” 
Thanks to R2, all letters appearing in pa consequewnces can be taken as schematic var-
iables; all consequences are schemata. Most formal systems dispense with Replacement 
by simply taking their axioms and theorems as schemata from the outset. Some authors 
refer to Replacement as (variable) ‘Substitution’.28 
 
R1 and R2 warrant close scrutiny in light of the careful treatment of Substitution by 
other authors. The reader should also ponder why R1 says “any” while R2 says “every”. 
LoF explicitly invokes R1 and R2 only in the “pedantic” demonstration of C1 and the 
worked examples on pp. 44-47. In this paper, almost all use of R1 and R2 goes unre-
marked. But regardless of whether R1 and R2 are invoked tacitly or explicitly, the pa 
would be useless without them. 
Some pa Theorems. 
All PA theorems carry over to the pa; thus the pa inherits soundness and tautological 
equivalence from the PA. An additional 11 theorems, T8 through T18, bear on the pa on-
ly. I defer discussion of T14-T18 to §4.4. T8 and T9 merely restate J1 and J2. T10-T13 
generalize certain consequences: 
3.1.9. (T10). J2 generalizes to ((air)…) = ( ia′ …)r. 
T10 is needed only to prove T15. T11 and T12 are straightforward generalizations of C8 
and C9 that have no application in this paper and so are omitted. 
3.1.10 (T13). Let φ〈ε〉 be a formula containing one or more instances of the subformula ε, 
and let φ stand for φ〈ε〉 with all instances of ε erased. Then ε(φ〈ε〉)=ε(φ). 
Informal Proof.  Let the deepest instance of ε lie in depth k. Invoke C2 k-1x to create 
a copy of ε in each subspace of depth 1,…,k-1. One more instance of C2 then elim-
inates the instance of ε at depth k. Invoke to C5 to erase any multiple instances of 
ε at each of depths 1,…,k-1. Then invoke C2 k-1 times to undo the process des-
cribed in the second sentence of this paragraph. Doing so erases all instances of ε 
in φ〈ε〉. ? 
                                                          
28. LoF does not prove R2, instead asserting (p. 26): “R2 derives from the fact, proved with J1 
and J2, that we can find formulae, [equivalent yet not identical,] which, considered arithme-
tically, are not wholly revealed.” For other discussions of Replacement, see Prior (1962: 24-
25), Quine (1982: 44), Bostock (1997: §2.5.D), Halmos and Givant (1998: §§13, 36), Wolf 
(1998: 86-7), and Cori and Lascar (2000: Cor. 1.23). Replacement is also a commonplace of 
ponential logic, as it preserves satisfiability and implication (Carnap 1958: T7-1). 
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Remarks. 
1. T13 nicely generalizes C2 and is an example of a theorem schema. A formal proof of 
T13 would require induction on formula depth. Bricken (2002) was the first to 
propose T13 in this form, naming it Pervasion. 
2. Viewing a formula as an ordered tree, any two instances of any subformula can be 
seen as connected by a path. A path is monotone if all parentheses crossed along the 
path are of one type, left or right. Repeated application of C2 allows ε to be copied 
into, or erased from, any subspace of φ whose depth exceeds that of ε, as long as a 
monotone path connects ε and its copy. 
 
3.2.  Tacit Order Irrelevance. 
“The spatial relations of written symbols on a two dimensional writing surface can be employed 
in far more diverse ways than the mere following and preceding in one-dimensional time, and 
this facilitates the apprehension of that to which we wish to direct our attention. In fact, simple 
sequential ordering in no way corresponds to the diversity of of logical relations through which 
thoughts are interconnected.”                Frege (1882: 87). 
 “…commutation…may be dispensed with by not recognizing any order of arrangement as signi-
ficant. Associative transformations…will be dispensed with in the same way…” 
Peirce (4.374, 1902). 
We may think of a and b in the pa formula ab as linked by a tacit connective called juxta-
position, even though no explicit symbol separates a from b. Because this connective has 
been merely tacit thus far, I have said nothing about it. In particular, I have not assumed 
it commutative or associative, or restricted its scope to the binary. Nor have I assumed 
that the order or grouping of variables within a pa formula affects its value. I now show 
how the properties of the PA imply that variable order and binary scope are indeed ir-
relevant for juxtaposition. Let α, β, and γ be arbitrary pa formulae. Then: 
• αβ commutes. This is a trivial implication of Table 2-1a. I became aware of the need 
for a broader axiomatic treatment of ⊥ when attempting to justify why juxtaposition 
commutes. More generally, all objects within a given subspace can be reordered at 
will. Hence a formula can be rearranged so that any multiple instances of a subform-
ula in a given subspace can be juxtaposed. By virtue of C5, these multiple instances 
reduce to a single one. Hence a BA formula behaves not only like a list, as in section 
2, but also like a set.29 
• αβγ associates. () and ⊥ are the possible values that α, β, and γ can each take on. (By T3 
and T4, α, β, and γ can each stand for any formulae whatsoever.) Then the value of 
αβγ is the value of a PA formula that is some concatenation of () and ⊥. According to 
Table 2-1a or T2, this concatenation simplifies to () if at least one of α, β, and γ has 
value (); otherwise, it simplifies to ⊥. Now T3 assures us that the simplification of 
any pa formula is unique. Hence the simplification of αβγ cannot depend in any way 
on the order in which α, β, and γ are paired. Associativity explains why the BA has 
no need for bracketing, thus freeing up brackets for another use. 
                                                          
29. Peirce’s (4.372-584, 1902) logical graphs, discussed in section 6 below, clearly illustrate the 
irrelevance of order and grouping for the CTV. The first thorough treatment of modern logic, 
Frege (1879), also featured a two dimensional notation. 
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From the preceding, I conclude that the variables and sub-formulae that make up any 
formula may be reordered at will. LoF fully acknowledges this useful and important 
fact, but does not sufficiently highlight it. Juxtaposition indeed commutes and associ-
ates, but this fact should not be seen as a fundamental mathematical property. Rather, it 
merely offsets a metalinguistic typographic convention. All this merely restates in a bit 
of algebraic dress what I asserted about the BA at the beginning of section 2. 
Using parentheses to denote an algebraic operation would appear to have two draw-
backs. First, parentheses are already widely employed in mathematics, e.g., to denote or-
dered pairs and open intervals. Second, parentheses now cannot serve as brackets, i.e., 
as devices for resolving ambiguity in formulae or for overriding operator precedence. 
But the discussion in this section shows that the pa is free of all ambiguity arising from 
infix notation (a defect of the conventional notation for both logic and Boolean algebra). 
Hence the pa requires neither parentheses for grouping nor the notion of operator prece-
dence.30 Any ambiguity arising from expressions that mix the pa and conventional 
mathematical or logical notation (and I do not wish to rule out such expressions) can be 
resolved by square brackets, ‘[‘ and ‘]’. Since the comma plays no role in BA, I trust that 
the notations (x,y), denoting the ordered pair consisting of x and y, and [x,y]={t|x≤t≤y}, 
denoting a closed interval, are free of ambiguity. 
That ‘()’ appears to have a two-sided “exterior” is a drawback of my preferred notation. 
The following geometric analogy may clarify this. Fold a circle upon itself along any dia-
meter. The two resulting half circles will coincide, meaning that a circle is symmetric 
about any line going through its diameter. Now carry out this same exercise on ‘()’. 
Although ‘()’ is not a regular polygon, it definitely has a geometric centre. But the only 
lines through that centre that preserve folding symmetry are the two lines parallel to the 
Cartesian axes. 
Moral: A boundary can be thought of as a circle, because a circle appears the same from 
all angles. I intend “circle” as a metaphor, to suggest that a formula mixing statement 
variables and boundaries commutes and associates. The sign ‘()’, not being symmetric 
from all perspectives, regrettably does not highlight this key property of boundaries. 
3.3.  From Anti-Symmetry to Boolean Algebra via Lattices. 
(N.B. The axiomatization of lattice theory proposed below is not fully satisfactory, but is not in-
voked elsewhere in this paper.) 
“When logically analyzed, order turns out to be… inconceivable and incomprehensible to us 
unless we had the idea… expressed by the term ‘negation’. Thus it is that negation, which is 
always also something intensely positive, not only aids us in giving order to life, and in finding 
order in the world, but logically determines the very essence of order.“       Royce (1917: 540) 
I now modify the definition of an equivalence relation (2.3.8) in a crucial way. 
 
3.3.1. Definition. Let A be a set with typical members a and b. Let an infix ‘=’ denote an 
equivalence relation whose field is a superset of A and whose intended reading is 
‘equality.’ Let aRb denote a reflexive and transitive binary relation whose field is A. If 
                                                          
30. Polish notation dispenses with brackets by writing truth functors in prefix form. Is the persist-
ence of infix notation a form of path dependence? 
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(aRb ∧ bRa) → a=b, the relation R is anti-symmetric and a partial ordering. In this case, R is 
distinct from = and we write a≤b. R is said to partially order A, and A is a partially ordered 
set (poset). 
 
Equivalence relations and partial orderings are both reflexive and transitive, and recur 
in mathematical logic and foundational mathematics. (The only relation in common use 
that is neither reflexive nor transitive is set membership itself.) Equivalence relations are 
also symmetric, but a partial ordering is anti-symmetric, meaning that symmetry holds 
only for those members of A that are also members of some equivalence class under 
equality, ‘=’. Anti-symmetry does not require that a≤b be defined for all ordered pairs 
(a,b). If one or both of a≤b or b≤a is the case, then a and b are comparable. If any two 
members of A are comparable, then A is linear or totally ordered. Th. 3.3.2 is an important 
reason why partial order is of interest: 
 
3.3.2. Theorem. B is partially ordered, in two ways. 
Proof. Case 1. Let (a)b ⇔ a≤b and true ⇔ (). Then ⊥≤() ⇔ (⊥)() [A2] = ()() [A1] = (). 
Case 2. Let (a(b)) ⇔ a≤b and true ⇔ (()). Then ()≤⊥ ⇔ (()(⊥)) [A2] = (()()) [A1] = (()). ? 
 
3.3.2., whose proof requires merely A1 and A2, grounds much of the mathematical sub-
stance of BA/Ba. I will not elaborate on this substance much beyond what I say in this 
section and in §4.1. Posets have a rich mathematical structure, beginning with the next 
three definitions. 
 
3.3.3. Definition (Machover 1996: 4.2.23). Let ≤ partially order the set A, and let B⊆A. If 
∀x[x∈B ∧ x≤a] holds for some a∈A, then a is an upper bound of B. If b is an upper bound 
of B such that b≤a, where a is any upper bound of B, then b is the least upper bound of B. 
Replacing ‘≤’ in the preceding three sentences by ‘≥’ requires changing upper to lower 
and least to greatest. 
 
The syntax of lattices is very simple. Let Latin letters range over some poset L. Let α and 
β be formulae. A lattice features two binary operations, concatenation, denoted 'αβ', and 
enclosure, denoted '[αβ]'. 
  
3.3.4a. Definition (Donnellan 1968: 49). L is a lattice if ab denotes one of the pair (least 
upper bound, greatest lower bound) of a and b, and [ab] denotes the other member of the 
pair. 
 
Note that a matched pair of ‘[‘ and ‘]’ simply toggles from one lattice operation to the 
other. Corresponding the set theoretic definition 3.3.4a is the algebraic definition: 
 
3.3.4b. Definition. A lattice is an algebra 〈L,⋅⋅,[⋅⋅]〉 of type 〈2,2〉 such that ∀α,β∈L, the 
axioms in Table 3-2 hold. 
 
If ab is the meet of a and b, then [ab] is their join, and vice versa. 3.3.4a can be derived 
from 3.3.4b, and conversely (Donnellan 1968: §8). While the underlying algebraic con-
cepts are standard, the notation and terminology in 3.3.4b, and the axioms L1 and L2 are 
new. The conventional axiomatization of lattices is OI and L3a-b. 
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Table 3-2. Lattice Axioms. 
L0 Closure ∀a,b∈L, ab∈L and [ab]∈L. 
OI Order Irrelevance Concatenation commutes and associates. 
L1 Involution [[ab]] = ab. 
L2 Duality a = b iff [a] = [b]. 
L3a Absorption a[ab] = a. 
L3b    “ [a[ab]] = a. 
 
The idempotence of concatenation, L4, follows immediately from L3a-b: 
 
L4a: aa=a. Dem. aa [L3b] = a[a[aa]] [L3a] = a. 
L4b: [aa]=a. Dem: [aa] [L3b] = [a[a[aa]]] [L3b] = a. ? 
A trivial corollary of L4 is [a] [L4a] = [aa] [L4b] = a. 
 
[a[ab]] = a [L2] ↔ [[a[ab]]] = [a] [L1; ] ↔ a[ab] = a. ? 
 
A lattice L is bounded iff L has two distinct members called bounds, denoted ⊥ and T and 
governed by the axiom: 
 
L5: Ta = T ↔ [⊥a] = ⊥. [Ta] = T ↔ ⊥a = ⊥. 
 
L5 is equivalent to ∀a∈L, ⊥≤a≤T. ⊥ is the least element of L; T is the corresponding greatest 
element. 
 
Now let enclosure by ‘(‘ and ‘)’ denote complementation as in the BA, with (a)=a′ denoting 
the complement of a. Let the members of L include ⊥ and T. We can the define: 
 
3.3.5. Definition. A bounded lattice L is complemented iff: 
• L is closed under complementation; 
• For all a∈L, the following axioms hold: 
L6.  (a)a=T. 
L7.  ⊥=(T) and (⊥)=T. 
 
The next theorem shows how L5 is redundant in the presence of L6 and L7. 
 
3.3.6. Theorem. A complemented lattice is bounded. 
Proof. Ta [L6] = (a)aa [L4] = (a)a [L6] = T. 
[⊥a] [L7; L6] = [(a′a)a] [L3a] = [(a′a)[a(a′a)]] [OI] = [(a′a)[(a′a)a]] [L3b] = [(a′a)] [L6; 
L7] = [⊥] [L4] = ⊥. ? 
[⊥a] [L7; L6] = [⊥a[a⊥]] (a′a)a] [L3a] = [(a′a)a[a(a′a)]] [OI] = [(a′a)[(a′a)a]] [L3b] = 
[(a′a)] [L6; L7] = [⊥] [L4] = ⊥. ? 
Remark. The converse of 3.3.6 does not hold; a bounded lattice is not necessarily comple-
mented. 
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3.3.7. Definition. A distributive lattice obeys the axiom: 
L8.  a[bc] = [[ab][ac]]. 
 
3.3.8. Definition. A Boolean algebra is a complemented and distributive lattice (Donnel-
lan 1968: §27). 
 
3.3.9. Theorem. The pa is a complemented distributive lattice and hence a Ba. 
Proof.31 Let L=B, ()=T, and let (a′b′) in the pa translate lattice meet and ab join. (The oppo-
site translation is equally valid. In §4.1, we shall see that (a′b′) and ab constitute a dual 
pair.) I now verify that the pa satisfies L0−L8. 
L0. pa concatenation and enclosure always yield a pa formula (T1). A pa formula has a 
simplification (T3), and that simplification is necessarily a member of B. 
OI. pa concatenation commutes and associates in precisely the way lattice concatenation 
does. 
L1. ((ab))=ab is an instance of C1. 
L2. ab=cd iff (ab)=(cd) follows from the demonstration of C2, C3 in §A.5. 
L5. [⊥a] ⇔ ((⊥)a) [A2] = (()a) [C3] = ⊥. 
L7. If T⇔(), L7 is simply A2. 
 
Table 3-3. Completing the Proof of 3.3.9. 
 ab ⇔ ab ab ⇔ (a′b′) 
L3 ab=a ⇔ b≤a. (a′b′)=b ⇔ a′b′=b′ ⇔ a′≤b′ ⇔ 
b≤a. 
(a′b′)=a ⇔ a′b′=a′ ⇔ b′≤a′ ⇔ a≤b. ab=b ⇔ 
a≤b. 
L4 a(a′b′) [C2,2x] = a((ab′)ab′) [J1] = a. (a′(ab)) [C2,2x] = (a′((ab)ab)) [J1] = (a′) [C1] 
= a. 
L6 Let T⇔(). Then L6⇔J0. Let ⊥⇔(()). Then L6⇔J1. ? 
L8 J2 (a′(bc)) [C1,2x] = (a′((b′)(c′))) [J2] = 
 (((a′b′)(a′c′))) [C1] = (a′b′)(a′c′). 
 
Dilworth (1938: Postulate 1) showed that ab.c=b.ac and a⊥=a (taken as an axiom) sufficed 
to demonstrate that juxtaposition commutes and associates. Byrne (1946: Ths. 2′, 3′) 
proved that fact from the axiom abc=bca and the consequence aa=a; see §A.1. Note that 
the repeated application of OI to the formulae abc and cba generates all six possible ar-
rangements of the letters a, b, and c. Henceforth, OI refers to abc=bca. 
A Ba also requires that equality ‘=’ be a congruence relation, defined as follows: 
                                                          
31. LoF (Appendix 1), too, proves that Ba is a model of the pa, in the following curious way. It 
begins with Sheffer’s (1913) postulate set for Ba (Table 6-2), containing a single binary func-
tor, the Sheffer stroke, whose pa representation is (ab) (dually, a′b′; Table 4-2, bottom row). 
Sheffer’s first two postulates are effectively C1 and J1. His third postulate is an easy pa con-
sequence: Dem. ((a(bc))) [C1,2x] = ((a((b′)(c′)))) [J2] = ((((b′a)(c′a)))) [C1] = ((b′a)(c′a)) ?. 
Engineers know the Sheffer stroke as NOR; its dual as NAND. The pa representations of 
NAND and NOR make it easy to see how they commute but do not associate: e.g., a′b′= b′a′ 
and (ab)=(ba), but ((ab)c)=(a(bc)) is not always the case. In group theory, by contrast, the 
sole binary operation associates but does not necessarily commute. 
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3.3.10. Definition. A Ba congruence relation is an equivalence relation R also satisfying 
aRb → a′Rb′ ∧ ∀c[c∈B ∧ acRbc]. (Stoll 1963: 261). For a proof that ‘=’ is a congruence 
relation, see §A.5. 
 
A Boolean algebra is any algebra defined over a finite poset B, such that B is closed 
under: 
• A binary operation ‘⋅‘ that commutes and associates;32 
• A unary operation ‘′’, such that ∀c∈B, c′⋅c = infB or supB, 
and such that ‘=’ is a binary dyadic relation. Moreover, that B={⊥,()} is partially ordered 
emerges if the required ordering relation is taken to be (a)b. From Table 2-1 we may con-
clude that (a)b=() for all possible values of a and b except a=() and b=⊥,33 as desired if 
⊥≤() is to be the case. Table 2-1 further implies that juxtaposition commutes and associ-
ates, and that B is closed under both juxtaposition and enclosure. If a⋅b ⇔ ab, a′ ⇔ (a), 
and T ⇔ (), the pa can be seen as a minimalist notation for Ba. 
We can now see that L3 [L4] is analogous to J2 [J0] of Ba. Hence J0 and J2 nicely distill 
why a lattice is not necessarily a Ba. As argued above, L4 (and hence J0) is independent 
of L0−L2. But J2 and C2 are not independent of OI, L2, and J0, by virtue of the following 
argument. §A.1 derives L2 from J1, C1, and C2. §A.1, in turn, derives J1 from J0 alone, 
and C1 from J0 and C2. Moreover, LoF derives C1 and C2 from J1 and J2. Hence L2 is re-
dundant, given J0 and one of J2 or C2. Finding an axiom independent of OI, L2, and J0 
that, when added to these, yields Ba would be an interesting exercise. 
Because B has only two members, c′c designates the greatest element of B. Let a, b, and c 
range over B. Then ab=a and ab′=c′c both imply that B is partially ordered. Specifically, 
let ⊥≤(). Then b≤a, ab=a, and ab′=c′c are all equivalent. More generally, the following 
theorem shows that b′a, ab=a and (a′b′)=b all assert the same thing: 
 
3.3.11. Theorem (Consistency Principle). a≤b, a∪b=b, and a∩b=a are equivalent Ba state-
ments, and these in turn have the pa equivalents a′b=(), ab=b and (a′b′)=a. 
Proof.  See §A.3. 
 
Unlike Ba complementation, pa enclosure can have an empty scope; the result is a lattice 
bound. By virtue of A2, the other lattice bound is, in effect, the blank page. Bricken (per-
sonal communication) argues that the mere presence of ⊥ (or of any other symbol with 
the same semantics) renders BA indistinguishable from Ba. To fasten on ⊥ in this man-
ner, however, overlooks the signal contribution of BA to our understanding of 2: the car-
rier need be no more than empty complementation and the blank page.34 The improper 
symbol ⊥ can be seen as just a convenient way to denote the blank page as a lattice 
bound (§4.1 discusses another justification for ⊥). In all other respects, 3.3.9-11 and the 
adjacent discussion show that BA and 2 are isomorphic. This fact is independent of the 
                                                          
32. That this connective associates can be demonstrated; see §A.1. 
33. If a=⊥ or b=(), (a)b=() by C3 and A2. Substituting the only remaining valuation, a=() and 
b=⊥, into (a)b yields (())⊥=⊥⊥=⊥. 
34. In this respect, LoF was only walking a trail blazed by Peirce’s graphical logic; see §6.1. 
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ontological status of ⊥ or its denotatum, and does not make BA redundant. Nor does 
arguing that BA and Ba are isomorphic demean BA, because Ba is a rich subject; see the 
references under “Boolean Algebra” in the Bibliographic Postscript. 
 
3.3.12. Definition. Let a,b∈B where B is some carrier. a is an atom iff b≤a → (b=⊥ ∨ b=a). If 
for any b≠⊥, there exists an atom a such that a≤b, then Ba is atomic. A Ba is complete if 
every nonempty subset of B has a least upper bound. 
 
We now state a simple version of a famous deep result about Ba, the Stone Representation 
Theorem (SRT): 
 
3.3.13. Theorem (Stoll 1963: §6.5). A Ba is isomorphic to the algebra of all subsets of its 
set of atoms iff the Ba is complete and atomic.35 
 
Every finite B is trivially complete and atomic, simply because B is a bounded lattice. 
The SRT has the following very interesting consequence: 
 
3.3.14. Theorem. A tautological equivalence holds in every possible Ba iff it holds in 2. 
Proof: Koppelberg (1989: Prop. 2.19 (a) and (d)). The ‘if’ part of the proof follows easily 
from 2 being a subalgebra of every Ba whose carrier has a cardinality of two or more. 
Her concise proof of the converse invokes the SRT and notions beyond the scope of this 
essay, namely homomorphism and ultrafilter. 
Since 2 is a model for BA, a consequence of 3.3.14 is that the advantages of BA as a 
calculation tool apply to all nontrivial Boolean algebras. Unfortunately, BA as it stands 
cannot serve as a notation for nontrivial Boolean algebras other than 2, because x=() ∨ 
x=⊥ evaluates to (). 
 
3.3.15. Theorem. The cardinality of B in BA is necessarily 2. 
Proof: see §A.3. 
Modifying BA so that its models include any Ba with a finite carrier would be a worthy 
endeavour. Models of such “large” Boolean algebras include certain forms of mereology, 
(Casati and Varzi 1999) the formal theory of part and whole. 
3.4. Boundary Algebra and Groupoids. 
The BA can be seen as the culmination of a fact pointed out in Huntington (1933): Ba 
requires but two operations, one binary and one unary. Hence the seldom-noted fact 
that Boolean algebras are magmas (a.k.a. groupoids). To see this, note that the BA is a 
commutative: 
• Semigroup because BA juxtaposition is order-irrelevant; 
• Monoid with identity element ⊥, by virtue of the elementary BA consequence a⊥= a. 
Groups further require a unary operation, called inverse, and an inverse element. By J0, 
the BA inverse element is (). Hence the BA is a 〈--,(-),()〉 algebra of type 〈2,1,0〉. It would 
also be an commutative (Abelian) group were the identity and inverse elements equal 
                                                          
35. For a more topologically flavoured exposition of the SRT, see Cori and Lascar (2000: §2.6). 
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rather than mutual inverses; that is, if one of (a)a=⊥ or a()=a were a BA consequence.36 
C2 demarcates BA from other magmas, because C2 enables demonstrating the absorp-
tion and the distributive laws central to lattice theory but irrelevant to magmas. 
4.  pa Semantics:  From BA to Boundary Logic. 
“Every logical notation hitherto proposed has an unnecessary number of signs.” 
    Peirce (4.12, 1880). 
“Yet logic is nothing more than the properties of the act of distinction!”     Kauffman (2001: 90). 
LoF (pp. 113-17) shows how the CTV and the elementary Boolean algebra of sets are pos-
sible interpretations (models) of the pa. Before showing how the pa translates the CTV, I 
first sketch some facts about the key players in the CTV, the truth functors (functors for 
short). A functor has an arity n∈N. Because B has cardinality 2, there are 22n possible 
functors with arity n; in particular, there are 16 binary functors. Six of these map a and b 
into one of {a,~a,b,~b,T,F} and will not detain us. The remaining 10 binary functors are 
{∧,∨,→,←,↔} and their negations (see Table 4-2). There are 221=4 possible unary func-
tors; of these, only ~a need be considered. There are 220=2 0-ary functors, T and F by 
convention. All functors of arity>2 are redundant, because any formula employing such 
functors is tautologically equivalent to a formula whose functors all have arity≤2 
(Epstein 1995: §II.J.3). 
It would seem that there are 5+1+2=8 essential truth functors. In fact, there is ample 
redundancy among these, in that starting from 2 or 3 functors, the remaining 5 or 6 can 
be defined. If for any CTV formula, there exists an equivalent CTV formula in which 
only a subset of these 8 functors appears, the members of that subset are termed express-
ively adequate (abbreviated EA) or truth-functionally complete (Bostock 1997: §§2.7, 2.9).37 
For the purpose at hand, the primitive basis of CTV (e.g., DeLong 1971: 107) consists of 
the primitive values T and F, and any EA set of functors. Boundary logic results from a 
one-to-one correspondence between the BA and an EA set of functors. Among the bina-
ry functors, ∨, ∧, and ↔, commute and associate, just as juxtaposition does in the pa. De-
nial, ~, is a unary functor whose scope is set by brackets, which is exactly the way (⋅) 
works in the pa. We shall see in §4.3 that {∨,~} and {∧,~} are EA; the upshot is two of 
the three interpretations of the pa shown in Table 4-1. 
 
Table 4-1. Some Interpretations of the pa. 
    
Interpretation Primal Dual 
Key Binary Functor Alternation Conditional Conjunction 
Implied EA Functor Pair {∨,~} {→,F} or {→,~} {∧,~} 
pa Equivalent {((⋅⋅)),(⋅)} {(⋅)⋅,(())} or {(⋅)⋅,(⋅)} {((⋅⋅)),(⋅)} 
Representation of:   
                                                          
36. Magma, semigroup, monoid, and (Abelian) group are defined in Burris and Sankappanavar 
(1981: §2.1). 
37. For more on connectives, axiomatics, etc., see the references under Calculus of Truth Values 
in the Bibliographic Postscript. 
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    Alternation ab (a′b′) 
    Conjunction (a′b′) ab 
    Conditional a′b (ab′) 
Antecedents 1910: PM, 6.11 1879: Frege, 1.1 
1885: Peirce, 3.11 
1956: Church, 1.4c, P1 
1892: Johnson 
1897: Peirce EG 
Recent Examples Halmos & Givant 
  (1998: §§8,13) 
Machover (1996: §7.6) 
Bostock (1997: §5.2) 
Quine (1982: §1) 
Note. m.n refers to a numbered system in Prior’s (1962) Appendix I. 
 
I now establish a correspondence between the PA and conventional logic, beginning 
with the assumption ()⇔T. Table 2-1b immediately reveals that the semantics of (α) are 
identical to those of ~α, namely ~T=F (A2) and ~F=T. Thus emerges the most salient fact 
about boundary logic: just as an empty boundary denotes a BA primitive value, a nega-
tion with an empty scope denotes a truth value. ()() = () (A1) and ⊥⊥ = ⊥ in Table 2-1a imply 
that juxtaposition is idempotent. The two remaining cells of Table 2-1a reveal that juxta-
position commutes, as discussed in §3.2. Hence by virtue of the PA, αβ can interpret 
either α∨β or α∧β and the road to a CTV translation of Table 2-1 is now clear.38 
Since Frege and Peirce, the predominant primitive CTV connective has been the condi-
tional, for which the current notation is ‘→’.39 The well-known equivalence a→b ⇔ ~a∨b 
suggests the translation a→b ⇔ a′b. Then note that a→F ⇔ a′⊥ = a′; thus the pa also 
translates the EA set {→,F}. Table 2-1b now translates as T→⊥ and its converse, ⊥→T. 
Other possible translations of the pa into the CTV are discussed in §4.2. Table 4-1 sum-
marizes this section. Throughout this paper, “Prior m.n” refers to axiom set m.n in Prior 
(1962: Appendix I). Epstein (1995: 407-9) is a more recent and limited survey.40 
 
4.1.  Duality. 
“Algebra includes many formal calculations drawing consequencs from axioms, so the notation 
should be chosen to make these calculations efficient. The device of juxtaposing two letters… is so 
efficient that it is used in many different senses…”    Birkhoff and MacLane (1998: 70). 
 
Let S be a set partially ordered by the relation R, and let a,b∈R. Then there exists a rela-
tion R′ that also partially orders S, such that bR′a=T ↔ aRb=T; this is the principle of 
duality for posets (Donnellan 1968: Th. 13; Stoll 1974: 193-94). Let S=B, [{T,F}] Rab ⇔ a≤b 
[→], and R′ab ⇔ a≥b [?], and the duality of Ba [CTV] follows. Ba is typically formulated 
                                                          
38. 3.3.4 and 3.3.5 also suggest that the CTV with primitive {∨,¬} is a model for the pa. 
39. Quine (1982: §3) rightly prefers ‘conditional’ to the ‘material implication’ of PM, because 
a→b does not translate “a implies b”, but arguably does translate “if a then b”. I prefer read-
ing a→b as a synonym for a≤b, where a and b are members of some ordered set. 
40. For more on systems with {→,F} primitive, cf. Prior (1962: §I.III.1, 3.11-13). Systems based 
on {→,¬} are quite standard, e.g., Prior 1.1-5, Church’s (1956: §20) P2, Epstein’s (1995: 
408) PC, and Mendelson’s (1997: 35) L. Systems with {∧,¬} primitive include that of John-
son (1892) discussed in §6.2 below, those of Rosser and of Sobocinski (Prior 6.3), and the 
modal logics of C. I. Lewis (Prior 11.1). Peirce’s existential graphs are the subject of §6.1. 
For more on historical axiom systems, see §6.2-3 below and Prior (1962: Appendix I). 
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such that B={0,1}, 1′≡0, and 0≠1. BA duality follows from (())≠() being a trivial conse-
quence of A2, and from (())≠() ⇔ 0≠1. 
By 3.3.2, B is partially ordered. B must also be connected, since B has only two members, 
so that one of ⊥≤() or ()≤⊥ must be the case. ()=⊥ leads to triviality; hence the inequalities 
must hold strictly. Thus far, I have tacitly assumed ⊥<(). The nearest LoF gets to the con-
tent of this paragraph is the first complete paragraph on p. 113. 
 
4.1.1. Definition. The BA semantics that flow from assuming ⊥<() [()<⊥] make up the 
primal [dual] reading. Each reading is the semantic dual of the other. Duality refers to the 
fact that Ba, BA, and logic can all be carried out under either reading. To switch from 
one reading to the other, mutatis mutandis, is known as dualization. 
 
Duality is little more than an interesting consequence of B‘s being an ordered set. By an 
interpretation of BA I mean a one-to-one correspondence between B and another set, 
and there are two possible such correspondences between B and {T,F}. Thus far, I have 
assumed T⇔(). The dual reading begins with T⇔⊥. Conjunction now interprets juxtapo-
sition, and the conditional interprets (ab′). Thus the dual of {∨,~} is {∧,~}. 
Under the dual reading, Table 2-1a is now the table for Boolean multiplication, and 
Boolean and numerical multiplication yield the same result when the carrier is assumed 
to be {0,1}. Perhaps surprisingly, Table 2-1 and T1-T7 hold under both interpretations. 
Likewise, the rules defining and simplifying PA and pa formulae do not change. Hence 
the syntax of BA is invariant under dualization. PA duality is merely a semantic affair, 
namely a switch from one mapping of B onto {T,F} to the other. 
Matters are a bit more involved for the pa, because dualization alters the semantics of 
juxtaposition. The semantics of a formal system are known as its truth definition or Boole-
an valuation (Smullyan 1968: §I.2, Def. 1). Recall that an atomic valuation (3.1.3) assigns 
one of () or ⊥ to every variable. The pa then has the following trivial truth definition: 
4.1.2. Definition. A Boolean valuation for BA. Let φ,δ be metalogical notation for BA form-
ulae, and let  the value of φ be |φ|, given some atomic valuation. All molecular formu-
lae then evaluate to either () or ⊥ by recursive application of two elementary rules: 
|(φ)|=(|φ|), and |δφ|=max[|φ|,|δ|], where max[(),⊥]=() [=⊥] under the primal [dual] 
reading.41 
 
This truth definition follows trivially from Table 2-1. A tautology can now be defined as 
a formula whose value is invariant to the choice of atomic valuation. Moreover, φ=δ is a 
tautological equivalence if |φ|=|δ| holds for all atomic valuations. Some further defini-
tions: 
 
4.1.3. Definition (adapted from Halmos and Givant 1998, §22): Let 1,..., na aαα = 〈 〉 be a 
formula containing the atomic formulae a1,...,an. α is the primal, 1( ,..., )na aα〈 〉  the comple-
ment, 1,..., na aα ′ ′〈 〉  the contradual, and Dα = 1( ,..., )na aα ′ ′〈 〉  the syntactic dual (dual for short). 
The dual of the dual is the primal; hence a primal and its dual are known as a dual pair. 
 
                                                          
41.  For more on truth definitions, see Bostock (1997: §§2.4, 3.4) and Hodges (2001: §3). 
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4.1.4 answers the following question: if the equation α φ=  holds under some or all 
atomic valuations, what is true of Dα  and Dφ ? 
 
4.1.4.  Duality Theorem.  α φ=  ↔ D Dα φ= . 
Proof. See §A.9. 
 
The Duality Theorem is the basis for the duality principle characterising Ba and CTV, 
which says that the dual of a tautology is also a tautology. Keeping in mind that α in 
4.1.3 is a tautology if α=() or ⊥ for all possible valuations of 1,..., na a , 4.1.4 says more. If a 
formula or equation is tautologous under some interpretation, then its contradual and 
dual are also tautologies under that same interpretation.42 
Duality, about which LoF is silent, is another compelling reason for an explicit symbol 
denoting the unmarked state. There is no syntactical or proof-theoretic ground for pre-
ferring one interpretation over the other. Spencer-Brown preferred the primal reading, 
claiming that a'b is a more economical represention of the conditional than (ab') (LoF, p. 
113-14).43 There is, however, a pragmatic reason for conjunction, not disjunction, as the 
preferred reading of concatenation. I agree with Prior when he wrote: 
 
“…’and’ and ‘not’ are the only operators which are quite unambiguously 
truth functional in ordinary speech; truth functional interpretations of 
other ordinary-speech connectives all wear at times an air of artificiality.” 
       Prior (1962: 254). 
In §6.1, we shall see that Peirce too came to prefer the dual reading. 
4.2.  Boundary Logic. 
“…everything in pp. 98-126 of Principia Mathematica can be rewritten without formal loss in 
the one symbol ‘()’… Allowing some 1500 symbols to the page, this represents a reduction of the 
mathematical noise-level by a factor of more than 40,000.”        LoF, p. 117. 
Table 4-2 translates the ten nontrivial CTV binary connectives into the pa, assuming the 
primal reading.  Each row of Table 4-2 contains a dual pair; hence the connectives can be 
grouped into two groups of five, I and II, with each group being the dual of the other. 
Connectives sharing the same numerical identifier (shown in the two middle columns) 
can be derived from each other via negation. Let a* stand for either a or a′; a* is a literal. 
The simple connectives are those that can be described by a*b* or the duals thereof; these 
are ab, a′b, ab′, a′b′, and their duals. 
Note that the assignment of () to either T [⊥≤()] or F [()≤⊥] is arbitrary. But once a choice 
is made, the pa representation of all connectives is determined. Table 4-2 translates ab as 
a∨b, and its dual, (a'b'), as a∧b, both as per the first column of Table 4-1. Likewise, either 
                                                          
42. Quine (1982: §12) states five “laws of duality.” The first follows from semantic duality; the 
second, proved in §A.9, defines syntactic duality. His third law is α=() ⇔ Dα =⊥; the fourth, 
( ) ( )D Dα φ φ α→ ↔ → ; the fifth, 4.1.4. On duality, also see Bostock (1997: §2.10). 
43. Spencer-Brown makes too much of this, especially if one downplays the conditional in favor 
of conjunction/alternation. Moreover, while (ab′) has more symbols than a′b, (ab′)=(()) is 
equivalent to b′a=(), which has no more symbols than a′b=(). 
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a′b′ or (ab) translates the Sheffer stroke, a|b. These translations render obvious that | can 
be read as “not and” and as “if a then not b”; the latter reading suggests more strongly, 
perhaps, the peculiar expressive power of the Sheffer stroke. The duality of a′b′ and (ab) 
points to “not or” as the semantic dual of the Sheffer stroke.44 
 
Table 4-2. 
The 10 Nontrivial Binary Connectives (Functors). 
Primal Dual 
Name Logic Sets pa   pa Sets Logic Name 
Alternation a∨b a∪b ab 1 5 (a′b′) a∩b a∧b Conjunction 
Conditional a→b a⊆b a′b 2 4 (ab′) b~a a?b Difference 
(a′b)(ab′) 3a 3a ((a′b)(ab′)) 
Symmetric Difference a?b aΔb 
((a′b′)(ab)) 3b 3b (a′b′)(ab) a⊆b⊆a a↔b Biconditional 
Converse a←b a⊇b ab′ 4 2 (a′b) a~b a?b Difference 
Sheffer stroke a|b a b∩  a′b′ 5 1 (ab) a b∪  a↓b NOR 
Note.  Each row contains a dual pair. Items with the same number are negation pairs. The six 
remaining binary connectives are uninteresting as they map {a,b} into one of a, b,~a,~b, T, and F. 
 
The meaning of CTV duality should now be clear: for any statement α, there exists an 
equivalent statement αD derived by interchanging ∧ and ∨, → and ?, ↔ and ?, | and ↓, 
and T and F. More generally, under either interpretation, the pa representation of con-
junction is the dual of the pa representation of alternation, and the same dual relation 
holds for the conditional and the negation thereof. 
Duality reveals that the conventional syntax for Ba and CTV are uneconomical. A given 
pa formula enjoys a multiplicity of CTV translations, revealing the ample redundancy 
inherent in the CTV. For instance, take the well-known De Morgan’s laws, ~(a∨b)↔ 
(~a∧~b) and ~(a∧b)↔(~a∨~b). The pa translation of these laws, (ab)=(ab) and a′b′=a′b′, 
immediately reveals that these laws are trivially true and form a dual pair. 
Because the algebra of sets is a model for 2, it is also a model for the pa. Let U be the 
universal set, a,b∈U, and ∅ be the null set. Then the columns headed by “Sets” show 
how the algebra of sets and the pa are equivalent. 
Table 4-3 translates the LoF consequences into CTV notation, using Table 4-2 as the key. 
For each LoF consequence, Table 4-3 also supplies a name, if the conventional literature 
provides one, and the number of the corresponding tautology in Kalish et al (1980: 
§II.11) (KMM), an unusually comprehensive list of tautologies. LoF says very little about 
how J1-C9 relate to the extant literature on logic and Ba. J2, C1, C3, and C5 should be 
very familiar. J1 is the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM); C2, Johnson’s (1892: 342) Law of 
Exclusion; C3 means that () is a lattice upper bound, cf. 3.3.5; C4, the biconditional cor-
responding to an axiom in conditional form proposed by Peirce (W5: 162-90, 1885). C6 is 
the Law of Elaboration or Development, so called by Bostock (1997: 41). C7 and C9 are 
                                                          
44. The misconception that the pa is little more than a new notation for the Sheffer stroke (Grat-
tan-Guiness 2000: 557; Wolfram 2002: 1173) may stem from hasty readings of LoF’s Ap-
pendix 1. 
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not well known. If a and b on either side of C9 were to trade places, the two sides of C9 
would then form a dual pair.45 
 
Table 4-3.  The Standard Reading of the LoF Initials and Consequences. 
LoF Conventional Notation Name KMM 
J1 ~(a→a) ↔ ⊥ Law of Contradiction 59 
J2 (a∨r)∧(b∨r) ↔ (a∧b)∨r Distributive Law 62 
C1 ~(~a) ↔ a Law of Involution 110 
C2 (b∨a)→a ↔ b→a Law of Exclusion 73 
C3 T∨a ↔ T B has an upper bound.  
C4 ((a→b)→a) ↔ a Peirce’s Law 23 
C5 a∨a ↔ a Law of Tautology 47 
C6 (a∧b)∨(a∧~b) ↔ a Law of Elaboration 68 
C7 [(a→b)∧~c]  ↔  ~[(a∨c) ∧(b→c)]   
C9 [(a→r)∧(r→~b)] ↔ ~[ (a∨r)∧(r→b)]   
 
LoF invokes J1-C3 104x, C4-C9 15x, and C5-C8 a mere 6x. LoF invokes C2 more often 
than any other consequence, C1 excepted. C2 allows a subformula to be copied into and 
erased from any subspace deeper than the shallowest instance of itself (with the proviso 
that a subformula cannot be copied into a part of itself). While not a standard part of ele-
mentary logic, C2 is at once a trivial corollary of the Consistency Principle, 3.3.11, and a 
powerful tool for BA demonstrations (§§5.0, 5.2). I say more about C2 in §A.7. 
Perhaps all I have done thus far is to employ the following elementary reasoning to 
eliminate all explicit truth functors from the syntax. Alternation and conjunction com-
mute and associate; hence mere juxtaposition suffices to notate either. Brackets are then 
free to notate negation. It is well known that negation and one of conjunction or alterna-
tion are EA. Hence brackets are the only explicitly truth functional notation required. 
QED. Equivalently, recall that {→,⊥} is EA and that (a)b ⇔ a→b and (a)⊥ ⇔ ~a. Hence a 
single two place functor, (−)−, and the constant ⊥ also suffice to express all truth func-
tors. To express juxtaposition, note that ab [C1] = ((a))b [C2] = ((a)b)b.46 
With the pa and its CTV interpretation in hand, and given our definition of a Ba, we can 
speak to the algebraic structure of the CTV (cf. Stoll 1963: 267-76). Let S0 be a set of CTV 
atomic formulae, and let S be the set whose members are all possible formulae con-
structed from members of S0 by conjunction (or alternation) and denial. Let logical 
equivalence ‘=’ be the congruence relation (cf. 3.3.10) Ba requires. A congruence relation 
partitions its field into equivalence classes; let S/= be the set of equivalence classes 
resulting from ‘=’. Define ⊥ as ~a∧a, ∀a∈S, and T as ~⊥. Then 〈S/=,∧,~,⊥〉 is a Ba, 
                                                          
45. PM (*2–*5) proves many tautologies including the following ones from LoF: J1, 3.24; J2, 
4.41; C1, 4.13; C2, 2.621 & 2.67; C5, 4.25; C6, 4.42; C8, 4.4. Other lists of tautologies in-
clude Rosser (1953: Theorem VI.6.1), Carnap (1958: T8-2, T8-6), Wolf (1998: Appendix 3), 
and Cori & Lascar (2000: §1.2.3). In Ba, J1 is known as “complementarity”; C3, “union”; C5, 
“idempotence”; De Morgan’s laws, “dualization”. For more on the relation between J1-C5 
and conventional logic and Ba, see §A.6. 
46. In the language of universal algebra (Abbott 1969: §2-5), the pa is a 〈B,(−)−,⊥〉 algebra of 
type 〈2,0〉. A model of this algebra is Church’s (1956) P1; see Table 4-1. 
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specifically the “free Boolean algebra generated by S0 under =,” more commonly known 
as a Tarski-Lindenbaum algebra. 
A Historical Digression on Notation. 
What I enclose in parentheses, Spencer Brown places under , the ‘mark’; e.g., (a)b and 
(ab) correspond to ab  and  a b  in LoF. (Martin Gardner (Scientific American 1980 (2): 14) 
deemed LoF’s notation “eccentric.”) LoF’s notation has antecedents. In a paper written 
1880 but not published until 1933, Peirce (4.12-20) proposed to notate Ba with concaten-
ation, interpreted as NAND, and brackets. This notation is that of this paper, but for his 
limitation of concatenation to a binary scope. Kauffman (2001), citing Peirce (1976: 106-
15), an excerpt from a manuscript titled “Qualitative Logic,” written in 1886 but not 
published in full until 1993 (W5: 323-71), points out that Peirce later fused the overbar 
(denoting Boolean complementation) to the Boolean ‘+’ (OR) to create a symbol Peirce 
called the “sign of illation,” closely resembling the ‘ ’ of LoF and having the same 
semantics.47 Peirce saw that his sign of illation sufficed for Ba and syllogistic logic. 
Kauffman also notes that the ‘    ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ’ notation of Nicod (1917) likewise has the functional-
ity of ‘  ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ’, but does not mention that Nicod on occasion commuted ‘ a b ’ to ‘b a ’. Many 
authors, as well as earlier versions of this paper, denote the denial of a by ¬a rather than 
~a. I prefer to reserve ‘¬’ for intuitionist negation. 
4.3.  The Enigmatic Degeneracy of BA. 
The expressively adequate (EA) subsets of the functors in common use are {→, F/~} and 
{∧/∨, ~}. Table 4-1 shows how these four EA functor sets map into BA. This mapping 
reveals a curious detail: corresponding to each EA functor set is a pair of BA formulae, 
one involving one boundary, the other two. The question naturally arises as to whether 
this is true of the Sheffer stroke and its dual, and all nine EA functor sets with two mem-
bers (Wernick 1942: 132), consisting of four dual pairs and the self-dual set, {→,?}. Row 
1 of Table 4-4 shows how the Sheffer stroke follows from the pair {(--),(())}. Rows 2 
through 5 show how seven of the nine two-member EA functor sets can be derived by 
inserting 1 or 2 letters into (), and 0 or 2 letters into (()). The sixth row reveals that the 
dual pair of EA functors involving ↔ cannot be represented in this manner, suggesting 
that ↔ should be seen as a tacit conjunction of conditionals. 
 
Table 4-4. 
Building the Nine EA CTV Functor Pairs from () and (()). 
EA CTV Functor Pairs Pa 
primal dual 
(ab), (()) 2,0 a↓b   F a|b   T 
(a)b, (()) 2,0     a→b   F ~(b→a)   T 
((a)b)b=ab=((ab)), (a) 2,1     a∨b ~a     a∧b  ~a 
((b)a), (a) 2,1 b?a ~a     a→b ~a 
(a)b, ((b)a) 2,2 a→b, b?a 
(a)b, ((a)b)((b)a) 2,4    a→b a?b b?a a↔b 
Source for EA Functor Pairs:  Wernick (1942: 132). 
                                                          
47. Peirce’s manifold contributions to mathematics, logic, and semiotics inform Kauffman’s 
discussion in other ways. 
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The first five rows of Table 4-4 capture the essence of the correspondence between Ba 
and the CTV. The reader is welcome to explore further the symmetries inhering in the 
two leftmost columns of Table 4-4. 
The pa suggests that expressive adequacy requires two capabilities, namely a way of: 
• Concatenating subformulae. Let these ways be  a*b and (a*b); 
• Enclosing subformulae. We may create a′ in one of three ways: 
• Invoke it outright; 
• Given (ab), set a=b so that (aa) [C5] = a′; 
• Given a′b, set b=(()) so that a′(()) [C4a] = a′. 
Note how (()) follows from (b′a): either erase a and b, or let a=b, then J1. Note that the 
Sheffer stroke is EA by itself. As () and (()()) denote distinct primitive values, () alone 
suffices for all of truth functional logic. 
 
Table 4-5.  How a*b, (a*b), and a′ Yield 
The Sheffer Stroke and the Nine EA Functor Pairs. 
Interpretation: Needed to Obtain (a):  
primal dual Assume Interpretation (a) = 
Commute 
ab a∨b a∧b a′ ~a --- 
(ab) a↓b a|b --- --- (aa) 
Do not Commute primal dual  
a′b a→b b?a a′ ~a --- 
“ “ “ (()) F T a′(()) 
“ “ “ (c′a) † c?a a→c a′(a′a) 
“ “ “ (c′a)(c′b) a?c a↔c a′(a′a)(a′a) 
† Self-dual row.         
 
Tables 4-4 and 4-5 reveal that all possible EA functor pairs can be obtained by inserting 
letters in certain ways into () alone, or into () and (()). Hence there is a sense in which the 
two members of B encapsulate all EA functor pairs. The members of B can be seen as the 
operators (-)- and ((--)-), where ‘-’ indicates a possible location of a letter. BA does not 
syntactically demarcate operators from operands; only in context can the operators (-)- 
and ((--)-) be distinguished from the operands () and (()), the primitive values. 
 
4.4.  pa: Metatheory. 
Every pa formula has a normal form, a fact repeatedly invoked in proofs of pa metathe-
ory. 
 
4.4.1. Definition. Let the pa formula α contain n variables so that 1( ,..., )nf a aα = . The 
normal form, NF, is a formula tautologically equivalent to α having the form: 
(#) * *( ...) [ ]i j ijj ia a⇔ ∨ ∧ . 
All variables in (#) appear as literals. 
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*( ...)i ja  is the jth disjunct. The ranges of the indices i and j begin with 1 and are finite; 
otherwise, these ranges are deliberately unspecified, if only because the NF is not uni-
que. Also, either i or j may in some cases not exceed 1. If the jth disjunct is (⊥), then the 
entire NF degenerates to (); if it is (()), the jth disjunct vanishes. The NF can be seen as 
the analog of a polynomial in ordinary algebra. It is easier to parse a NF if the variables 
in each disjunct appear in lexicographic order, moving from left to right. This reordering 
is allowed because the variables in any disjunct can be reordered at will, but is not a 
mathematical imperative. 
Given any Ba/CTV formula, there exists an equivalent formula resembling the rhs of 
(#), namely a series of subformulae linked by alternation. Each of these subformulae in 
turn consists of literals linked by conjunction. This is the disjunctive normal form (DNF), 
whose dual is the conjunctive normal form (CNF). LoF is silent about the well known 
Ba/CTV result that there exists a CNF/DNF dual pair equivalent to any formula. In the 
pa, the distinction between the DNF and the CNF is merely semantic.48 
4.4.2-7 lay down the metatheory of the pa. The corresponding proofs are in §A.10. 
 
4.4.2 (T14).  Let α be a formula such *dα >2. Then α can be transformed, by taking steps, 
into an equivalent formula β such that *dβ =2. 
 Remarks. 
1. In LoF, T14 only serves to help prove T15 and T17. 
2. Crucial to the proof of T14 is the ability of C7 to transform any subformula of 
depth 3 into an equivalent sub-formula of depth 2. Invoking C7 repeatedly, 
beginning at each point in α with depth= *dα −3, transforms α into an equivalent 
formula with maximum depth≤2. The Appendix proof views a pa formula as an 
ordered tree; the LoF proof does not. 
 3. Read from left to right, both C4 and C9 can also be seen as depth reduction 
tools. C4 [C9] reduces a subformula of depth 2 [3] to one of depth 0 [2]. 
 4.  Note that no formula in J1-C9 is more than two parentheses deep, the left side 
of C7 and C9 excepted.  
4.4.3 (T15).  Let the pa formula α〈v〉 contain more than two instances of the variable v. 
Then α〈v〉 can be transformed, by taking steps, into an equivalent formula β〈v〉, 
such that β〈v〉 contains at most two instances of v. 
 Remark. In LoF, T15 only serves to prove T17. T15 is essentially a simple form of 
the following well-known Ba theorem (Hohn 1966: 229, Lemma 2), recast into pa 
notation as follows: 
Let f be a truth function whose arguments are 1,..., nx x . Then 1( ,..., ,..., )i nf x x x = 
1( ( ,..., (),..., ) )n if x x x′ ′ 1( ( ,..., ,..., ) )n if x x x′⊥ , 1≤i≤ n. 
 
                                                          
48. For more on the CNF and DNF see, e.g., Quine (1982: §10), Bostock (1997: §2.6), Halmos & 
Givant (1998: §38), and Cori & Lascar (2000: §1.3.2). Bostock defines the DNF so that each 
disjunct includes all n variables, in which case i in (#) necessarily ranges over 1 to n. He does 
this so that the truth table corresponding to α can be easily recovered from the DNF. This 
stipulation is unnecessary here, because truth tables play no essential role in the pa. 
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T14 and T15 together guarantee that every pa formula has an NF equivalent, whose 
depth does not exceed 2 and that contains at most two instances of any given variable. 
 
4.4.4 (T16).  If two or more formulae are equivalent in every case of one variable, they 
are equivalent. 
 Remarks. 
1. I propose to restate this enigmatic theorem as “Let the variable v appear in one 
or both of the formulae α and β, and let iv  =|v|. Let iv vα〈 = 〉  and iv vβ 〈 = 〉  be 
vα〈 〉  and vβ 〈 〉  with v set to iv . If () ()v vα β〈 = 〉 = 〈 = 〉  and v vα β〈 =⊥〉 = 〈 =⊥〉 , then α=β.” The converse is also true. 
2. LoF maintains that T16 justifies the decision procedure described in §5.1.49 
3. Erasing every instance of a variable is equivalent to setting that variable equal 
to ⊥. Hence T16 has another implication, heretofore unmentioned: a tautology 
remains a tautology when every instance of any variable is erased. 
4. Prior (1962: §I.III.4) shows that the CTV can be derived from a single metalogic-
al axiom. Its pa translation, ( ()vα〈 = 〉 )( vα〈 =⊥〉 ) vα〈 〉  = (), reveals that it is an in-
stance of a clause (§5.3) and is equivalent to T16. 
4.4.5 (T17).  The pa is complete. 
 Remark. A logic is complete if for any tautology α, one of α or ~α can be proved 
from the axioms/initials, using the inference rules. The pa inference rules are in 
fact R1 and R2, although LoF does not make this explicit. Moreover, the com-
pleteness asserted by T17 is of the strong sort (LoF, p. 119), because adding an 
initial that cannot be proved from the existing initials would render the pa 
unsound. Finally, if a formula simplifies to a member of B, T17 also implies that 
there exists a corresponding tautology in the pa. 
While T17 is arguably the most important (meta)theorem of the BA, it is not an 
unexpected result because, as we shall see, the CTV and 2 are both models of the 
pa, and the completeness of these models is well established. The LoF proof of 
T17 requires all LoF consequences except C4 and C5; hence T17 can be seen as the 
culmination of chapters 1-10 of LoF. The proof of T17 resembles Quine’s (1938) 
proof (which LoF cites) that the CTV is complete, in that both proofs proceed by 
strong induction on the total number of variables in hypothetical pa formulae in 
normal form; this is the only explicit instance of an inductive proof in LoF. Crucial 
to this proof are two facts: 
• Every pa formula has, by virtue of T14 and T15, an equivalent in normal form; 
• A1 [A2] is a tautological equivalence because it is an instance of C3 [C1].50 
                                                          
49. T16 is Cole’s (1968: 346) rule R2. LoF (p. xvii) states that T16 resembles a lemma in Quine’s 
(1938) proof that the CTV is complete. LoF neglects to mention Quine’s later invention of 
TVA, which is essentially identical to the LoF decision procedure for which T16 is the main 
justification. Prior’s (1962: 53, (3); 58-60) re-exposition of Quine’s proof includes proving a 
lemma that is essentially T16. The LoF proof of T16 (restated in §A.10) is vastly easier than 
either Quine’s or Prior’s. 
50. §A.1 demonstrates every consequence the proof of T17 in §A.10 requires. §A.10 also in-
cludes a pa version of Kneebone’s (1963: 48) proof that the CTV is complete, perhaps the 
simplest proof extant. Post (1921) was the first to prove the CTV complete (for a summary, 
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If a logic is sound, then there does not exists a formula α such that both α and ~α can 
both be proved in that logic. If both α and α′ were provable in the pa, then (α′α)=(), 
contradicting J1. Hence the soundness of the pa follows from its completeness. If there 
exists a formula α such that both α=() and ~α=(), then all formulae can be equated to ().51 
In short, if a logic is both sound and complete, then for any statement α of that logic, α is 
a tautology ↔ α is provable. A simple direct proof of soundness goes as follows: 
 
4.4.6. Theorem. The pa is sound. 
Proof: The pa initials are tautologies. When R1 is applied to a tautology, the result is a 
tautology. The rule R2 is valid only when applied to tautologies, in which case it yields a 
tautology. R1 and R2 are the sole rules of inference. Hence any demonstration results in 
a tautology. ? 
Remark. Any formal system for which a proof of this nature goes through is said to 
possess the hereditary property (DeLong 1971: 134). 
 
4.4.7 (T18).  The initials J1 and J2 are independent. 
Remark. That is, neither initial can be proved from the other alone. The very concise LoF 
proof of T18 is wholly syntactic and predicated on there being only two initials. Given 
that J1 and J2 can be demonstrated from C6 alone (cf. §6.2 and §A.4), and that I prefer to 
make OI explicit, so that there are in fact three initials, T18 loses some of its luster. On 
axiom independence, also see Hunter (1971: §36) and Bostock (1997: 195-99). 
5.  Proof and the pa. 
 “As a material machine economises the exertion of force, so a symbolic calculus economises the 
exertion of intelligence. …the more perfect the calculus, the smaller the intelligence compared to 
the results.”                  Thus begins Johnson (1892). 
What is conventionally termed a proof, LoF calls a demonstration, meaning a sequence of 
steps showing that two pa formulae, e.g., φ and γ, are equivalent. The consequence φ=γ 
results. Each step invokes an axiom, initial, or previously demonstrated consequence. R1 
or R2 are seldom explicitly invoked in demonstrations. A demonstration is carried out 
entirely within an object language, the pa or other formal system. The correctness of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
see Hunter 1971: §30). For the completeness proofs of Hilbert and Ackerman, and of Quine 
(1938), see Prior (1962: §§I.II.3, I.III.2). These proofs require over 20 tautologies apiece. 
Hunter (1971: §§31, 32) restates the proofs of Kalmar and Henkin. Kalmar’s proof is the basis 
for those of Stoll (1963: Th. 9.2.3), Epstein (1995: §§II.L.2-3, II.M.2), and Mendelson (1997: 
1.14). These proofs require the Deduction Theorem and at least a dozen lemmas. The proof of 
T17 merely requires J1-C7 and C9. Henkin’s proof has the advantage of yielding the Com-
pactness and Interpolation theorems as corollaries. Finally, there is the cryptic proof of An-
derson and Belnap (1959), restated less tersely in Hunter (1971: §37.4). Nowadays, the pre-
ferred approach to proving the CTV complete relies on refutation trees (e.g., Bostock 1997: 
§§4.6-7; Smullyan 1968: chpt. II). The reader is welcome to peruse this literature and to draw 
a conclusion about the economy of the pa. 
51. The proof is in §A.8. On soundness, see Hunter (1971: §§24, 25a,b, 28) and Hunter’s referen-
ces to Church (1956). Also see Inconsistency in Table 5-3. 
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demonstration can be verified algorithmically, at least in principle. In LoF, proof applies 
only to (meta)theorems. A proof is necessarily metalinguistic, may draw on any device 
from mathematics or logic, and cannot be verified by algorithm.52 
A calculation is a demonstration that methodically eliminates all variables from a pa 
formula. If this elimination is successful, by 2.2.3 and T3 the resulting PA formula sim-
plifies to a primitive value.53 The following algorithm may be helpful: 
 
5.0.1. Algorithm. 
1. Alter α in a series of steps, justifying each step using one or more initials and conse-
quences, with the objective of finding a formula β equivalent to α, from which all 
variables have been eliminated; 
Remark.  C1, C2, and J1 are espfecially powerful here. But C4-C6 too may be seen as 
tools for eliminating redundant variables. C7 can be useful as a last resort. 
2. If β exists, it will be a PA formula, and by T3-T4, any PA formula can be simplified 
using A1 and A2; 
3. Hence if β exists, α is a tautology. If β does not exist, α is satisfiable. 
End of Algorithm 
 
Cal. Signals the beginning of a calculation. To verify a pa equation of the form φ=γ, first 
calculate φ′γ, denoted LR (left to right), then calculate γ′φ, denoted RL (right to left). If 
both conditionals reduce to the same formula, φ=γ holds by T7. Equivalently, φ=γ holds 
if a calculation reduces the biconditional ((φ′γ)(γ′φ)) to (). 
A demonstration of φ=γ consists of a sequence of formulae, beginning with φ. Each 
formula in the sequence results from a step, inferred from one or more preceding formu-
lae in a manner to be discussed shortly. The demonstration terminates when a step re-
sults in the formula γ. Hilbert demonstration is the rather pedantic name I propose for an 
exercise of this nature. A Hilbert demonstration is a variant of common-garden mathe-
matical proof. By virtue of the completeness of the pa (T17), there exists a Hilbert dem-
onstration for any tautology. But T17 gives us no clue on how to find that demonstra-
tion; the proof of T17 suggests restating φ=γ in normal form. Hence if both φ and γ are 
hypothesized from the outset, it is usually easier to verify φ=γ by calculation. 
Time was, Hilbert demonstrations were the only verification technique. During the past 
50-odd years, however, the reigning fashion among logicians (in contrast to mathemati-
cians doing logic) has been, first natural deduction and sequent calculi, both derived 
from Gentzen’s work in the 1930s, then refutation trees (Bostock 1997: §§4.1-4, 6.2, 7.4). 
5.1.  A Decision Procedure. 
“An operand in the primary algebra is merely a conjectured presence or absence of an operator.” 
(LoF, p. 88) 
                                                          
52. The distinction between proof and demonstration is not peculiar to LoF. See Quine (1951: 
319-22), Machover (1996: 120), and Mendelson (1997: 36, fn †). 
53. “Calculation”, a word not appearing in LoF, is my shortening of Dijkstra and Scholten’s 
(1990: 21) calculation proof, meaning a series of steps that transform a given Boolean ex-
pression into True. 
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A different proof procedure, very much in the spirit of the PA, follows from T16: If form-
ulae are equivalent in every case of one variable, they are equivalent, and conversely. Let f〈a〉 and 
g〈a〉 be formulae containing the variable a. Let φ〈()/a〉 denote the uniform replacement of 
a by (), and so on. If f〈()/a〉=g〈()/a〉 and f〈⊥/a〉=g〈⊥/a〉, T16 concludes that f=g, regardless 
of the values of any other variables appearing in f and g. Hence f=g is a tautological 
equivalence. 
Consider the following algorithm for determining the satisfiability of f. Evaluate f〈()/a〉 
and f〈⊥/a〉; let these be two branches. Then note the following facts: 
• Setting an unprimed [primed] variable to ⊥ [()] makes the variable vanish; 
• Setting an unprimed [primed] variable to () [⊥] results in (); 
• If both branches result in the same formula, they terminate; 
• If a branch simplifies to () or ⊥, it terminates. 
At any stage, a branch may be simplified by invoking a consequence; in this regard, J0, 
J1, and C3 are especially useful. A branch containing a recognisable tautology termin-
ates; set it to whichever of () or ⊥ is applicable. Repeat this procedure, each time select-
ing the remaining variable with the most instances so as to save labor. I find it useful to 
notate in the left margin of a row the variable being instantiated in that row. The 
structure of this algorithm is that of a tree; the algorithm terminates when all branches 
of the tree have terminated. 
If all branches of the tree terminate with the same formula, the original formula is a 
tautology. If the branches terminate in a mixture of () and ⊥, the formula is satisfiable, 
with the pattern of () and ⊥ indicating the satisfying atomic valuations. This algorithm 
sufficiently resembles Quine’s (1982: §5) truth value analysis (TVA) that I appropriate the 
name.54 
Fig. 2 gives, by way of example, a TVA proof of Leibniz’s (1969: 244) Praeclarum Theo-
rema, [(p→r)∧(q→s)]→[(p∧q)→(r∧s)]: 
 
Fig. 2. 
Verifying Leibniz’s Praeclarum Theorema via Truth Value Analysis. 
                 (((p′r)(q′s)))((p′q′))(r′s′) 
p   (((r)(q′s)))((q′))(r′s′)         (((()r)(q′s)))((()q′))(r′s′) 
q          ((r′s′))(())(r′s′)  (((r)(()s)))((()))(r′s′)       (((()r)(q′s)))()(r′s′) [C3; C4a] 
         ((r′s′))(r′s′) [C4a] (((r)(()s)))()(r′s′) [A2]        () [C3] 
       () [J0]   () [C3] 
? 
 
Section 6 below will demonstrate the Theorema in three ways. 
Verifying both α′β and β′α by TVA amounts to a TVA verification of the equation α=β. 
Iterate the TVA until the set of formulae terminating the branches of α is the same as the 
                                                          
54. TVA first saw the light of day in the 1950 first edition of Quine (1982). I owe my discovery 
of TVA to Bostock’s (1997: §2.11) elegant treatment thereof, to my knowledge unique among 
contemporary texts. For a fine example of a TVA proof in tree form, see Prior (1962: 17). 
N.B: the “truth value analysis” in Kalish et al (1980: §§II.8-9) is an unrelated concept. 
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set terminating the corresponding branches of β, in which case the equation if verified. 
In all other cases, the equation does not hold. 
Given a formula with n distinct variables, the construction of the corresponding truth 
table requires evaluating 2n PA formulae. This is always a tedious affair, but not an im-
practical one when n does not exceed three or four. Moreover, T3 assures us that a truth 
table and a pa demonstration must yield the same result. But thanks to TVA, any such 
resort to brute force is unnecessary. One round of the above algorithm, applied to the 
variable with the most instances, often suffices.55 
5.2.  J0 and C2 as Initials. 
Because the pa is a Ba, the many postulate sets proposed for Ba (Rudeanu 1963: chpt. 5) 
are also possible sets of pa initials. We shall see that J1, J2, and OI are not necessarily the 
best initials among those known. 
Bricken (1986) demonstrated J1 and J2 from C1-C3; hence C1-C3 can serve as initials. 
They appeal mainly because C1 and C2 alone suffice to justify most calculation steps. 
Also, C1-C3 are very easily verified by a decision procedure, and C2 is much shorter 
than J2. Bricken (2002) improved on C1-C3 by taking the complement of C3, obtaining 
(a())=⊥, and replacing C2 with a notational variant of T13 (see §3.1). I will henceforth 
refer to T13 as C2. From C2 and the complement of C3 he then calculated C1. I replace 
Bricken’s (a()) =⊥ with J0, and derive J1 and J2 from J0 and C2 in §A.1. Thus J0, C2, and 
OI form a very economical basis for the CTV and 2. T18a in §A.10 proves these initials 
independent. For a derivation of J0 from C2 and C3, see §A.1. 
J0 and J1 govern the primitive value (). Table 5-1 shows how the initials J0,C2 can be 
seen as insertion/cancellation rules whose tacit goal is to make all variables vanish: 
• J0 Insert. Anything may be written on both sides of an empty boundary. 
• J0 Cancel. If the entire content of a boundary also occurs in the pervasive space, both 
instances of that content may be erased, leaving an empty boundary. 
• C2 Insert. Anything outside a boundary may be copied into a boundary. 
• C2 Cancel. If any part of the content of a boundary also occurs in the pervasive space, 
that part may be erased. When a given subformula appears on both sides of a bound-
ary, the interior instance is always redundant. 
J0 can be seen as the sole axiom of natural deduction, and as akin to the rule for closing a 
branch in a tableau (cf. Bostock 1997: chpts. 4,6). C2 can be seen as a paired insertion and 
elimination (Fitch’s term was intelim) rule for ¬ and ∨/∧ of the sort that is typical of 
natural deduction. Likewise, A1 [A2] can be seen as an intelim rule for () [⊥]. 
 
 
                                                          
55. Ascertaining the satisfiability of a formula with n distinct variables via truth tables requires 
evaluating 2n interpretations. Hence the truth table decision procedure for CTV satisfiability 
is said to require exponential time. Whether there exists a decision procedure for satisfiability 
that is merely a polynomial function of n, (i.e., a procedure executable in polynomial time) is 
a major unsolved problem in computational mathematics; see Hodges (2001: 23-24) and ref-
erences cited therein. While I submit that TVA is quicker and easier than truth tables, especi-
ally when n is not large, I cannot claim that executing TVA on a computer would require less 
than exponential time for any n. 
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Table 5-1.  The pa in a Nutshell. 
Initial Content of () Action Notation Antecedents 
OI Na Reorder at will the con- 
tent of any subspace. 
abc=bca Dilworth (1938) 
Byrne (1946) 
Let there be a boundary, and let a appear outside it.   
J0 a 
Write (a′a) anywhere, 
   and erase it at will. 
(a)a = () Natural deduction 
C2 ab Only the shallowest 
instance of a is nonre- 
dundant. 
a(b〈a〉)=a(b〈⊥//a〉) Rule of (De)Iteration 
in Peirce’s Existential 
Graphs† 
† See 2i-e in Table 6-1. 
 
It should now be clear why pa demonstrations here and in LoF work J0−C2 very hard. 
Moreover, consequences beyond these are required in only a few situations. Demon-
strating C9 requires C6; calculating it requires C7 as well. The proofs of T14-T18 invoke 
C9 twice and C7 once. The pa demonstrations in §3.3 and §5.4 invoke C5 twice and C4 
once. 
J2 is one of Huntington’s (1904) Ba postulates (cf. §6.2), and all demonstrations of J2 I 
have encountered are nontrivial. Is this why Spencer-Brown chose J2 as an initial? In any 
event, by deeming J2 an initial, all LoF demonstrations, those of C1 and C9 excepted, are 
near-trivial. While demonstrating J2 from J0,C2 is a bit involved, this is amply offset by 
an easy derivation of C1 and by the calculating power, revealed in §5.4, that J0, C1, and 
C2 afford. 
All CTV tautologies can be verified by TVA. Furthermore, the axioms of the CTV are a 
small subset of the set of all tautologies. From these undisputed facts, Quine (1951: *100; 
1982: §13), citing Herbrand, argues that all CTV tautologies are equally deserving of the 
honorific title of axiom. (Concurring voices include Smullyan 1968: 81, Wolf 1998: 79, 
and Cori & Lascar 2000: §4.1.1.) This commendably egalitarian view, however, fails to 
distinguish the context of verification, i.e., determing the satisfiability of formulae, for 
which decision procedures are indeed adequate, from the context of discovery, one re-
quiring proof from axioms or rules, trial, error, and inspiration. We may make the axi-
oms as economical as desired.56 
Boundary logic is classical simply because (a∨~a)↔T interprets J0. Intuitionist logic is 
based on axioms (Kneebone 1963: §9.4) from which equivalents of J0 and C1 cannot be 
demonstrated. Moreover, in intuitionist logic, no subset of {∧,∨,→,~} is EA. C2 has the 
following intuitionist interpretation. [(a→c)∧(b→c)]→(a∨b)→c is an intuitionist axiom. 
The substitution b/c yields [(a→b)∧(b→b)]→[(a∨b)→b]. Now b→b evaluates to T, and 
(a→b)∧T evaluates to a→b. Hence (a→b)→[(a∨b)→b], one half of C2, is an intuitionist 
tautology but the converse, [(a∨b)→b]→(a→b), is not. Devising a boundary syntax and 
proof theory for intuitionist logic would be an interesting exercise. 
I now derive another boundary representation of the Ba and CTV. Consider the follow-
ing trivial syntax: If a,b,c are formulae, then ab, (ab)c, and a(bc) are formulae. Given the 
                                                          
56. For a defense of Hilbert proof in contexts where a decision procedure is available, see Epstein 
(1995: §II.K.1). 
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semantics ab ⇔ a→b and (ab)c ⇔ (a→b)→c, this syntax suffices for CTV statements 
whose sole connective is →. The axioms PIA1, (ab)b=(ba)a, and PIA2,  a(bc)=b(ac), result 
in positive implication algebra (PIA), in which all intuitionistically valid tautological equiv-
alences whose sole connective is the conditional are demonstrable. Parentheses are re-
quired because the conditional does not associate. Introduce the symbol ⊥ with intended 
reading false. a⊥ then defines intuitionist negation, ¬a (Prior 12.3); no axioms are re-
quired. The path to classical logic begins by adding (ab)a=a [C4] to PIA, yielding implica-
tion algebra (IA; Abbott 1969: §7-4; Wolfram 2002: 803).57 IA stands to the implicational 
calculus as BA stands to the CTV. a⊥ now defines classical negation. Adding the axiom 
⊥a=bb [C3] to IA yields the CTV (Prior 3.12) and renders C1, (a⊥)⊥=a, and J0, aa=bb, 
demonstrable. Hence IA+C3 is equivalent to Ba, interpretable as classical logic. 
5.3. The Usual Inference Rules of Logic. 
“…if one could find characters or signs appropriate for expressing our thoughts as neatly and as 
exactly as arithmetic expresses numbers or geometric analysis expresses lines, one could accom-
plish in all subjects in so far as they are amenable to reasoning all that can be done in Arith-
metic and Geometry. For all investigations depending on reasoning would be performed by the 
transposition of characters and by a sort of calculus, which would render very easy the invention 
of beautiful results. Hence we would not need to worry our heads as much as we do at present, 
yet we would be sure that we could execute anything feasible. Moreover, we could convince all of 
what we had found or concluded, since it would be easy to verify the calculation… And were 
someone to doubt what I was proposing, I would say to him ‘Sir, let us calculate’ and thus… 
soon settle the question.”            Leibniz (1903: 155-56).58 
The only inference rules mentioned so far are R1 and R2, which suffice for equational 
logics. All other truth functional inference rules, including those characterizing ponen-
tial logics, are special cases of the inference rule Wolf (1998: §§3.5, 4.2) calls propositional 
consequence, PC. First some definitions: 
 
5.3.1. Definition. An argument consists of one or more formulae called premises, and a 
formula called a conclusion. A clause (Cori & Lascar 2000: §§1.3.2, 4.4.1) links the con-
joined premises to the conclusion via the conditional. PC asserts that an argument is 
valid, meaning that the conclusion follows from the premises, iff the corresponding 
clause is a tautology. 
 
Let the premises be φ1…φn, and let χ be a conclusion. Then PC can be stated as: 
 
(1) φ1,…,φn ? χ ⇔ ? [φ1∧…∧φn]→χ ⇔ (((φ1)…(φn)))χ [C1] = (φ1)…(φn)χ = (). 
 
The BA clause associated with an argument simply encloses each premise, then juxta-
poses the conclusion and the enclosed premises. While I have tacitly assumed that a 
                                                          
57. When stated in IA notation, C4 exactly resembles the absorption law of lattice theory (L2 in 
Table 3-3). 
58. Emphasis in original. From “Préface a la Science Génerale,” included in the volume of Leib-
niz texts first published by Couturat. When I compared Wiener’s translation (Leibniz 1951: 
15) to the original (Leibniz 1903: 155), I saw that the former left something to be desired. 
Hence the translation is mine. 
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clause contains but one conclusion, doing so entails no loss of generality: a clause can 
contain multiple conclusions, all juxtaposed. 
Ascertain the satisfiability of a clause as follows: 
• Translate every premise and every conclusion into the pa; 
• Enclose each premise, then concatenate the premises and conclusions; 
• Invoke C5 to erase all duplicate instances of a subformula within a given subspace; 
• Invoke C1 to erase redundant parentheses; 
• Invoke C2 to erase redundant subformula instances at different depths; 
• Invoke J1 to erase any subformulae of the form (α′α). 
If the above results in a primitive value, the clause or its negation is always valid. If the 
result is a formula, the clause is valid under those atomic valuations satisfying that 
formula. 
 
Table 5-2. 
Some Common Instances of Propositional Consequence.  
Name φ1 φ2 φ3 χ Source 
Contrapositive α′ β  α′β 88 
Conjunction α β  (α′β′) 88 
modus ponens α α′β  β 79 
modus tollens α′β β′  α′ 88 
Biconditional α′β β′α  ((α′β)(β′α)) 85 
Syllogism59 α*β β′γ*  α*γ* --- 
Proof by cases αβ α′γ β′γ γ 84 
Source: Corresponding page number in Wolf (1998). 
 
The inference rule modus ponens (from α and α→β, infer β; also known as the rule of 
detachment) of conventional ponential logic is a special case of PC. Table 5-2 includes 
modus ponens and several other inference rules discussed in Wolf (1998). Greek letters 
are metalogical devices, standing for anything that can be assigned a truth value. 
Table 5-3 presents the usual inference rules of contemporary logic, taken from Machover 
(1996) and Bostock (1997), along with their boundary justifications. The boundary trans-
lation of the syntactic and semantic turnstiles is: prime all objects to the left of the turn-
stile, then concatenate everything on both sides. Given this translation, the inference 
rules in Table 5-3 are all trivial pa consequences.  
Basic Sequents and Inconsistency are all J0 in another guise; ditto for INT and OI, CON 
and C5, and Indirect Proof and C1. The Cut Rule is the only rule whose demonstration in-
vokes C2. Its meaning is simpler than may appear: if both ϕ and ϕ′ appear in the 
premises, ϕ is irrelevant to the conclusion.60 
                                                          
59. Cal. (α*β)(β′γ*)α*γ* [C2,2x] = (β)(β′)α*γ* [C2; OI] = (β′α*γ*)β′α*γ* [J0] = (). ? Validity 
requires that the letter not appearing in the conclusion (β in this case) appear primed in one 
premise, unprimed in the other. 
60. This is the import of LoF’s (p. 123) unproved Interpretive Theorem 1. The Cut Rule is no-
where mentioned. 
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The molecular subformulae making up the BA representation of a clause can be permut-
ed at will. Hence all partitions of these molecular subformulae into premises and conclu-
sions have the same BA translation and hence are equivalent. In particular, (φn) and ? in 
(1) can be transposed; the result is the boundary logic equivalent of the Deduction Theo-
rem. Moreover, the validity of a clause does not depend on whether any particular mol-
ecular subformula is included among the premises or the conclusion, as long as any 
formula moved from one side of the turnstile to the other is first enclosed. This is 
presumably why boundary logic dispenses with all turnstiles. 
 
Table 5-3.  Some Common Logical Rules and Their Boundary Derivations. 
Name Formal Version pa Derivation Source† 
Bostock’s (1997) Structural Rules 
Basic Sequents‡ Γ,ϕ ? ϕ,Δ Γ′ϕ′ϕΔ [J0] = (). p. 285 
INTerchange, L [Γ,ϕ,ψ,Δ?Θ] → [Γ,ψ,ϕ,Δ?Θ] (Γ′ϕ′ψ′Δ′Θ)Γ′ψ′ϕ′Δ′Θ [OI; J0] 
= (). 
§7.1 
        “             , R [Γ?Δ,ϕ,ψ,Θ]→[Γ?Δ,ψ,ϕ,Θ] (Γ′ΔϕψΘ)Γ′ΔψϕΘ [OI; J0] =() “ 
CONtraction, L [Γ,ϕ,ϕ ? Δ] → [Γ,ϕ ? Δ] (Γ′ϕ′ϕ′Δ)Γ′ϕ′Δ [C5; J0] = (). “ 
        “             , R [Γ ? ϕ,ϕΔ] → [Γ ? ϕ,Δ] (Γ′ϕ′Δ)Γ′ϕ′ϕ′Δ [C5; J0] = (). “ 
CUT [Γ ? ϕ,Δ] ∧ [Φ,ϕ ? Θ] 
 → [Γ,Φ ? Δ,Θ] 
(((Γ′ϕΔ)(Φ′ϕ′Θ)))Γ′Φ′ΔΘ [C1; 
C2,4x] = (ϕ)(ϕ′)Γ′Φ′ΔΘ [J0] =() 
§2.5.C 
Machover’s (1996) Inference Rules 
Indirect proof, 
reductio 
Γ,~α ? ⊥ ↔ Γ ? α Γ′((α))⊥ [C1] = Γ′α . §7.8.9, 
15 
Deduction 
Theorem 
Γ,α ? β ↔ Γ ? α→β Γ′α′β = Γ′α′β. §7.7.2 
Inconsistency61 [Γ ? ⊥] ? [Γ ? β] (Γ′⊥)Γ′β [C4a; J0] = (). §7.8.6 
† Section of Bostock (1997) or Machover (1996) where the rule in question is introduced 
and discussed. The formal versions are from Bostock (1997: 385). 
‡ Replacing Bostock’s (§2.5) ASSumptions, and THINning from the left, right. 
Note: L=left; R=right. A lower [upper] case Greek letter denotes a single formula [set of 
formulae]. A primed upper case letter signifies that each constituent formula is primed. 
 
5.3.2. The pa Recapitulated. The primitive basis of the primary algebra (pa) consists of: 
• The PA; 
• Variables (statement letters), with or without subscripts ranging over the natural 
numbers, inserted anywhere in a PA formula. ‘′’ and ‘…’ are improper symbols; 
• The initial (3.1.5) set (a)a=(), a(ab) = a(b), and abc=bca; 
• The usual inference rules for equational logics, the substitution of equivalents (R1), 
and the uniform replacement of variables (R2). 
Juxtaposition is a tacit connective that commutes and associates. Hence the contents of a 
boundary and its pervasive space can be rearranged at will. The pa is well-suited to a 
decision procedure resembling Quine’s truth value analysis. That decision procedure  
verifies the initials. Other tautologies may be demonstrated, Hilbert-style, or verified by 
calculation. The pa is sound and complete, and has two intended interpretations: 2 and 
                                                          
61. Cf. §A.8 and text related to fn 50. 
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the CTV. Boundary logic follows from the interpretation () ⇔ T [F], then αβ ⇔ α∨β 
[α∧β]. In either case, (α) ⇔ ~α.62 
 
5.4. Some Worked Examples. 
“Civilization advances by extending the number of important operations which we can perform 
without thinking about them. Operations of thought are like cavalry charges in a battle—they are 
strictly limited in number, they require fresh horses, and must only be made at decisive 
moments.”                  Whitehead (1948: 61). 
 “…standard university logic problems, which the calculus published in this text renders so easy 
that we need not trouble ourselves further with them...”        LoF, p. viii. 
I now give a number of worked examples showing that CTV proofs in undergraduate 
textbooks can be greatly simplified if the problem is first translated into BA notation, as 
per Table 4-2, and the proof executed as a pa demonstration, as per §5.0 above. This 
procedure requires the following metatheorem. “MP” abbreviates the rule modus ponens. 
 
5.4.1. Theorem. The BA and the CTV have the same expressive power. In symbols, BA ? 
CTV and CTV ? BA. 
Proof. The proof is in two parts. The first derives in BA the rule MP and a set of three 
axioms for sentential logic, PC1-PC3 below (Prior 1.4c) and hereinafter PC1-3. Hence BA 
? CTV. I then derive OI, J0, and C2 (simple form) in the CTV, and note that R1 and R2 
are CTV metatheorems⎯see the references in §3.1. Hence CTV ? BA. 
BA ? CTV. The basis PC1-3 and the rule MP are all easy BA consequences: 
PC1: Cal. ϕ→ξ→ϕ ⇔ (ϕ)(ξ)ϕ [C2; OI] = (ξ′ϕ)ξ′ϕ [J0] = (). ? 
PC2: Cal. [ϕ→ξ→ν]→[(ϕ→ξ)→(ϕ→ν)] ⇔ ((ϕ)(ξ)ν)((ϕ)ξ)(ϕ)ν [OI; C2] = ((ξ)(ϕ)ν)(ξ)(ϕ)ν 
[J0] = (). ? 
PC3: Cal. [~ϕ→~ξ]→ξ→ϕ ⇔ (((ϕ))(ξ))(ξ)ϕ [C1; OI] = (ϕ(ξ))ϕ(ξ) [J0] = (). ? 
MP: Cal. (α)(α′β)β [OI] = (α′β)α′β [J0] = (). ? 
CTV ? BA. The CUT rule (Table 5-3) is derivable in the CTV. Let Γ=PC1-3+MP, ϕ=PM, 
Θ= BA, and Δ,Φ = ∅. Then CUT results in the clause [PC1-3+MP ? PM] ∧ [PM ? BA] → 
[PC1-3+MP ? BA]. PC1-3+MP ? PM holds simply because PC1-3 is a CTV basis and MP 
is *1.11. To show that PM ? BA, translate BA concatenation as alternation and ‘=’ as the 
biconditional. Then note that J0 is *2.08 in PM, and that the two halves of C2, viewed as 
a biconditional, are *2.621 and *2.67. Recall that the only purpose of OI is to prove that 
alternation commutes and associates, facts which the PM axioms *1.4 and *1.5 assure. 
Hence PC1-3+MP ? BA. ? 
Remark. The calculations for PC1 and PC2 reveal that these are C2 in another guise; ditto 
for PC3 and C1. Note that all four calculations invoke J0 in the final step. PC1-3 neither 
are, nor claim to be, “obvious” and “elementary.” PC3 is one of many possible axioms 
                                                          
62. Kauffman (2001) and Bricken (2002) exposit BA and boundary logic in a manner arguably 
more in philosophical sympathy with LoF. Other possible approaches, not pursued here, to a 
deeper understanding of BA include elementary topology (Rosser 1969: 12-20), mereology 
and mereotopology (Simon 1987; Casati and Varzi 1999), cognition and mathematics (Lakoff 
and Núñez 2001), and semiotics (Merrell 1995). 
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governing negation. J1 fills that role in LoF; C1 is arguably the simplest. PC1 and PC2 are 
popular as axioms because they facilitate the proof of the Deduction Theorem (Macho-
ver 1996: 7.7.3), stated in Table 5-3 above.63 
 
Many of the demonstration in the remainder of this paper are in columnar form, with 
the annotations written to the right of each step. Text about to be deleted in the next step 
is underlined. When subformulae or nested parentheses first appear, or change depth, 
they are shown in bold, as before. Demonstrations very seldom require A1, and J1 
usually can do what A2 does. 
If a step invokes one of C6-C9, the annotation may be more complicated, building on the 
fact that BA formulae can be taken as schemata, in which case they are stated using up-
per case letters. E.g., C6 is assumed to take the form (A′B′)(A′B)=A. R2 allows the uni-
form replacement of any upper case statement letter by a subformula. Substitutions are 
notated as per the following example. If the subformulae α and β are substituted for A 
and B in C6, the annotation is ‘C6, α/A, β/B’, with the actual values of α and β written 
using lower case letters. 
 
Example 1. I now calculate six rather involved tautologies taken from standard texts. The 
first two are from Nolt et al (1998: 4.46, 109). 
 
Dem. (p→q) ↔ ~(p∧~q) ⇔ (p)q = (((p)((q)))) [C1, 2x] = (p)q. ? 
 
I have taken the liberty of translating ‘↔’ as ‘=’. To someone experienced in the pa, the 
tautological equivalence of (p→q)↔~(p∧~q) is evident at a glance. 
The next problem is to verify the clause: 
 
  ~s↔(~p∨~v), v∧p ? s From the conjunction of everything to the left of ‘?’, 
infer the alternation of everything to the right of ‘?’. 
 ⇔ (((((sp′v′)((p′v′)s′)))((v′p′))))s  
                      (sp′v′)((p′v′)s′)v′p′s C1, 3x 
                      (sp′v′)sp′v′((p′v′)s′) OI 
   () J0. ? 
 
I chose the two preceding examples because the corresponding demonstrations in Nolt 
et al are the longest purely sentential proofs in that text, respectively 18 and 21 lines 
long. The next two examples are from Kalish et al (1980: 417, 66f). 
 
    (a→b) → [(a∧b) ↔ a)]                [(~a→r)∧(b→r)] ↔ [(a→b)→r] 
⇔ (a'b)((((a'b'))a)(a'(a'b')))     ⇔ ((((ar)(b'r)))((a'b)r))(((ar)(b'r))(a'b)r) 
        (a'b)((a'ab')(a'(a'b')))   C1; OI        ((ar)(b'r)((a'b)r))((a'(b'))(a'b)r)  C1; C2,2x 
                 (a'b)((a'(a'b')))      J1            ((ar)(b'r)((a'b)r))((a'b)(a'b)r)  C1 
                    (a'b)((a'(b'))) C2                              ((ar)(b'r)((a'b)r))((a'b)r)  C5 
                                                          
63. PC1, PC2, and the converse of PC3 are three of the six axioms in Frege’s Begriffschrifft 
(Prior 1.1). Lukasiewicz found in 1930 that Frege’s three other axioms could be derived from 
PC1-3, a basis commanding pride of place in Church (1956: 119) and Bostock (1997: 387). 
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                       (a'b)((a'b))       C1                                         ((ar)(b'r))((a'b)r)   C2 
                                     () J0. ?                                                r((a'b))(a'b)r   J2 
                            ()   C1; J0. ? 
 
I chose these examples because the corresponding demonstrations in Kalish et al are 32 
and 27 lines long, respectively. The former fills an entire page and is preceded by five 
pages of discussion. The demonstrations in Nolt et al and Kalish et al are not reproduced 
here because they require 102 lines in all and invoke natural deduction techniques that 
are beyond the scope of this paper, typographically as well as logically. The above four 
pa calculations require a mere 22 steps. 
The next example, from MacKay (1989: exercise 9m.4), requires determining the satisfia-
bility of ((p↔~q)↔~p)↔~q. I translate α↔~β as ((α′β′)(αβ)). To avoid working with a 
single very long formula, I break up the rightmost biconditional into two conditionals. 
 
((p↔~q)↔~p) → ~q    ~q → ((p↔~q)↔~p) 
        ⇔ (((p′q′)(pq)p)(((p′q′)(pq))p′))q′      ⇔ q((p′q′)(pq)p)(((p′q′)(pq))p′) 
           (((p′)(q)p)(((p′q′)p′q′(pq))p′))q′   C2,4x        q((p′q′)(pq)pq)(((p′q′q)(p))p′)     C2,3x 
   (((p′)p)( p′))q′    J1; C2        q(((p))p′)     J1,2x 
        ((p)( p′))q′    C2           q     J1. ? 
          q′    J1 
 
As one conditional simplifies to q′ and the other to q, their conjunction evaluates to ⊥ by 
C1 and J1. While this calculation is a bit involved (14 steps), mainly because ‘↔’ lacks a 
concise pa representation, it requires only J1 and C2. By contrast, MacKay’s (pp. 368-69) 
proof is 43 lines long and invokes 11 natural deduction rules. 
The most spectacular example of this nature I have saved for last. Leblanc and Wis-
dom’s (1976: 395) proof of [p∨(q→r)]↔[(p∨q)→(p∨r)] is 42 lines long and invokes eight 
natural deduction rules. If the single instance of ‘↔’ is taken as ‘=’, the pa demonstration 
is utterly trivial:  Dem. pq′r [OI] = q′pr [C2] = (pq)pr. ? 
Example 2. Quine (1982: 69) introduces the DNF as a method for determining satisfiabili-
ty, and builds his exposition of the DNF around a six page discussion of the formula (1), 
one he deems “forbidding”: 
 
(1) ~(((p→(~s∧q))→~((s∧q)→p))∧~(~(r∧p)∧~(p→s))). 
 
Because (1) includes five instances of conjunction and none of alternation, I translate it 
using the dual reading. Hence x∧y translates as xy rather than (x′y′). 
 
⇔ (((p(s′q))(((sq)p′)))((rp)(ps′)))  
(((p(s′q))(sq)p′)χ)    C1; let χ=((rp)(ps′)) 
              (((p′p(s′q))(sq)p′)χ)    C2; OI 
            (((sq)p′)χ)    J0 
          (((sq)p′)((rp)(ps′)))    Expand χ 
              (((sq)p′)p(r′(s′)))       J2 
   ((p′p(sq))p(r′s))    C2; OI; C1; OI 
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          (p(sr′))    J1. ? 
 
Conclusion: (1) is satisfied when p→s→r is the case. Note how this technique easily 
reveals the irrelevance of q, even of all of (1) to the left of the third ‘∧’. 
Example 3. Now for two examples from texts with a contemporary following. Hurley 
(2000: 415, exercise 19) asks students to verify the clause: 
 
    a→(nn′)→s∨t, t→(f∧~f) ∴ a→s. 
  ⇔ (a′(nn′)st)(t′(ff′))a′s   
          (a′st)(t′)a′s J1,2x 
   (a′st)a′st C1; OI 
   () J0. ? 
 
Hurley’s natural deduction proof (p. 653) requires 19 steps and invokes 13 rules. 
Lepore’s (2003: 131) exercise 8.5.2 asks whether ((p∧q∧k)∨~r) and (r→(~q→ (p∧~(v∨~j)))) 
are equivalent. Following Lepore, I breake up the problem into two conditionals and 
calculate each: 
 
((p∧q∧k)∨~r) → (r→(~q→(p∧~(v∨~j))))  (r→(~q→(p∧~(v∨~j)))) → ((p∧q∧k)∨~r) 
       ⇔ ((p′q′k′)r′)r′q(p′vj′)          ⇔ (r′q(p′vj′))(p′q′k′)r′  
    ((p′q′k′))r′q(p′vj′) C2        (q(p′vj′))(p′q′k′)r′ C2 
         q′qp′k′r′(p′vj′) C1; OI              (q(vj′))(q′k′)p′r J2. 
       () J0.        (qv′)(qj)(q′k′)p′r C7. 
 
The conditional on the right cannot be simplified any further. Hence the two halves of 
the biconditional do not simplify to the same formula, and the two statements are not 
equivalent. Note the use of C7 on the right to obtain the NF, which is more nakedly re-
vealing of the inability to proceed further. Lepore’s worked answer using refutation 
trees is 25 lines long, invokes 6 rules, and fills all of his p. 389. 
Example 4. I now give a detailed example of how the pa simplifies clausal reasoning, by 
reworking Stoll’s (1963: 184) Example 4.4.3. Unlike the case with the other examples in 
this section, reproducing Stoll’s proof is a manageable affair; thus Table 5-4. A lone ‘p’ in 
the third column identifies a row containing a premise. A ‘t’ in the same column signi-
fies that an unspecified tautology has been invoked. The numbers in the rightmost col-
umn are the row numbers of the premises upon which the formula in a given row de-
pends. The conclusion is in the bottom row. 
 
Table 5-4. 
Stoll’s (1963) Example 4.4.3. 
1 ~C∧~U p 1 
2 ~U 1,t 1 
3 S→U p 3 
4 ~S 2,3,t 1,3 
5 ~C 1,t 1 
6 ~C∧~S 4,5,t 1,3 
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7 ~(C∨S) 6,t 1,3 
8 (W∨P)→I p 8 
9 I→(C∨S) p 9 
10 (W∨P)→(C∨S) 8,9,t 8,9 
11 ~(W∨P) 7,10,t 1,3,8,9 
12 ~W∧~P 11,t 1,3,8,9 
13 ~W 12,t 1,3,8,9 
 
Readers unversed in natural deduction need take away from Table 5-4 only the relative 
opacity of its content. Stoll’s example can be recast as the following clause: 
 
Premises: (CU)  ⇔ ~C∧~U   Conclusion:  (W) ⇔ ~W 
(S)U  ⇔ S→U 
(WP)I  ⇔ (W∨P)→I 
(I)CS  ⇔ I→(C∨S) 
The pa calculation verifying this clause goes as follows: 
((CU))((S)U)((WP)I)((I)CS)W′ Enclose premises, concatenate all. 
     CU((S)U)((WP)I)((I)CS)W′ C1 
           CU((S))((WP)I)((I)S)W′ C2,2x 
     CUS((WP)I)((I)S)W′ C1 
            CUS((WP)I)((I))W′ C2 
              CUS((WP)I)IW′ C1 
               CUS((WP))IW′ C2 
                    CUSWPIW′ C1 
                    W′WCUSPI OI 
            () J0. ? 
 
Stoll proof’s staggers the introduction of the four premises; deciding what premise 
should be invoked where requires nontrivial reflection. The pa calculation introduces all 
premises at the outset, then proceeds mechanically, either invoking C2 to prune a re-
dundant instance of a variable, or C1 to eliminate redundant boundaries. When a 
primed and unprimed instance of the same variable appears in the pervasive space, J0 
terminates the calculation. I submit that the above calculation is vastly simpler than 
Stoll’s proof. The pa also reveals that a valid argument from Stoll’s premises requires 
that at least one variable appearing in the premises also appear primed in the con-
clusion. 
End of Examples 
These examples reveal that pa calculations are much easier than conventional proofs. 
The simplicity of pa calculation stems from: 
• A notation that fully embodies the expressive adequacy of {∨/∧,~}; 
• Working very hard a mere five rules, OI, J0, J1, C1, and C2. 
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The 10 demonstrations in Examples 1-4 employ all other resources of the pa a mere four 
times: J2 twice, and C5 and C7 once apiece. That the pa accomplishes so much with so 
little reveals that in practice, the pa is more than just a new notation for the CTV and 2.64 
 
5.5. Syllogisms as Clauses. 
“If, as I hope, I can conceive all propositions as terms, and hypotheticals as categoricals... this 
promises a wonderful ease in my symbolism and analysis of concepts, and will be a discovery of 
the greatest importance.”          Leibniz (1966: 66).65 
The syllogism of traditional logic is the oldest and most intensively studied clausal form. 
That logic, founded in ancient Greece, restricted each premise and conclusion to a state-
ment of the form “[All/Some] α are [Not] β.” Such statements are categorical forms, 
where α and β are metavariables standing for terms. Linguistically and intensionally, a 
term is a common noun or a noun phrase. Mathematically and extensionally, a term is a 
set, in which case ‘all α are β’ may be seen as shorthand for ‘all members of set α are also 
members of set β’, i.e., α⊆β. A syllogism is a clause consisting of two premises and a con-
clusion, each in categorical form. The clause contains three terms, each term appearing 
in two categorical forms. For a modern overview of the syllogism, see Kneebone (1963: 
8-22). 
Table 5-5 shows how to interpret the pa as a logic of terms and categorical forms, if let-
ters are reinterpreted as term names. Letting, as before, a ‘*’ after a variable denote a lit-
eral, the pa notation (α′β*)* captures all possible categorical forms. Monadic logic works 
as follows. Let Aa=() if it is indeed the case that a is a member of set α; likewise for Bb 
and the set β. Quine (1982: §§18-20) designed his Boolean term schemata (BTS in Table 5-5) 
so as to embody the Boolean structure common to the syllogism, the logic of terms, and 
the monadic predicate calculus. The resulting notation is (unwittingly) very similar to 
that of the pa.66 
 
Table 5-5. 
Alternative Notations for the Four Categorical Forms. 
* Categorical Form pa BTS Monadic Logic Set Algebra 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A All α are β α′β -αβ′ ∀x[Ax→Bx] α⊆β 
E No α are β α′β′ -αβ ∀x¬[Ax∧Bx] α∩β=∅ 
I Some α are β (α′β′) αβ ∃x[Ax∧Bx] α∩β≠∅ 
                                                          
64. I invite the reader to compare the demonstrations in LoF and here with those in Nidditch 
(1962), a book comparable to LoF in size and time of writing, also intended for undergraduate 
instruction, but far more conventional in approach. Deferring to intuitionist logic, Nidditch 
posits 11 algebraic axioms and the rule modus ponens, then proves 4 lemmas and 58 theorems 
(a category that lumps together what are here called (meta)theorems and consequences). 
65. Original in Leibniz (1903: 377, §75). 
66. Leibniz algebraized the categorical forms in a manner closely related to the one set out in the 
text. In paragraphs 83-87 of a paper written in 1686 but published only in 1903, Leibniz 
(1966: 67-68) wrote αβ*=α and αβ*≠α where I write α′β* and (α′β*). Also see Leibniz 
(1966: xlvii, Scheme III). 
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O Some α are not β (α′β) αβ′ ∃x¬[Ax→Bx] α∩β′≠∅ 
*  These abbreviation are from medieval logic. 
 
The clause (α′β)(β′γ)α′γ corresponds to the syllogism medieval tradition named ‘Barba-
ra’.67 This clause is an instance of the more general clause (α*β)(β′γ*)α*γ* (cf. Table 5-2), 
which admits of 24 possible permutations, and tradition indeed asserts the validity of 24 
syllogistic forms. Unfortunately, not all of those forms correspond to one of the 24 per-
mutations of (α*β)(β′γ*)α*γ*. Determining the number and form of the possible variants 
of (α*β)(β′γ*)α*γ* admitted by tradition is a nontrivial combinatoric exercise. There are 
three meaningful permutations of (α′β)(β′γ)α′γ, one for each possible position of α′γ. 
There are also six possible permutations of (α′β)(β′γ′)α′γ′. Given any of the latter, if both 
terms in a premise are primed, the terms may commute. Thus (α′β)(β′γ′)α′γ′ gives rise to 
three permutations, for a total of 15 valid syllogisms thus far. 
If we assume that at least one of α, β, or γ is nonempty, i.e., that at least one of α≠⊥, β≠⊥, 
or γ≠⊥ holds, then variants of the clause (α′β)(β′γ*)(α′γ*)* can be valid, where each ‘*’ 
stands for the presence or absence of a ‘′’. (β′γ′)(α′β)(α′γ) is valid if α≠⊥ or γ≠⊥. Moreov-
er, permuting β′γ′ does not affect validity; result, four valid syllogisms. (α′β)(β′γ′)(α′γ) is 
valid if α≠⊥; β′γ′ can again be permuted, resulting in two valid syllogisms. (α′β)(β′γ)(α′γ′) 
is valid if at least one of α≠⊥, β≠⊥, or γ≠⊥ is the case, result ing three valid syllogisms. 
The approach of this paragraph yields nine more valid syllogisms, for a total of 24. 
These 24 include five pairs whose members differ only in that where one has “all” in the 
conclusion, the other has “some.” 
Hence Appendix 2 of LoF is mistaken when it asserts that Barbara (by which it means 
(α*β)(β′γ*)α*γ* ) nests all 24 valid syllogisms. Barbara nests only the 15 syllogisms not re-
quiring that one or more terms be assumed nonempty. (α′β)(β′γ*)(α′γ*) is not an instance 
of Barbara, but can be valid given suitable nonemptiness assumptions. Deriving the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a syllogism to be valid, I leave to future research. 
The above approach is essentially that of Lukasiewicz, who axiomatized the syllogism 
by adding term variables to the CTV, extending the scope of R2 to such variables, and 
then introducing four axioms. Translated into the pa notation of this section, these axi-
oms are: 
• α′α=(). J0 holds for term variables; 
• (α′α′) [C5; C1] = α = (). This has the effect of assuming all terms nonempty; 
• Two axioms equivalent to asserting that (α′β)(β′γ*)α′γ*=() holds for term variables. 
On this and other attempts to algebraize the syllogism, see Prior 10.11-6. None of these 
alternatives are as simple as (α′β)(β′γ*)(α′γ*)*, or reveal that elementary Ba suffices to 
test syllogisms if all terms are assumed nonempty. At any rate, the pa nicely trivializes 
what had been a rather involved subject for over 2000 years. 
 
 
                                                          
67. Barbara follows from the CUT rule (Table 5-3) when both Δ and Φ are empty. 
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6.  Historical Antecedents and More Axiomatics. 
6.1. Peirce‘s Existential Graphs. 
”[A thorough understanding of mathematical reasoning] is the purpose for which my logical 
algebras were designed but which, in my opinion, they do not sufficiently fulfill. The system of 
existential graphs is far more perfect in that respect...”      Peirce (4.429, 1903) 
Kauffman (2001) discusses how the pa resembles the graphical logic to which Peirce de-
voted much of his last 20 years. Peirce’s logical graphs are planar representations of log-
ic formulae, consisting of ovals, called seps, that may be nested, and atomic formulae 
written anywhere. (Peirce usually referred to seps as cuts, a term I avoid because of pos-
sible confusion with the Cut Rule of conventional logic, discussed in §5.3.) The graphical 
logic has but one very simple syntactic rule: seps cannot intersect. Seps and BA bounda-
ries are functionally identical and share a common logical interpretation as denial.68 
Peirce devised two systems of graphical logic, the entitative and existential graphs. In the 
former, the blank page denotes falsity, so that juxtaposition denotes alternation. LoF (p. 
5) unwittingly concurs with this entitative interpretation of the blank page. Hence the 
entitative graphs and the primal reading of the pa share the same semantics. Peirce dev-
eloped the existential graphs (EG) at far greater length, even subtitling them “My Chef 
d’Oeuvre” (4.347-529, 1903); hence I will not linger over the entitative graphs. In the EG, 
the blank page denotes truth and juxtaposition denotes conjunction. Hence the EG are 
dual to the entitative graphs. The EG are of three kinds, the first of which, alpha (herein-
after alpha graphs), is isomorphic to the pa. The scope and power of Peirce’s graphical 
logic did not become clear until Roberts (1973).69 Nevertheless, that logic is a major pre-
cursor to boundary logic.70 
The alpha graphs are governed by six conventions (i.e., definitions, roughly), and four 
rules of transformation, akin to natural deduction rules. These are shown in Table 6-1, 
                                                          
68. An advantage of the alpha graphs is that they dispense with formula definitions such as 2.1.4: 
any (finite) nesting or juxtaposition of nonintersecting seps is well-formed. 
69. Roberts (1973) evolved out of his 1963 PhD thesis. Zeman’s (1964) thesis, never published, 
likewise saw that alpha is isomorphic to CTV, and went beyond Roberts by proving that the 
beta graphs are isomorphic to first order logic with identity. However, Roberts was the first to 
give this fact wide currency. Shin (2002) includes a thorough exposition of alpha and beta, 
and discusses (§§2.4, 2.5) Peirce’s view of logic as semiotic. This section has not benefited 
from Hilpinen’s (2004) survey of Peirce’s logic. 
70. By pointing out parallels between BA and Peirce’s graphical logic, I do not wish to suggest 
plagiarism. One should keep in mind that LoF is more of a text than a scholarly tract. More-
over, LoF predates the publication of Peirce (1976), containing the crucial excerpt from Peir-
ce’s 1886 paper on the “sign of illation” (cf. §4.2 above). LoF cites Volume IV of Peirce’s 
Collected Papers (Peirce 1933), which includes 115pp on the logical graphs, but Spencer 
Brown could easily have overlooked this part of Peirce’s oeuvre, as it was dismissed or ig-
nored until Roberts (1973). Roberts also made extensive use of Peirce’s unpublished papers, 
not accessible to scholars before 1956 and not catalogued until 1967. In time and place where 
LoF was written, the 1960s UK, the secondary literature on Peirce’s graphs, cited in Roberts, 
was sparse and hard to access. 
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where CVn denotes the nth convention, and Rn the nth rule of transformation. The third 
column of this Table proposes BA counterparts to the alpha rules and conventions.71 
 
Table 6-1. 
Peirce’s Existential Graphs and Boundary Logic 
Name in 
 Roberts (1973) Remarks BA 
   
CV0 (4.394, 1903) What is not forbidden is permitted. This contradicts the PA Convention of Intention.  
CV1 A blank surface asserts truth. Sometimes referred to as SA, the “sole axiom” of the alpha graphs. 
T1 
Dualreading 
CV2 A graph asserts some truth about the domain.  T2 
CV3 ab ⇔ a∧b. Dualreading 
CV4  a b ⇔ (a(b)). “ 
CV5 a  ⇔ (a);  ⇔ () ⇔ false. “ 
1i.  Insert Odd Any subgraph may be written in an odd depth. 6.1.1 
1e. Erase Even Any evenly enclosed subgraph may be erased. “ 
2i.  Iteration a(b)→a(ab); a→aa. T13, C5 
2e. Deiteration a(ab)→a(b); aa→a. “ 
3i.  Insert double cut a→((a)). Write (()) anywhere C1, A2 
3e. Delete double cut  ((a))→a. Erase any instance of (()). “ 
 
SA stands for “sheet of assertion,” the blank surface on which graphs are to be written. 
The blank page tacitly asserts truth. For Roberts (1973: 32, 119), this assertion, which he 
names SA, is the sole axiom of the alpha graphs. SA follows from A2, which asserts that 
the blank page denotes a primitive value; cf 2.2. CV1 and CV2 can be seen as defining 
“graph” and “domain”. I state CV3-CV5 using alpha as the object language and the pa as 
the metalanguage. CV3 defines conjunction; CV4, the conditional; CV5, denial. For a 
comparison of Peirce’s graphs with other notations for logic, see Roberts (1973: 136). 
The BA is an uninterpreted formal system. Meanwhile, CV1-CV5 reveal that the alpha 
graphs and the dual reading of the pa share the same semantics. Hence the alpha graphs, 
unlike BA, are not self-dual, although it would be trivial to make them so. Peirce failed 
to see that the alpha graphs could be self-dual; this is the main way in which they differ 
from BA. 
The rules of transformation 1i-3e operationalize “step” in the context of alpha; in the 
terminology of Roberts, a step preserves tautologies. Roberts (1973: §3.2) shows that 1i-3e 
are CTV consequences. 2i-e can be seen as analogs of T13 and C5; 3i-e are C1 and A2 in 
new guises. 2i-e and 3i-e are bidirectional. If 1i is invoked only in contexts where it is 
equivalent to (a())=⊥ (the complement of C3), 1i too becomes bidirectional. Any step 
invoking a bidirectional rule is analogous to a BA equational step. In EG demonstrations 
below, I indicate this bidirectionality via a double-headed arrow. However, a step 
                                                          
71. LoF includes a few diagrams in the spirit of Peirce’s graphs; see chapter 12, the notes thereto, 
and p. 115. 
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invoking 1e cannot be retraced; 1e is thus unredeemedly non-bidirectional and alien to 
boundary logic. Fortunately, we do not require this rule. 
If the inserted /erased (sub)formula evaluates to ⊥, 1i-e  follow trivially from A2. More 
generally, we have: 
 
6.1.1. Theorem. 1i-e preserve tautologies. 
Proof. Let γ be a subformula of the formula α. It follows from T14 that there exists a 
formula β=α, also containing γ, such that the depth of γ in β does not exceed 2. Alterna-
tively, if γ is to be inserted in α, the result is equivalent to inserting γ in some β whose 
depth also does not exceed 2. Hence only three cases need be considered: γ has depth 0, 
1, or 2. As the EG map very naturally into the dual reading of the pa, the objective is to 
reduce β to ⊥. 
Erase γ at depth 0. Cal.  aγb′→ab′ ⇔ (aγb′(ab′)) [OI] = ((ab′)abγ′) [J1] = ⊥. 
Insert γ at depth 1. Cal.  (ab′)→(aγb′) ⇔ ((ab′)((aγb′))) [C1; OI] = ((ab′)ab′γ) [J1] = ⊥. 
Erase γ at depth 2. Cal.  (a(bγ))→(ab′) ⇔ ((a(bγ))((ab′))) [C1] = ((a(bγ))ab′) [C2] = (((bγ))ab′) 
[C1] = (bγab′) [OI] = (b′bγa) [J1] = ⊥ . 
The depth=0,2 cases justify Erase Even. The case depth=1 justifies Insert Odd. 
I now show that the three remaining possibilities do not reduce to tautologies: 
Insert γ at depth 0.  Dem.  ab′→aγb′ ⇔ (ab′(aγb′)) [OI; C2,2x] = (ab′γ′). 
Erase γ at depth 1.  Dem.  (aγb′)→(ab′) ⇔ ((aγb′)((ab′))) [C1] = ((aγb′)ab′) [C2,2x] = (ab′γ′). 
Insert γ at depth 2.  Dem.  (ab′)→(a(bγ)) ⇔ ((ab′)((a(bγ)))) [C1] = ((ab′)a(bγ)) [C2] = ((b′)a(bγ)) 
[C1] = (ba(bγ)) [C2; OI] = (abγ′). ? 
 
Remark. The six demonstrations making up 6.1.1 require only C1 (3i-e), C2 (2i-e), OI (ta-
cit in the EG), and J1. I infer that J1 in effect plays the same role in BA that 1i-e play in 
EG. 
 
Since 2i-e is analogous to C2, the converse of 6.1.1—that the pa is derivable from alpha—
merely requires an alpha demonstration of J0, to wit: 
 
 3 1 2Blank a
Page
i i i←⎯→ ←⎯→ ←⎯⎯→a a . 
 
Hence 1i-3e form a basis for the pa. There is a sense in which J0 does the work of 1i-e. I 
submit, however, that J0 is more intuitive than 1i-e, and eliminates any need to keep 
track of depth parity. 
I now present, by way of example, Sowa’s (2002) demonstration of Leibniz’s Praeclarum 
Theorema, verified by TVA in §5.1. Variables inserted by 1i or duplicated by 2i first ap-
pear in bold; variable instances about to be eliminated by 2e are underlined. 
 
   
               
3 1 2 1 2
p r q sp r q s p r q sBlank
page pq rp r
i i i i i←⎯→ ←⎯→ ←⎯⎯→ ⎯⎯→ ←⎯⎯→p r q s
q sp r q
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2 3
p r q s p r q s
pq r s pq rs
e e←⎯⎯→ ←⎯⎯→ . 
 
The first use of 1i is bidirectional as discussed above 6.1.1, but the second is not, as this 
step has no pa analog. 
I now verify the Theorema via a pa calculation. In keeping with the spirit of the alpha 
graphs, the pa translation invokes the dual reading. 
 
Cal.  [(p→r)∧(q→s)]→[(p∧q)→(r∧s)] ⇔ ((pr′)(qs′)((pq(rs)))) [C1] = ((pr′)(qs′)pq(rs)) [C2,2x] = 
((r′)(s′)pq(rs)) [C1,2x; OI] = ((rs)rspq) [J1] = ⊥ . 
 
Reading this calculation in reverse suggests the following alpha demonstration: 
 
    
3 1 2 3 2 3
pq p r q sBlank r s r s
rs
page pq rs pq rs pq rs
i i i i i i←⎯→ ←⎯→ ←⎯⎯→ ←⎯→ ←⎯⎯→ ←⎯→
pq
p q
rs
rs
. 
 
The preceding demonstration has one less step than Sowa’s, a minor advantage. Much 
more significant is that my demonstration invokes 1i but once, at the outset, to insert, in 
any order, one instance of each variable appearing in the Theorema. 1i employed in this 
manner is analogous to C3 and hence bidirectional. Since 2i-e and 3i-e are analogous to 
C2 and C1, respectively, and C1-C3, OI form a pa basis (Table 6-2), 1e is redundant. 
Since the remaining alpha rules are all bidirectional, alpha can be recast as an equational 
system. Sowa’s demonstration, on the other hand, invokes 1i twice, each time requiring 
careful thought about what to insert. Sowa claims that the demonstration of the PM 
counterpart of the Theorema, *3.47, involves 43 steps and five axioms. Having demon-
strated the Theorema via TVA, alpha (twice), and a pa calculation, I invite the reader to 
decide which method is most perspicuous and easiest to learn. 
6.2. Some Ba Postulate Sets. 
“Any finite… selection of statements (preferably true ones, perhaps) is as much a set of postu-
lates as any other. …‘postulate’ is significant only relative to an act of inquiry; we apply the 
word to a set of statements… to which we have seen fit to direct our attention.”Quine (1982: 35) 
Table 6-2 includes a variety of postulate sets (bases) which are one or more of: important 
benchmarks, relevant to an evaluation of LoF, little known, or have otherwise piqued 
my curiosity. The first eight rows of Table 6-2 consist of CTV bases to be discussed in 
§6.3. The remainder of the Table consists of Ba and pa bases, none of which are men-
tioned in Prior (1962) or Epstein (1995: 407-9); logicians, evidently, are not in the habit of 
delving into the Boolean algebra literature. Boolean algebraists do not all sin reciprocal-
ly; see, e.g., the references in Huntington (1933) and Bernstein (1934). If a basis includes 
a pair of axioms asserting that a connective commutes and associates, I have replaced 
the pair with OI. I have added OI to all pa bases, even though no author did so. The 
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“length” of a basis is the number of BA symbols required to express it. For other details 
of how I operationalize the “length” of a basis, see the Note to Table 6-2. The Ba and pa 
bases (excepting those of Bernstein, McCune, and Schröder) seem simple and intuitive. 
Leibniz. In two brief memoranda, written in 1690, published in 1903, and translated into 
English as chapters 9 and 10 of Leibniz (1966), Leibniz set out a ‘logical calculus’ with 
primitive conjunction and denial, respectively denoted by juxtaposition and ‘non-a’. I 
shall cite passages in these memoranda as (9.m) and (10.n), where m and n are paragraph 
numbers. I also have taken the liberty of reordering Leibniz’s axioms (undemonstrated 
propositions, actually) and restating them in pa notation. 
Leibniz effectively devised 2 because: 
• His axioms are tantamount to a CTV basis, called L in §6.3 and due to Lukasiewicz; 
• He postulated that ‘=’ is a congruence relation. 
The latter is the easier of the two to show. (9.3) is a=a; hence ‘=’ is tacitly reflexive. (10.5) 
reads ‘a=b means that one can be substituted for the other…[a and b] are equivalent’, 
which I take as tantamount to R1. The symmetry and transitivity of ‘=’ can be derived 
from R1 and reflexivity, so that ‘=’ is an equivalence relation (2.3.8). By virtue of (9.8) 
and (9.11), ‘=’ is also a congruence relation (3.3.10). 
I derive Lukasiewicz’s CTV axioms as follows. Leibniz’s (9.6) is C5, and (10.9) is J0 and 
C3. Two of Lukasiewicz’s axioms are immediate: Cal. (aa)a [C5] = (a)a [J0] = (); (a)ab [J0] = 
(). I thus include J0, C3, and C5 in Leibniz’s “basis.” Lukasiewicz’s remaining axiom is 
what I call Syll1, (a′b)(b′c)a′c. At this point the reader would do well to refer to §5.5, as 
Leibniz intended letters in his formalism to stand for terms. Syll1 can be read as assert-
ing the validity of the syllogism Barbara. While Syll1 per se cannot be found in Parkinson 
(1966: chpts. 9,10), Leibniz (1966: 33, 42) freely assumed Barbara, its equivalent in cate-
gorical form. He (p. 105) purports to derive Barbara from his version of the medieval lo-
gicians’ dictum de omni et nullo taken as an axiom. Hence I take Leibniz as granting Syll1. 
The upshot is a reading of Leibniz at once generous and novel, that makes him the in-
ventor of Ba, interpreted as a logic of terms. Leibniz failed to see that alternation as well 
as conjunction could interpret concatenation. Thus he missed duality and De Morgan’s 
laws.72 
Grassmann. In 1872, Robert Grassmann (brother of the better known Hermann) pub-
lished a curious book titled Die Formenlehre (“The Theory of Forms”), setting out a theo-
ry of magnitudes. He defined a magnitude as “”anything that is or can be the subject of 
                                                          
72. After writing this section, I discovered Lenzen (2004: 3,4,§4) and Hailperin (2004: 324-37). 
Lenzen, reviewing papers he published in German in the 1980s, concludes that his system L1, 
extracted from Leibniz’s work, is isomorphic to sentential logic and Boolean algebra. It is not 
evident whether Lenzen based his conclusion in part on the original texts underlying chpts. 
9,10 of Leibniz (1966). Hailperin does base his discussion on these texts, but reaches no con-
clusion about the strength of the implied system. The true value of Leibniz’s work was not ap-
preciated before the 1980s because both Couturat, the editor of the Latin originals (Leibniz 
1903), and Parkinson, the editor and translator of Leibniz (1966), failed to appreciate the 
strength of Leibniz’s system. Moreover, when Leibniz (1966) was published, the two 20th 
century logicians with the strongest interest in the history of the subject were either dead (Lu-
kasiewicz) or about to be (Prior). According to Lenzen, Rescher (1954) was the first to see 
that the power of Leibniz’s formal systems had been seriously underestimated. 
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thought, insofar as it has one value, not more” (Grassman 1966: Be-6).73 The primitive 
values of the Theory of Magnitudes are stems, denoted by an e (which may or may not 
have numerical subscripts) and defined as follows: 
 
“…a magnitude that is initially posited, and which therefore does not 
result from [a combination] of other magnitudes… The initial stems of the 
universe are the God-given properties of particles, the ether, and the spirit, 
of whose synthesis the entire universe consists.”     Grassmann (1966: Be-6). 
 
He then applied that theory to four subjects: numbers, ‘combinations,’ ‘externals,’ and 
‘concepts’ (i.e., logic); only this last will concern us here. 
Grassmann wrote before Peano, Hilbert, Huntington, and others formulated the current 
understanding of an axiomatic theory. Hence ‘axiom’ and ‘postulate’ do not appear in 
his work. The axioms I propose below for the Theory of Concepts are BA translations of 
propositions Grassmann states without proof. The part of the Theory of Magnitudes 
Grassmann deemed applicable to his Concepts consists of two primitive binary opera-
tions, denoted by ‘+’ and ‘⋅’, governed by the following laws (Be-7: 2). I have taken the 
liberty of modernizing Grassmann’s terminology: 
a) Magnitudes are closed under ‘+’ and ‘⋅’; 
b) These operations commute and associate; 
c) The identity elements for ‘+’ and ‘⋅’ are 0 and 1, respectively; 
d) Each operation distributes over the other. 
The closure property (a) I take as tacit throughout this paper; OI captures the essence of 
(b). a⊥=a nicely summarizes the dual pair (c); ditto for J2 and (d). 
Grassman (Be-7: 3) then introduced two laws peculiar to the Theory of Concepts. They 
warrant quotation in full: 
 
“1. The sum and… product of two equal stems gives the same stem again, and 
  2. The product of two different stems is zero.” 
 
The Theory of Concepts is a model of BA. Let the ‘stems’ be () and ⊥, and let a+b ⇔ ab 
and a⋅b ⇔ ((a)(b)). Then the first law is equivalent to the PA equations ()()=(), ⊥⊥=⊥, 
((())(()))=(), and ((⊥)(⊥))=⊥; Table 6-2 retains the first two. I propose to translate the sec-
ond law as ()⊥=(), true by virtue of A2. Thus it would seem that Grassmann unknowing-
ly anticipated the PA in 1872. He defined complementation in context (Be-14: 29) via a 
pair of equations that are notational variants of the dual pair J0 and J1. Table 6-2 retains 
J0. With the postulation of J1, the Theory of Concepts becomes isomorphic to BA. 
Schröder (1966), vol. 1 of the Vorlesungen (originally published in 1890 and discussed in 
Brady 2000) is, I would argue, the first systematic presentation of Ba. To my knowledge, 
                                                          
73. I am very grateful to Lloyd Kannenberg, the translator of Hermann Grassmann’s Ausdenungs-
lehre, for having taken up my invitation that he translate the Formenlehre, and for making his 
unpublished translation available to me. Page numbers refer to this unpublished translation. I 
know of the Formenlehre thanks only to Grattan-Guiness’s (2000: 157-60) discussion thereof. 
Grassmann (G-9) mentions Leibniz but no work on logic more recent than Hegel’s. In partic-
ular, Grassmann appears to have had no knowledge of Boole’s work. 
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Lejewski (1960: 23) is the only mention of this possibility. The basis shown in Table 6-2 
appears nowhere in the Vorlesungen, but rather is my distillation of Lejewski’s S1-S9, 
which he derived from 3 axioms and 6 definitions spread over 140pp of the Vorlesungen. 
Translating S1-S9 into the pa reveals that S1, S8, and S9 are effectively J0, and that S3 
and S4 are effectively C3. Neither Schröder nor Lejewski noticed that S4 and S5 in effect 
form a dual pair; I dropped the longer of the two, S4, as redundant. The result is the five 
axioms shown in Table 6-2. Comparing Schröder’s basis with that of Sheffer (1913) 
reveals that the two bases have (ab)c=((a′c)(b′c)), a variant of J2, in common. But Sheffer 
requires only two other postulates, his versions of C1, C5, and J1. Hence Schröder’s basis 
is amply redundant. It is likewise prolix because his notation includes equivalents of the 
∪, ∩, ⊂, overbar, U, and ∅ of set theory, and of the truth functors ∧, →, and ↔. 
Johnson (1892).  In a three-part article in the leading journal Mind, the British logician W 
E Johnson set out a system whose syntax⎯juxtaposed letters with and without overbars 
⎯translates trivially into BA: if ,α β  are formulae, ( )αβ  translates Johnson’s αβ . He 
interpreted juxtaposition as conjunction, the overbar as complementation. His axioms 
were C1, C5, axioms equivalent to OI, and the Law of Dichotomy, Johnson’s name for 
(ab)(ab′)=a′. Since Dichotomy is but the contradual of C6, I will refer to it as C6. §A.4 in-
cludes a demonstration of J1, C1, C2, and C5 from C6 and OI, thus proving that John-
son’s axioms form a pa basis, and that his C1 and C5 are redundant. Johnson’s verbose 
exposition falls short of the taut understanding of Ba and CTV that later emerged. He 
did claim Peirce as an important influence. To my knowledge, the only study of John-
son’s system is Meredith and Prior (1968). Prior (1962) repeatedly cites Johnson (1892) 
but does not mention Johnson’s system. 
Huntington (1904). LoF rightly cited this paper, the wellspring of self-aware Boolean axi-
omatics. My summary of Huntington’s axioms follows Stoll (1974: §4.1) and Eves (1990: 
216, 257). Huntington defined Boolean algebra as a set B with at least two members and 
closed under two binary and one unary operations. The binary operations are dual to 
each other, so that his remaining eight axioms are grouped into four dual pairs. The 
binary operations commute (B1), have distinct identity elements (B2), distribute over 
each other (B3), and have inverses defined in terms of the unary operation and the iden-
tity elements (B4). Given B1-B4, associativity is a theorem (Eves 1990: 217-19). Since the 
pa has both a primal and dual reading, a pa initial contains the same information as a 
dual pair of Huntington axioms. Interpreting Huntington’s two binary operations as ab 
and (a′b′), BA satisfies Huntington’s basis: 
B1. ab=ba and ((a)(b))=((b)(a)) are both true by OI; 
B2. a⊥=a has already been established. ((a)(())) [C4a] = ((a)) [C1] = a; 
B3. J2. ((a)(bc)) [C1,2x] = (a′((b′)(c′))) [C2,2x] =  (((a′b′)(a′c′))) [C1] = (a′b′)(a′c′); 
B4. J0 and J1. 
Bernstein (1916) combined B2 and B4 into a(b′b)=a (J1, in effect) and its dual.74 
Huntington (1933, 1933a) derived his 1904 Ba basis from OI andC6, a nontrivial exercise. 
Like Johnson, he (1933) at first thought that C5 had to be postulated, but very soon 
(1933a) corrected himself. Kauffman (1990), using the pa, considerably simplified Hun-
                                                          
74. Also see Wolfram (2002: 773). Montague and Jan Tarski (1954) later showed that given 
either of ab=ba and (a′b′)=(b′a′), the other is redundant. 
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tington’s result; see §A.4 for details. That J1,J2, J0,C2, and C6 each form a pa basis re-
quires demonstrating each of J1,J2 ? C6 (LoF), C6 ? J0,C2 (§A.4), and J0,C2 ? J1,J2 (§A.1). 
Robbins conjectured that C6 could be replaced by its dual. That OI and the dual of C6 
constitute a Ba basis eluded proof until McCune (1997) brought powerful theorem 
proving software to bear on the question. 
 
Table 6-2. 
Selected CTV/Ba Axioms, pa Initials, Reexpressed in pa Notation. 
Year Author  
Axioms/Initials 
Syll1: (a′b)(b′c)a′c. Syll2: (ab′)(bc)ac  Diff. Length 
1885 Peirce75 CTV J0, C3, ((a′b)a)a, Syll1, (a′b′c)b′a′c 3 55 
1917 Nicod CTV J0, Syll2 4 20 
1924 Lukasiewicz-Bernays CTV A′ab, (aa)a, Syll2, (ab)ba 4 36 
1929 Lukasiewicz CTV a′ab, (aa)a, Syll1 4 32 
1942 Rosser76 CTV a′ab, (aa)a, Syll2 4 28 
1948 Lukasiewicz-Wajsberg CTV C3, ((a′b)r)(r′a)s′a 5 25 
1956 Church CTV PC1, PC2, ((a′⊥)⊥)a 4 42 
1964 Mendelson CTV PC1, PC2, (a′b)(ab)b 4 43 
      
1690 Leibniz na J0, C3, C5, Syll1 2 32 
1872 Robert Grassmann na J0, J2, ()()=(), ⊥⊥=⊥, ()⊥=(), OI 1 45 
1890 Schröder-Lejewski Ba J0, C3, Syll1, (ab)c = ((a′c)(b′c)) a′(bc)(a′b′)(a′c′) = () 2 73 
1892 Johnson na C1, C5, contradual of C6, OI 2 32 
1904 Huntington Ba J1, J2, a⊥=a, ab=ba 3 37 
1913 Sheffer77 Ba ((aa)(aa))=a, a(b′b)=a, (ab)c=((a′c)(b′c)) 3 41 
1916 Bernstein Ba a(b′b)=a, J2, ab=ba 3 34 
1933 Huntington Ba C6, OI 2 23 
1933 Robbins-McCune Ba C6 (dual), OI 6 21 
1969 Abbott Ba C3, C4, ab=ba, (ab)c=(ba)c 2 31 
1969 LoF Pa J1, J2, OI 1 35 
1986 Bricken Pa C1-C3, OI 1 28 
2000 Veroff Ba ((ab)(a(bc)))=a, ab=ba 5 20 
2002 McCune et al Ba ((b((ab)b))(a(cb)))=a 6 21 
2002 Bricken Pa C2, C3, OI 1 21 
                                                          
75. This is Prior’s 3.11, his reading of Peirce (W5: 162-90, 1885). 
76. Eves 1990: 256, L′; Prior 6.3. The pa translation invokes the dual reading, as Rosser’s primi-
tive connective is ‘∧’. 
77. LoF discusses this basis then asserts (p. 107), without proof or citation, that (ab)c = 
((c′a)(b′a)) and the dual of a′(b′b))=a form a Ba basis. Since ((aa)(aa))=a is the Sheffer stroke 
equivalent of C1, Spencer Brown in effect alleged that replacing a(b′b)=a with its dual ena-
bles a proof of C1. Bernstein (1934: 880) proved that (ab)c = ((a′c)(b′c)) and an axiom 
equivalent to the Robbins axiom form a Ba basis. 
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Note.  PC1, PC2 are defined in §5.4. 
Length = Number of BA symbols required to state the axioms in BA notation. A primed 
variable counts as 3 symbols, ‘()’ as 1. (ab), not a′b′, translates the Sheffer stroke. A CTV 
axiom is treated as an equation ending in ‘=()’, adding 2 to its length. I have shortened 
axioms of the form (φ)=() [ (φ)=(γ) ] to φ=⊥ [ φ=γ ]. A dual pair of axioms in the source 
is stated as a single pa axiom here. I have: 
(i) eliminated axioms requiring that the cardinality of the carrier be at least 2; 
(ii) replaced Ba axioms asserting commutativity and associativity with OI; and 
(iii) added OI to every pa basis. To date, no published basis includes OI. 
Diff.:  A purely subjective assessment of the ingenuity required to derive J1-C6 in LoF 
from the given basis, with 6 requiring the most ingenuity. 
 
McCune et al. Employing computer-intensive search methods they devised, McCune et al 
(2002: Sh1) found a new single axiom for Ba based on the Sheffer stroke, 
(((bc)a)(b((ba)b)))=a,78 requiring only 21 symbols. This is the shortest known single axiom 
for Ba/CTV, whether based on the Sheffer stroke (Prior 6.4) or not (Prior 1.5, 3.13, 6.14; 
McCune et al 2002: DN1). They proved (Th. 3) that there can be no shorter single axiom 
for Ba whose sole connective is the Sheffer stroke. Note that the Robbins-McCune basis, 
and Bricken’s (2002) basis with ()a=() replacing his (()a)=⊥, are also 21 symbols long. 
The literal pa translation of Veroff’s (McCune et al 2002: 2) basis is ((ab)(a(bc)))=a and 
(ab)=(ba). The four parentheses in the second axiom are needed only because Veroff’s 
sole primitive operation is the Sheffer stroke, and thus can be eliminated at no cost. The 
resulting Ba basis is only 20 symbols long, the shortest in Table 6-2, contradicting 
Wolfram’s claim that his basis is the shortest possible. 
Single axiom bases make for very difficult proofs of elementary results. For instance, 
Wolfram’s (2002: 810-11) derivation of Sheffer’s (1913) Ba axioms from the single axiom 
of McCune et al requires 343 steps, 81 lemmas, and expressions with as many as 128 
operators. Merely proving that the Sheffer stroke commutes requires 42 lemmas! Wol-
fram (p. 1175) also ran the following computer “horse race,” where the contestants were 
the eight bases named on his p. 808. For each basis, he counted how many steps were re-
quired to prove, using proprietary software, each of 582 consequences, each containing 
no more than 2 variables and 6 instances of the Sheffer stroke. His results, reported only 
as graphical summaries, revealed large differences across the eight bases in the number 
of proof steps required. Sheffer’s 1913 and Veroff’s basis were more or less tied for few-
est proof steps, averaged over the 582 consequences. The Robbins-McCune basis did 
poorly; its dual, Huntington’s (1933a) basis, was not a contestant. The single axiom bases 
of McCune and of Wolfram fared worst of all.79 
6.3. Other Historical Systems Related to the pa. 
A pa basis can serve as a CTV basis and vice versa. CTV axioms take the form ‘α→β’ or 
can be re-expressed as such. pa initials are of the form ‘α=β’, and are easier to work 
with, especially for those whose mathematical habits are those of elementary algebra. 
                                                          
78. Verified as follows. Let a|b⇔(ab). Dem. (((bc)a)(b((ba)b))) [C2,2x] = (((bc)a)(b((a)))) [C1] 
= (((bc)a)(ba)) [J2] = (((bc))b′)a [C1; OI] = (b′bc)a [J1] = a. ? 
79. This computer ‘horse race’ suggests a relatively objective way of ranking the various bases in 
Table 6-2 by difficulty. 
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The distinction is not essential, however, because any axiom of the form α→β is equival-
ent to the equational form (α)β=(). OI is absent from the CTV bases in Table 6-2, because 
no CTV basis contains a pair of postulates asserting that one of ∧ or ∨ both commutes 
and associates. Instead, these bases were designed so that this can be demonstrated. 
Nicod (1917: 34) proposed a two axiom basis for the CTV, formulated using only the 
Sheffer stroke, read as NAND. The longer of these axioms is more easily understood 
when re-expressed using the conditional as well as the stroke (PM, p. xviii). Invoking 
the dual reading, so that a|b ⇔ (ab) and a→b ⇔ (a(b)), and treating any outermost par-
entheses as redundant, Nicod’s axioms are a′a and (ab′)(bc)ac, the shortest (20) CTV basis 
in Table 6-2. The substitutions a′/a and b′/b reveal that the latter axiom is an instance of 
Syll1. Because it is shorter by four symbols, I give it a distinct name, Syll2. Nicod then 
condensed his two axioms into one (PM, p. xix). From this single axiom and a variant of 
modus ponens, he derived the axioms of PM, thereby proving that his single axiom was a 
CTV basis. Lukasiewicz later simplified Nicod’s single axiom into something (not 
shown in Table 6-2 but well-known: cf. Prior 6.4; Quine 1982: 87) whose dual pa transla-
tion has length 23. 
Lukasiewicz (Prior 1.4a; Quine 1982: 85) proposed in 1929 a basis I call L, one with a 
straightforward pa interpretation. (aa)a is one half of C5. a′ab is J0 and is the other half of 
C5 when b/a. Syll1 asserts the transitivity of the conditional and the validity of Barbara. 
Syll1 with a=() yields another hoary chestnut, modus ponens. Nicod’s two axiom basis, 
just discussed, is, in effect, L with a′ab omitted. (Note also the similarity of Nicod’s basis 
to Rosser’s.) Hence a slight modification of Syll1 renders a′ab redundant; I have not seen 
this fact mentioned in print. 
Lukasiewicz and Bernays, working independently, earlier proposed a basis including 
Syll2 and (ab)ba in place of Syll1, yielding a revised version (Prior 6.11) of the truth-
functional axioms of PM.80 The literature is silent about the similarity between Rosser 
and Lukasiewicz-Bernays, as well as about how L and Rosser render PM’s (ab)ba re-
dundant. In 1948, Lukasiewicz proved that ((a′b)r)(r′a)s′a is the shortest possible single 
axiom from which all formulae involving ‘→’ alone can be demonstrated (Prior 2.15d). 
Wajsberg (Prior 3.12) had shown in 1937 that adding T→a (C3, in effect) and ~a =df  a→F 
to any axiom system adequate for ‘→’ alone results in a CTV axiom system. 
The radically “arithmetical” foundation BA proposes for Ba and the truth functors has a 
curious precedent. Van Horn (1917), writing in ignorance of Sheffer (1913), purported to 
derive PM ‘s CTV axioms from a single axiom giving the semantics of the Sheffer stroke 
(here notated by ↑), restated as follows: [|a|=|b|]→[|a↑b|≠|a|], and [|a|≠|b|]→ 
[|a↑b|=T]. This axiom follows trivially from A1, A2, keeping in mind that [a↑b ⇔ (a)(b)] 
↔[()⇔T] and [a↑b ⇔ (ab)]↔[(())⇔T]. The axiom also follows from 4.1.2 above. Nicod 
(1917: 40) praised Van Horn’s paper, but claimed that its derivations of the PM axioms 
were flawed, because Van Horn freely invoked what is here called T16, without being 
aware that he was invoking a metatheorem needing proof. Even though Van Horn’s and 
Nicod’s papers were published side by side, the only citation of Van Horn I have en-
                                                          
80. For a (nontrivial) demonstration of J2 from these axioms, see Halmos & Givant (1998: 37-8). 
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countered is Grattan-Guiness (2000: 434). While no one, to my knowledge, has revisited 
Van Horn’s paper, the pa reveals that its intuition was sound.81 
Byrne’s (1946) Ba notation is based on juxtaposition as sole connective and the unary 
prime. It translates into the pa as follows: (1) remove parentheses not immediately fol-
lowed by a prime; (2) if a pair of parentheses is primed, remove the prime; (3) replace 
subformulae of the form αα′ by (). Hence only the manner in which parentheses are 
used distinguishes Byrne’s notation from that of the pa. Curiously, six of Byrne’s eight 
theorems are C1-C6. Byrne proves his algebra Boolean by deriving Huntington’s (1933a) 
basis, C6 and OI. A virtue of Byrne’s system is that it deliberately leaves juxtaposition 
uninterpreted, and dispenses with Boolean 0 and 1. Even though Byrne’s paper is well-
known, to my knowledge his notation has no imitators. Likewise, the boundary mathe-
matics literature, such as it is, does not seem aware of Byrne’s work.82 
The system AB of Anderson and Belnap (1959) features one unary operation, denial, de-
noted by an overbar, and one connective, disjunction, denoted by ∨. Erasing all instan-
ces of ∨, and enclosing in parentheses that which lies under an overbar, results in the 
equivalent pa formula. AB is semantically identical to the primal reading of the pa.83 The 
sole axiom of AB is b(a)ac = (), true by J0. The rules of inference of AB are (1) from bac, 
infer b((a))c, true by C1, and (2) from (a)c and (b)c, infer (ab)c. Cal. (a′c)(b′c)(ab)c [C2,2x] = 
(a′)(b′)(ab)c [C1,2x] = ab(ab)c [J0] = (). ? 
The creators of AB founded relevance logic, a fact consistent with AB’s disavowal of 
modus ponens and silence re substitution. Hunter (1971: §37.6) sets out an effective proof 
                                                          
81. The way LoF grounds Ba in a bit of Boolean arithmetic is not without precedent. Shannon 
(1938) gives the following basis for 2: (a) his arithmetical postulates (1)-(3), isomorphic to 
Table 2-1a; (b) his assumption (4) that B has two members; and (c) a loose definition of com-
plementation. Table 2-1b is isomorphic to his “theorems” (7a) and (7b). Prior (1962: 4-13), 
following Polish practice, grounds his exposition of sentential logic in the Boolean arithmetic 
of 0 and 1. Cole (1968) derives Ba from analogues of Table 2-1, R1, and T16. Malmstadt et al 
(1973: 281, §3-4.1) sketch a derivation of 2 from Boolean addition (dually, multiplication) 
and complementation, taken as axiomatic. Rudeanu (1974) asserts (Example 1.1), but does 
not show, that his axioms for Ba (namely OI, absorption, Boolean versions of J1, J2, C3, and 
the duals of all the preceding, as per his Definition 1.1) can, in the case of 2, “be easily esta-
blished by direct verification” from the operation tables for Boolean addition, multiplication, 
and negation. (Shannon 1938 makes a similar assertion about his (1a)-(8).) Most of Rudea-
nu’s axioms are redundant, in that J1, J2, and OI suffice as a pa basis, the pa is a Ba by 3.3.8, 
and is complete by T17. 
82. Byrne’s Ba axioms are four: B has at least 2 members, OI, ∀xyz[xy=x → y′x=z′z], and 
∀xy∃z[y′x=z′z → xy=x]. The latter two axioms, often misquoted, are essentially the Consisten-
cy Principle, 3.3.10. I do not grant Byrne’s axioms the pride of place I granted them in 
Meguire (2003), because existentially quantified variables in algebraic axioms now strike me 
as a faute de beauté. 
83. To Hunter (1971: §37) I owe my discovery of the system AB. In a striking feat of bravado, 
Anderson and Belnap (1959) lay out AB and prove it sound, complete, decidable, and axiom 
independent in less than 300 words. AB thus enjoys the dubious distinction of being the ters-
est version of sentential logic devised to date. Hunter (§§37.1-5) expands the proofs of these 
metatheorems to all of three whole pages. The alternative proof of T17 in §A.10 makes 
possible an equally terse statement of the pa. 
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procedure for AB based on refutation trees, but the resulting proofs are a good deal 
more complicated than ones based on J0-C2. For example, Hunter requires 16 lines to 
verify that (p→q→r)→(p→q)→(p→r). The corresponding pa calculation is trivial: Cal. 
(p′q′r)(p′q)p′r [C2,3x] = (q′)(q)p′r [J0] = (). ? 
Translated into BA, Schütte’s (1977: 17) basis for the CTV is J1 and (⊥) [A2] = (). His rules 
I∧, I∨, and I→ are all instances of J0. I cannot determine whether an equivalent to C2 
resides somewhere in Schütte’s system. 
7.  Why the Indifference? 
“[The pa] is a very beautiful version of the propositional calculus, and I cannot understand why 
it has not become a standard method in logic text-books… Spencer-Brown’s theory has gained 
great popularity among various people, but logicians have taken little interest in it.” 
         Grattan-Guiness (1982: §5.1). 
Notwithstanding the merits I and others have claimed for it, the pa remains unadopted. 
I begin exploring the reasons behind this fate by setting out what this curious book re-
veals about its origins. Spencer-Brown worked out many of the ideas in LoF while teach-
ing an introductory course in logic (pp. xii; the page references below without citation 
are to LoF); LoF may have begun as lecture notes for this course. He derived his version 
of BA (namely, one using ‘ ’ instead of ‘()’, and with no analogue to ‘⊥’) by working 
backwards from 2 and CTV (p. 112). He (p. xii) attributed some key insights to his hav-
ing designed electronic circuits during the 1960s, but did not cite Shannon’s (1938) cele-
brated result that the algebra of switching circuits is a model for the CTV (and thus also 
for the pa). 
LoF does not sufficiently disclose the extent to which it builds on Boolean algebra. While 
rightly citing some classics. Huntington (1904, 1933) and Sheffer (1913), as well as Boole 
and Peirce, it cites no text on Boolean algebra extant at the time of writing (e.g., the 1958 
ed. of Hohn 1966; Whitesitt 1961; Arnold 1962; Goodstein 1963). The only formal logic 
text cited is Prior (1962), invoked near the end to make a minor point about syllogisms. 
LoF fails to cite any of the following texts, all standard at the time of writing: Hilbert and 
Ackermann (1950), the 1950 ed. of Quine (1982), Rosenbloom (1950), Quine (1951), Ross-
er (1953), Church (1956), Suppes (1957), Carnap (1958), Nidditch (1962), and Kneebone 
(1963). Worst of all, LoF appears oblivious to the centrality of first order logic and quan-
tification. 
Spencer-Brown argues (chpt. 11) that certain infinite pa formulae with a finite recursive 
representation have an “imaginary” truth value, arising in a manner analogous to the 
way complex numbers arise from the roots of certain polynomial equations with real 
coefficients, also having a recursive interpretation.84 He alleges that such truth values 
                                                          
84. If a Boolean equation has a pa representation that is not recursive, LoF (p. 57) says that is “of 
the first degree”. Recursive equations are said to be of “degree higher than one.” If neither () 
nor (()) solve an equation of higher degree, then LoF (pp. viii-x, 58) argues that it has an 
“imaginary” solution. Relating imaginary Boolean values to extant work on recursive arith-
metic and functions (e.g., Mendelson 1997: chpts. 3,5; Kneebone 1963: chpt. 10) and to 
Bochvar’s (1981) paradox logic are all possible directions for future research. 
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have momentous implications for mathematics, philosophy, and engineering. For in-
stance, they supposedly extinguish the paradoxical character of self-reference85: 
 
“All we have to show is that the self-referential paradoxes, discarded with 
the Theory of Types, are no worse than similar self-referential paradoxes, 
which are considered quite acceptable, in the ordinary theory of equations. 
The most famous such paradox is… ‘This statement is false.’” (p. ix) 
 
“[Recursive Boolean] equations have hitherto been excluded from the sub-
ject matter of ordinary logic by the Russell-Whitehead theory of types” 
       (p. xviii)86 
The Theory of Types is meaningful only if the ground logic is of order greater than zero, 
and such is never the case in LoF. In fact, LoF is innocent of polyadic predicates, as well 
as of all but a few trivial bits of naïve set theory (the Boolean algebra of classes makes a 
very brief and casual appearance in Appendix II). Spencer-Brown asserts that his ima-
ginary truth values render the well-known limitative theorems of Gödel and Church 
(Stoll 1963: §§9.9, 9.10; Mendelson 1997: Ths. 3.37-3.54) “…less destructive than was 
hitherto supposed” (p. xvii), but gives no details.87 Meanwhile, LoF is silent about 
nonclassical and infinitary logics and the theory of recursive functions, conventional 
topics which render chpt. 11 less radical than it would seem at first blush. 
While LoF does not claim that BA suffices to ground all of mathematics, others stride 
boldly where angels fear to tread: “…the propositional calculus…develops naturally 
from [A1 and A2]. Thus the act of severance leads inexorably to logic and through PM to 
the whole of mathematics.” (Croskin 1978: 187) This statement would be true if BA 
could model the quantification and second order logic PM requires, and if PM had suc-
ceeded in its aims. (A classic critique of PM is Quine 1995: 3-36, first published in 1941.) 
                                                          
85. On self-reference, logically and philosophically contemplated, see Bartlett (1992). 
86. Before touching on Russell’s paradox and the like, Spencer-Brown should have read Prior 
(1962: §III.3.3) closely. Spencer-Brown cites the 1958 edition of Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel, and 
Levy (1973: chpt. III) in support of his contention that there have been prior attempts to “… 
rehabilitate, on a logical rather than on a mathematical basis, something of what was discard-
ed with the Theory of Types…” (LoF, p. xix, fn 8). This is a very curious reading of Fraenkel 
et al, who survey type theory in the context of set theory, but never claim that type theory ever 
was standard. On type theory, see Quine (1969: §§34-38) and Hatcher (1982: chpt. 4). 
87. Church’s theorem states that first order logic, a system quite distinct from the pa and Ba, is 
undecidable. Those doubting the classic limitative theorems of Gödel should consult the short 
simple proofs in Boolos (1998: 383-88) and in Smullyan (1991: chpts 1,2). Boolos’s proof is 
grounded in Berry’s paradox; Smullyan’s proofs require little more than a formal language 
capable of enough self-reference to sustain the Diagonal Lemma. Neither author requires any 
of recursion, the Chinese Remainder theorem, a specific Gödel numbering, and Peano arith-
metic. Spencer-Brown would have done well to study Tarski’s theorem (a finitely axiomat-
ized formal system strong enough for mathematics cannot define its own truth predicate), 
which is easier to prove than Gödel’s and deserves to be better known. Smullyan also shows 
that the self-referential paradoxes of the sort LoF deems “quite acceptable” (see quote in text) 
are not so easily dismissed. 
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LoF also indulges in philosophical speculation (pp. v, vi, xix-xxii, 85, 89-96, 101-106) and 
invokes dubious etymologies (pp. 93, 101, 105, 106, 109, 126). Spencer-Brown claims (p. 
ii) to have studied under Wittgenstein88 (whom he cites four times) and R D Laing, but is 
silent on how he learned mathematics and logic. Elsewhere, he claims to have worked 
with Lord Cherwell in the 1950s and the mathematician J C P Miller in the 1960s. 
Spencer-Brown is especially guilty of falsified predictions about the future course of 
mathematics. Writing in 1967, he claimed that: 
 
 “...if we confine our reasoning to an interpretation of Boolean equations of 
the first degree only, we should expect to find theorems which will always 
defy decision, and the fact that we do seem to find such theorems in com-
mon arithmetic may serve, here, as a practical confirmation of this obvious 
prediction. To confirm it theoretically, we need only to prove (1) that such 
theorems cannot be decided by reasoning of the first degree, and (2) that 
they can be decided by reasoning of a higher degree. (2) would of course 
be proved by providing such a proof of one of the theorems. 
“I may say that I believe that at least one such theorem will shortly be de-
cided by the methods outlined in [LoF]. In other words, I believe that I 
have reduced their decision to a technical problem which is well within the 
capacity of an ordinary mathematician who is prepared, and who has the 
patronage or other means, to undertake the labour.” (pp. 99-100; emphasis 
in original) 
 
More specifically: 
 
“…I found evidence, in unpublished work undertaken in 1962-65, suggest-
ing that the four-colour map theorem [sic] and Goldbach’s conjecture are 
undecidable with a proof structure confined to Boolean equations of the 
first degree, but decidable if we are prepared to avail ourselves of equa-
tions of higher degree.” (p. xix)89 
 
Regarding Fermat’s Last Theorem (FLT), Spencer-Brown wrote: 
 
“…it is my guess that Fermat (who was apparently too excellent a math-
ematician to make a false claim to a proof) used [imaginary truth values] 
in the proof of his great theorem, hence the ‘truly remarkable’ nature of his 
proof, as well as its length.” (p. 99). 
 
                                                          
88. Whose spectre haunts LoF, as well as much of British philosophy of the mid-20th century. I 
leave to others the pleasure of tracing the specific influence of Wittgenstein’s oeuvre, the 
Tractatus in particular, on LoF. A similar pleasure undoubtedly awaits the Peirce or White-
head expert willing to give LoF a close reading. 
89. Spencer-Brown repeated his claim of a proof of the Four Colour Map theorem in a letter to 
the editor of Nature, dated 17.12.76. 
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Spencer-Brown was asserting that certain very well-known mathematical conjectures (as 
of the time he wrote) were unprovable using standard mathematics grounded on class-
ical bivalent logic, but could be proved using mathematics grounded in the 3-valued 
logic (i.e., one incorporating an imaginary truth value) he introduced in chpt. 11 of LoF. 
In the nearly 40 years that have elapsed since LoF first appeared, nothing of this sort has 
eventuated. Instead, seven years after LoF’s first publication, Haken and Appel an-
nounced their proof of the Four Colour Map Theorem, one based on conventional math-
ematics albeit supplemented by a large amount of machine computation (for a definitive 
treatment see Haken and Appel 1989). Wiles (1995) finally proved FLT using difficult, 
albeit thoroughly standard, mathematics. All this may help explain why Spencer-
Brown’s work has been ignored, and why it need not be swallowed whole.90 
 
 
8.  Conclusion. 
“Logical laws are the most central and crucial statements of our conceptual scheme, and for this 
reason the most protected from revision by the forces of conservatism; but… they are the laws an 
apt revision of which might offer the most sweeping simplification of our whole system of know-
ledge.”                   Quine (1982: 3). 
Let there be a blank surface upon which marks may be written. The mark can be the ‘ ’ 
of LoF (proposed by Peirce in 1886), a simple closed curve (proposed by Peirce from 
1896 onwards), or Croskin’s (1978) ‘()’, adopted here. The symbol () is the sole primitive 
constant and is both operator and operand. Whatever the mark is taken to be, it is es-
sential that it have a distinguishable "interior" and "exterior," as the mark serves as the 
boundary between the interior and exterior. The mark and the blank page are the 
boundary primitive values. Interpreting the blank page as one of ‘true’ or ‘false’ gives 
rise to boundary logic. 
The only means we have, at this stage, to distinguish anything is to write another mark 
on the state we wish to distinguish. To mark the exterior, we write ()(); to mark the inter-
ior, (()). The Law of Calling says that ()() is indistinguishable from simple (). The Law of 
Crossing says that (()) cannot be distinguished from the blank page. Hence the exterior 
and interior of a mark are distinguished simply by the way each interacts with another 
mark. The exterior of a mark is idempotent; the interior, nilpotent. Let Calling and 
Crossing be the sole axioms. LoF shows, in a rather cryptic fashion, that the primary 
arithmetic (PA) emerges from these notions plus logical equivalence, an equivalence 
relation. Thus the PA can be seen as Boolean arithmetic notated so as to lay bare its tree 
structure. For another recapitulation of the PA, see 2.3.4. 
Inserting letters anywhere in a PA formula yields a pa (primary algebra) formula. Com-
bine the PA and pa to obtain boundary algebra (BA). Letting the blank page interpret 
Boolean 0, and () interpret Boolean 1 (or vice versa), yields 2. The set B={(),(())} corres-
ponds to the carrier of 2, and a letter (a.k.a. variable) can assume any value of B. BA and 
boundary logic are equational rather than ponential, i.e., they privilege tautological 
                                                          
90. Lest I seem too critical, I should add that LoF is an instance of a worthy genre, namely intro-
ductions to formal logic intended for nonspecialists. A fine instance of the genre is Hodges 
(1977), built around refutation trees and linguistic examples. 
  
 
 
74
equivalence rather than tautology, and invoke the substitution of equals for equals 
instead of modus ponens. 
An initial is a tautological equivalence verified by a decision procedure. Any set of CTV 
axioms or Boolean algebra basis translates into a set of pa initials. The initials a′a=() and 
(ba)a=b′a, and the well-known consequences aa=a, (a′)=a, and (a′b′)r=((ar)(br)) enable cal-
culation, a proof method similar to, but easier than, that of Peirce’s alpha existential 
graphs. pa calculations are much easier than the proofs taught in standard texts, especi-
ally natural deduction proofs. The pa facilitates clausal reasoning, and trivializes the 
derivations of the inference rules of conventional logic. The pa and the CTV share a 
common metatheory. 
The pa is, at minimum, a simple yet powerful notation for the truth functors and Bool-
ean algebra, revealing the unity and simplicity underlying the seeming diversity of truth 
functors. Moreover, because the CTV and 2 are models of the pa, BA highlights the sel-
dom mentioned axiomatic role of Boolean arithmetic for these systems. BA also suggests 
that mathematical logic, set theory, theoretical computer science, and probability91 all 
share a common source: the mental act of making a distinction, for which the marker is 
the boundary sign (). I invite others to explore whether BA may be seen as a nominalist 
grounding for 2 and sentential logic, i.e., one abstaining from the notion of set. 
95 years after Boole’s first book and 30 years after PM, Berkeley (1942) noted that formal 
logic and Boolean algebra had been little applied.92 With the exception of computer sci-
ence, electrical engineering, and formal philosophy, this appears to be the case down to 
the present day (Hehner 2004 speaks to this). BA, treated as a demotic version of the 
hieratic languages 2 and the CTV, could facilitate the application of logic and Boolean 
methods. BA could be taught in secondary schools: pragmatically, as an introduction to 
the abstractions underlying information technology; intellectually, as a gentle introduc-
tion to logic and discrete math. Likewise, incorporating BA into Hehner’s (2004, 2005) 
Unified Algebra, an integrated notation for Ba and numerical mathematics, warrants 
exploration. 
Ba (and hence BA) may yet play a significant role in theoretical physics. The notion of 
boundary appears to be making inroads into physical theory. In a talk titled “It from 
Bit,” given at the Santa Fe Institute in 1989, John Wheeler said: 
 
“The boundary of a boundary is zero. This central principle of algebraic to-
pology, identity, triviality, tautology though it is, is also the unifying 
theme of Maxwell’s electrodynamics, [general relativity], and almost every 
version of modern field theory. That one can get so much out of so little, 
almost everything from almost nothing, inspires hope that we will some-
day complete the mathematization of physics and derive everything from 
nothing, all law from no law.”     Wheeler (1996: 302) 
                                                          
91. Discrete probability can be given a Boolean foundation by taking mathematical expectation 
as primitive, then defining probability as the expectation of a Boolean random variable. See 
Lad (1996: §2.2). 
92. Some of the reasons Berkeley gave for why this might be the case do not apply to BA. By the 
way, Berkeley, who was employed in insurance at the time he wrote, neither cited Shannon 
(1938) nor mentioned the possibility of electronic computation, on the brink of discovery. 
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Less speculatively, the BA points to a streamlined unified treatment of Boolean algebra, 
he truth functors, and monadic logic. This treatment should include a more rigorous re-
statement of BA, one dispensing with the enigmatic “canons” of LoF. The ontological 
grounding and semantics of the PA need firming, and the boundary analogue to refuta-
tion trees should be explored. I have indicated the applicability of boundary methods to 
mereology and lattice theory, the latter being a gateway to a variety of nonclassical (e.g., 
intuitionistic, relevant) logics. Boundary methods should prove fruitful for other formal 
systems near to Boolean algebra, such as modal logic and relation algebra, and may 
prove applicable to combinatory logic and to more general algebraic structures.93  
                                                          
93. Meguire (2004) proposes boundary versions of quantification theory, normal modal logic, the 
theories of sets, lattices, categories, groupoids, and ringoids. On connections between Boolean 
and other algebras, see Rudeanu (1974: §§12.3-7) and Burris et al (1981: §II.1). Smullyan 
(1985) is a humorous introduction to combinatory logic. On non-classical propositional logic, 
see Restall (2000) and Epstein (1995). 
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Bibliographic Postscript. 
BA lies at the intersection of four disciplines: mathematics, philosophy, computer 
science, and electrical engineering. I included a reference below either because I found it 
useful, or it was extant and relevant at the time LoF was written. The refences, grouped 
by broad topic, are listed in order of increasing perceived difficulty. 
• There are two distinct perspectives on Boolean algebra: 
• Mathematical: Arnold (1962: §§2,5), Hohn (1966: §§5.1-5), Goodstein (1963: §§2,3), 
Halmos and Givant* (1998: §§19-39), Stoll* (1963: §6), Rosenbloom* (1950: §§I.1-3, 
II.3), Abbott (1969: §§6,7), Cori & Lascar* (2000: §2), Koppelberg (1989), Burris et 
al (1981: §§II.1, IV.1-4). Algebras more general than 2 are typically assumed, and 
are developed in either a set theoretic or algebraic manner. Starred references dis-
cuss the close connection between Ba and CTV called Tarski-Lindenbaum algebra. 
• Engineering/Computer Science: Whitesitt (1961: §§1-3), Hohn (1966: §1), Rudeanu 
(1974: esp. §1; many references). 
• Lattice theory. Arnold (1962: §§3,4), Donnellan (1968), Curry (1963: §4 is very relevant 
for logic), Davey and Priestley (2002), Burris et al (1981: §§I, II.1). 
• Calculus of Truth Values. Mathematical: Arnold (1962: §1), Hohn (1966: §§3.1-12), 
Goodstein (1963: §4), Kneebone (1963: §§2,6), Halmos and Givant (1998: §§8-18), 
Epstein (1995: §§II.J-M), Stoll (1974: §§2.1-5,3.5), Nidditch (1962), Machover (1996: 
§7), Mendelson (1997: §1), Hunter (1971: §§15-36), Smullyan (1968: Part I), Cori & 
Lascar (2000: §1), Curry (1963: §§5,6), Schütte (1977: §I). Philosophical: Girle (2002: Part 
One), Quine (1982: Part I), Suppes (1957: §§1,2), Bostock (1997: §2), Prior (1962: 1-71, 
301-6, 318-19), Hodges (2001: §§1-7), Carnap (1958: §§2-8, 12a, 22), Zeman (1973: 1-
76), Segerberg (1982). 
• Calculus of Quantified Individuals. Mathematical: Stoll* (1974: §2.6-9, §3.6), Machover* 
(1996: §8), Quine* (1951: §2), Hunter (1971: §§38-59), Pollock (1990: §2.1), Smullyan 
(1968: Part II), Mendelson* (1997: §2), Schütte (1977: §II), Cori & Lascar (2000: §§3,4). 
Starred references include axiomatic set theory. Philosophical: Girle (2002: §§12-14), 
Quine (1982: Parts II, III), Bostock (1997: §§3,5), Hodges (2001: §§8-18), Carnap (1958: 
§§1, 9-14, 21-25). Bostock, Hodges, and Machover are best for current terminology. 
For gentle introductions to logic as part of elementary mathematics, see Wolf (1998: Unit 
1); to metamathematics and axiomatic thinking, see Stoll (1974: §3); to the philosophy of 
mathematics, see Lucas (1999). 
On Peirce’s role in the early history of Ba, see Brady (2000: 1-142). The first systematic 
treatment of Ba is vol. 1 of Schröder (1966), written in 1890. Ba came of age as serious 
mathematics in the 1930s, thanks to Marshall Stone, Tarski, and others. MacColl (Frege) 
invented the CTV (FOL) in 1877 (1879). Mathematical logic came into its own with Prin-
cipia Mathematica and the work of Hilbert and his students between the Wars. On the 
history of logic and related mathematics, see Curry (1963), Grattan-Guiness (2000), Gab-
bay and Wood (2004), and Kneebone (1963). 
There is a fair secondary literature on LoF; see the bibliography at http://www.lawsof 
form.org/bib/index.html, in which the names Bricken, Kauffman, and Varela stand out, 
as do a number of articles in the International Journal of General Systems. Another URL 
bearing on LoF is http://www.enolagaia.com/GSB.html . Both sites reveal that LoF’s 
love of paradox and enigma has attracted a nonmathematical following. 
  
 
 
77
Appendix: The Controverted Ontology of the Null Individual. 
This Appendix reviews a controversy in the foundations of mereology, a body of first 
order theories about the part-whole relation described in Simons (1987: chpts. 1,2) and 
Casati and Varzi (1999: chpt. 3). Mereology begins with a domain of individuals, and a 
primitive dyadic predicate Pxy, read as ‘x is part of y.’ P is assumed transitive and can be 
proved a partial order. Let the fusion b of any number of inviduals a be such that aPb 
comes out true for all a. An axiom asserts that the fusion of the members of any nonull 
set [of those individuals satisfying any monadic predicate] exists. 
Nearly all mereological systems deny the existence of a null individual, one that is part of 
every individual; the main exception is a system advocated by R. M. Martin. For present 
purposes, the null individual can be deemed the mereological analogue of the null set. 
In this Appendix, I argue that the denotation I propose for ⊥ is controversial in a manner 
analogous to the controversies aroused by Martin’s null individual. 
To my knowledge, the null individual, under the name null entitity, made its first public 
appearance in the following passage from Martin (1943: 3): “In order to develop an un-
restricted Boolean algebra… it is desirable to admit the existence of a null entity… We 
shall retain then the interpretation of this system as a calculus of individuals and also 
admit the null entity.” Carnap (1956: 36), citing Martin (1943), postulated the existence 
of a null thing as one of seven possible things named by a nonunique description. He 
wrote: “…a natural solution offers itself if we construct the system in such a way that 
the spatiotemporal part-whole relation is one of its concepts. …it is possible, although 
not customary in the ordinary language, to count among the things also the null thing, 
which corresponds to the null class of space-time points. …it is characterized as that 
thing which is part of every thing.” 
Geach (1972: 200), written in 1949 in response to the 1947 edition of Carnap (1956), 
wrote: “There is a well-known convention in mathematics whereby ‘the least’ or ‘the 
only’ number fulfilling a condition is deemed to be zero if there is in fact no number thus 
uniquely described. This has technical advantages… Carnap proposes an allegedly sim-
ilar convention for language about physical objects [, the null thing]. Further, [Carnap] 
describes the null thing as corresponding ‘to the null class of spacetime points’⎯or, in 
plain English, as existing nowhen and nowhere!” 
The following long quotation is taken from the opening paragraphs of Martin’s vigorous 
defense of the null individual, first published in 1965 and reprinted as Martin (1979). I 
trust that my substitution of ⊥ for ‘null individual’ has not traduced Martin’s meaning. 
 
“Is there such a thing as ⊥? Well, as an actual or concrete entitity, certainly not. There is 
no such actual entity, there never has been, and there never will be. If this were the 
whole story, one could end therewith. As a convenient technical fiction and useful nota-
tional device, however, introducing ⊥ into [first order logic] is not without interest. ⊥ 
can be given important roles to perform and it can be made to perform them well, so 
well in fact as to lend strong support to regarding its theory as a suitable appendage to 
logic. 
“One speaks of the ⊥ in the sense of there being one and only one ⊥. Could there be two 
or more? Possibly, but there is no need for such, and anyhow it is desirable to keep 
traffic with the ghostly at a minimum. 
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“Attitudes differ as to the feasibility of introducting ⊥... Lejewski… explicitly admits a 
‘nonreferential name… meant to be a name that does not designate anything.’ Such a 
name is to be read ‘object which does not exists.’ 
“That the notion of ⊥ is no better or worse than that of the null set seems likely. Refusal 
to postulate one should perhaps go hand in hand with refusal to postulate the other. The 
null set… is a useful mathematical notion that has been with us with impunity for some 
time. Set theory… would be impoverished without it and technical inconveniences 
would result. These are perhaps not insurmountable, but little would be gained if one 
were to reject it. And mathematics abounds with other convenient technical fictions that 
by parity of reasoning would have to be forsworn, many of these depending definition-
ally on the null class. The more reasonable course then seems to be to admit not only the 
null set but also such additional ‘fictions’ as are feasible if strong technical reasons can 
be given on their behalf.” (Martin 1979: 82-83) 
 
Martin went on to cite Carnap (1956) with approval. 
Bunt (1985: 56-7), nowhere mentioning Martin or Carnap, wrote of the empty ensemble as 
follows: “emptiness… is defined as the property of having no other parts than 
itself…From the transitivity of the part-whole relation it follows that all parts of an 
empty ensemble are empty. …it can be proved that there exists an empty ensemble, and 
that an empty ensemble is part of every ensemble [individual].” [emphasis in original] 
Simons (1987: 13), citing Geach, summarily dismisses the null individual as follows: 
“Most mereological theories have no truck with the fiction of a null individual which is 
part of all individuals… The chief culprit in propounding this absurdity is R M Martin.” 
Finally, Lewis (1991: 11) writes: “If we accepted the null individual, no doubt we would 
identify the null set with it, and so conclude that the null set is part of every class. But it 
is well nigh unintelligible how anything could behave as the null individual is said to 
behave. It is a very queer thing indeed, and we have no good reason to believe in it. 
Such streamlining as it offers in formulating mereology [e.g., closure under intersection] 
can well be done without. Therefore, reject the null individual; look elsewhere for the 
null set.” 
Casati and Varzi (1999: 45) also distance themselves from Martin, whom they relegate to 
a footnote, but in a more cautious way: “…few authors have gone so far as to postulate 
the existence of a ‘null individual’ that is part of everything. Without such… (which one 
could hardly countenance except for algebraic reasons), the existence of an [intersection] 
is not always guaranteed. Likewise… complements may not be defined, e.g., relative to 
the universe.” 
Given how contentious the null individual has proved to be, despite its seeming onto-
logical innocence, those who doubt the innocence of ⊥ can be forgiven. 
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Appendix:  Demonstrations, Proofs, etc. 
Throughout this Appendix: 
• ‘OI’ means that order irrelevance is invoked; 
• The symbol ‘?’ signals the end of a proof/demonstration/calculation. 
A.1. The Core Demonstrations and Calculations. 
LoF’s notrivial deduction of C1 from J1 and J2 enables the following quick demonstra-
tion of J0: Dem: a′a [C1] = ((a′a)) [J1] = (), which generalizes as follows: Dem. (a)ab [OI] = 
(a)ba [C2; OI] = (ab)ab [J0] = (). ? 
 
C2,C3 ? J0. Proof. Erasing all instances of any letter from a tautology results in a tautolo-
gy, because letters stand indifferently for () and ⊥, and A2 always sanctions erasing ⊥. 
Erasing b in C2 yields a(a)=a() [C3] = (). ?  Bricken (2002) invokes C2 to justify a(a)=a() 
without discussion. 
 
The demonstrations below differ from those in LoF mainly in that the initials here are J0 
and C2. The calculations of C1 and C5 are original. For the time being, I mention each 
invocation of R1. 
 
C5. aa=a. Cal. LR: (aa)a [C2] = (a)a [J0] = (). RL: (a)aa [C2] = (aa)aa [J0] = (). ? 
J1.  Dem.  ((a)a) [J0; R1] = (()). ? 
C3. Dem.  ()a [J0; R1] = (a)aa [C2] = (aa)aa [J0] = (). ? 
C4. Dem.  (a′b)a [C2] = ((a)ba)a [C2; TR] = ((ab)ab)a [J1] = (())a [A2] = a. ? 
C4a. Corollary. Dem.  (())a [J0; R1] = ((a)a)a [C4] = a. ?   C4a can do most of what A2 does. 
 
C1. ((a))=a. Cal. LR: (((a)))a [C2,2x] = (((a)a)a)a [C4; R1] = (a)a [J0] = (). 
    RL: (a)((a)) [TR; J0] = (). ? 
 
I now demonstrate the remaining LoF consequences. I adapted the demonstration of J2 
from Bricken (1986). The calculation of J2 is original. R1 will henceforth be invoked 
without mention. 
 
J2.  a((b)(c)) = ((ab)(ac)). 
Dem.  a((b)(c)) [C2,3x] = a((ab)(ac)) [C1; χ=((ab)(ac))] = (a′)χ [C2] = (a′χ)χ [C2,3x] = 
(a′(a′(a′ab)(a′ac)))χ [J1,2x] = (a′(a′(())(())))χ [C4a,2x] = (a′(a′))χ [J1] = (())χ [C4a] = 
((ab)(ac)). ? 
Cal. LR:  (a(b′c′))((ab)(ac)) [C2,2x] = (a((ab)(ac)))((ab)(ac)) [C2] = (a)((ab)(ac)) [C2,3x] = 
a′(a′(a′ab)(a′ac)) [J1,2x] = a′(a′) [J0] = (). 
 RL:  (((ab)(ac)))a(b′c′) [C1] = (ab)(ac)a(b′c′) [C2,2x; OI] = ab′c′(b′c′) [J0] = (). ? 
 
The demonstrations of C6 and C7 follow LoF. 
 
C6. Dem.  (a′b′)(a′b) [C1] = (((a′b′)(a′b))) [J2] = (a′((b′)b′)) [J1] = (a′) [C1] = a. ? 
C7. Dem.  ((a′b)c) [C1] = (((a)((b)))c) [J2] = (((ac)(b′c))) [C1] = (ac)(b′c). ? 
 
C9 is simpler than its LoF counterpart, and its demonstration is new: 
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C9.  Dem. ((b′r)(a′r′)) [J2] = ((((b′r)a)((b′r)r))) [C1; C2] = ((b′r)a)((b′)r) [C1; OI] = (a(b′r))(br) 
[C2] = (a(b′r)(br))( br) [OI; C1,2x] = (a((r′)b′)((r′)b))(br) [C6, r′/A, b/B] = (ar′)(br). ? 
The calculation of a consequence is usually easier than its demonstration. C9 is an excep-
tion; the RL part of the following calculation is surprisingly difficult. 
Cal.   LR: (((b′r)(a′r′)))(ar′)(br) [C1; OI] = (rb′)(rb)(r′a′)(r′a) [C1,2x] = 
((r′)b′)((r′)b)(r′a′)(r′a) [C6,2x] = r′r [J0] = (). 
          RL: ((ar′)(br))((b′r)(a′r′)) [C7,2x] = (r(br))(a′(br))(b(a′r′))(r′(a′r′)) [C2,2x]  = 
(r(b))(a′(br))(b(a′r′))(r′(a′)) [C1; OI] = (rb′)(a′(rb))(b(r′a′))(r′a) [C2,2x] = 
(rb′)(a′(rb′)(rb))(b(r′a′)(r′a))(r′a) [C6,2x] = (rb′)(a′r′)(br)(r′a) [OI; LR] = (). ? 
The RL part of the above calculation is much more easily verified by TVA: 
r=(): ((a)(b()))((b′())(a′)) [C3; C4a] = ((a))((a′)) [C1,2x] = aa′ [J0] = (). 
r=⊥: ((a())(b))((b′)(a′())) [C3; C4a] = ((b))((b′)) [C1,2x] = bb′ [J0] = (). 
 
Absorption (L3). 
Dem. Primal:  a(a′b′) [C2] = a((ab′)b′) [C2; OI] = a((ab′)ab′) [J1] = a. 
Dual:    (a′(ab)) [C2] = (a′(a′ab)) [C2; OI] = (a′((ab)ab)) [J1] = (a′) [C1] = a. ? 
L3, a(ab)=a, the lattice version of Absorption follows, since the pa translation of a(ab) is 
the dual pair a(a′b′) and (a′(ab)). 
 
Commutativity and Associativity 
Demonstrating that juxtaposition commutes and associates, while contrary to the planar 
spirit of the pa, is nevertheless possible. First note that erasing c from OI yields ab=ba; 
call this TR. Now let OI be read, here only, as ab.c = bc.a . Then: 
Associativity.  Dem. ab.c [OI] = bc.a [TR] = a.bc. ? 
That the dual of juxtaposition associates also follows trivially from C1: Dem. (((a′b′))c′) 
[C1] = (a′b′c′) [C1] = (a′((b′c′))). ? That juxtaposition itself associates then follows from 
4.1.3. Hence that juxtaposition associates requires only what the proof of 4.1.3 and the 
demonstration of C1 require. Proof: C1, R1 ? 4.1.3. J0, C1, C2 ? R1. J0, C2, TR ? C1. 
Hence J0, C2, TR ? 4.1.3. ? This proof is much simpler than Huntington’s (1904; repro-
duced in Eves 1990: 217-19) proof of associativity from the basis {J1, J2, a⊥=a, TR} (see 
Table 6-2). 
I now reproduce Byrne’s (1946: 271) demonstration of TR from OI and C5 alone. Note 
that the calculation of C5 above requires neither OI nor TR, and only J0 and C2. OI justi-
fies each step below, unless otherwise noted. 
 
TR. Dem. ab [C5] = ab.ab = b.ab.a = ab.a.b = ba.a.b = aa.b.b = bb.aa [C5, R1, 2x] = ba. ? 
 
Having shown that juxtaposition associates, we have no further need for notations such 
as ab.c. 
 
A.2.  Proof of 2.3.10. 
2.3.10. Theorem. R is an equivalence relation iff R is reflexive and Euclidian. 
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Proof. I assume that the uniform replacement of letters ranging over the field of a rela-
tion is allowed (the analogous BA property is R2). Since formulae of the form xRy have 
truth values, they can be treated as BA atomic formulae. The BA version of Euclidian is 
(aRc)(bRc)aRb = (). Then: 
 
(aRc)(bRc)aRb [a/c] = (aRa)(bRa)aRb [reflexive; C4a] = (bRa)aRb ⇔ bRa→aRb. 
(aRc)(bRc)aRb [a/b; b/a; c/b] = (bRb)(aRb)bRa [reflexive; C4a] = (aRb)bRa ⇔ aRb→bRa. 
Hence aRb ↔ bRa, i.e., R is symmetric. 
(aRc)(bRc)aRb [c/b; b/c] = (aRb)(cRb)aRc [symmetric] = (aRb)(bRc)aRc ⇔ (aRb ∧ bRc) → 
aRc. Hence R is transitive. ? 
Remark. Using ponential methods, Lukasiewicz (1967: 97-98) derives the three properties 
of equivalence relations from a variant of Euclidian, (cRb)(cRa)aRb, 1 on p. 97. Reflexivity 
and symmetry are *6 and *7 on p. 97; transitivity is 5 on p. 98. 
 
A.3. Proofs Required for §3.3. 
3.3.11. Theorem (Consistency Principle).  a≤b, a∪b=b, and a∩b=a are equivalent Ba state-
ments, and these in turn have the pa equivalents a′b=(), ab=b and (a′b′)=a. 
Dem:  a∪b=b ⇔ ab=b ⇔ (((ab)b)(b(ab))) [C2,2x] = (((a)b)(b(a))) [OI; C5] = (((a)b)) [C1] = a′b. 
a∩b=a ⇔ (a′b′)=a ⇔ ((((a′b′))a)((a′b′)(a))) [C1; C2] = ((a′b′a)((b′)a′)) [C1] = ((a′b′a)(ba′)) [OI] 
= ((a′ab′)(a′b)) [J1] = ((a′b)) [C1] = a′b. 
Moreover, a′b ⇔ a≤b because a′b satisfies the three criteria for a partial ordering: 
Reflexivity: a′a [J0] = ().  Antisymmetry: a≤b ∧ b≤a ⇔ ((a′b)(b′a)) [Def. of =] ⇔ a=b. 
Transitivity: (a≤b ∧ b≤c) → a≤c ⇔ (((a′b)(b′c)))a′c [C1] = (a′b)(b′c)a′c [C2,2x] = (b)(b′)a′c [J0] = 
()a′c [C3] = (). ? 
 
3.3.15. Theorem. The cardinality of B in BA is necessarily 2. 
Cal. x=() ∨ x=⊥ ⇔ (x′(()))(x())(x′⊥′)(x⊥) [C4a,3x] = (x′)(x())(x′())(x) [C3,2x] = (x′)(())(())x′ 
[C4a,2x] = (x′)x′ [J0] = (). ? 
 
A.4.  Demonstrating J0 and C2 from C6 and OI. 
Huntington (1933), cited on p. 88 of LoF, showed that C5, C6, and OI form a basis for Ba. 
LoF was not aware that Huntington (1933a) showed C5 redundant by deriving it from 
C6 and OI. The following demonstration that C6 and OI form a Ba basis, adapted from 
Kauffman (1990) and simpler than Huntington’s,94 also implies that Johnson’s axioms C1 
and C5 are redundant. I now derive J0 and C2 from OI and C6. 
J0. Dem. a′a [C6,2x] = ((a′)(b′))((a′)b′)(a′(b′))(a′b′) [OI] = ((a′)(b′))(a′(b′))((a′)b′)(a′b′) [OI] = 
((b′)(a′))((b′)a′)(b′(a′))(b′a′) [C6,2x] = b′b. Hence a′a has the same value for any a, so that a′a 
can be equated to either primitive value. I go with a′a=(), but a′a=⊥ is equally valid and 
gives rise to the dual reading. A trivial variant of this demonstration yields J1. ? 
C1. Dem. (a′) [C6] = (((a′))a′)(((a′))(a′)) [J1, (a′)/A, a′/B] = (((a′))a′)((a′)a′) [C6] = a. ? 
C5. Dem. aa [C1] =((aa)) [J1] =((a(a))(aa)) [C1,2x] =((((a))(a))(((a))a)) [C6] =((a)) [C1] = a. ? 
                                                          
94. See http://www.lawsofform.org/logic.html. This URL also includes Bricken’s (1986) demon-
strations. 
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C2. Dem. a′b [C6,2x] = (ab)(ab′)(b′a)(b′a′) [OI; C5] = (ab)(b′a)(b′a′) [C6] = (ab)b. ? 
 
A.5.  α=β ⇔ α↔β ⇔ ((α′β)(β′α)) Because ‘↔’ Is an Equivalence/Congruence Relation. 
In this section, I employ ‘⇔’ in place of ‘=’ because I am temporarily suspending belief 
in ‘=’ as an equivalence relation. 
Symmetric: [α=β]⇔[β=α] ⇔ [α↔β]↔[β↔α]. 
LR: Cal. (((α′β)(β′α)))((β′α)(α′β)) [C1] ⇔ (α′β)(β′α)((β′α)(α′β)) [C2,2x] ⇔ (). 
RL: Trivial, and also evaluates to (). ? 
Transitive: Let χ stand for (α′β)(β′α)(β′δ)(δ′β). ‘α=β and β=δ implies α=δ‘ trnslates as 
(α′β)(β′α)(β′δ)(δ′β)((α′δ)(δ′α)) ⇔ χ((α′δ)(δ′α)) [J2] ⇔ ((χα′δ)(χδ′α)). 
Cal. χα′δ ⇔ (α′β)(β′α)(β′δ)(δ′β)α′δ [C2,2x] ⇔ (β)(β′α)(β′)(δ′β)α′δ [C1] ⇔ β′(β′α)β(δ′β)α′δ 
[OI; J0] ⇔ (). 
χδ′α ⇔ () by a strictly parallel reasoning. ? 
Reflexive: Cal. [α=β] ⇔ ((α′α)(α′α)) [J1,2x] ⇔ (). ?  
By virtue of satisfying conditions C1 and C2 below, ‘=’ is also a congruence relation (cf. 
3.3.10 in the text, and Stoll 1963: 259-61). I now demonstrate this fact, ∀a,b,c∈B, again 
translating ‘=’ as ‘↔’: 
C1. a=b → ac=bc.  Cal. (a′b)(b′a)(((ac)bc)((bc)ac)) [C2,2x] ⇔ (a′b)(b′a)(((a)bc)((b)ac)) [J2] ⇔ 
(a′b)(b′a)((a′b)(b′a))c [OI] ⇔ ((a′b)(b′a))(a′b)(b′a)c [J0] ⇔ (). 
C2.  a=b → a′=b′.  Cal. (a′b)(b′a)(((a′)b′)((b′)a′)) [C1,2x] ⇔ (a′b)(b′a)((ab′)(ba′)) [OI] ⇔ 
((a′b)(b′a))(a′b)(b′a) [J0] ⇔ (). ? 
C3.  a′=b′ → a=b.  Cal. ((a′)b′)((b′)a′)((a′b)(b′a)) [C1,2x] ⇔ (ab′)(ba′)((ab′)(ba′)) [OI] ⇔ 
((a′b)(b′a))(a′b)(b′a) [J0] ⇔ (). ? 
Remark.  Stoll does not mention C3, which enables replacing C2 with a′=b′ ↔ a=b, a corol-
lary of which being that either of J0 or J1 does duty for the other. Note how the calcula-
tions reveal that C2 and C3 reduce to the same thing, which differs only slightly from C1. 
 
A.6.  J1-C5 Are Standard in Logic and Boolean Algebra. 
 
Table A-1. 
 Algebra of 
Propositions 
BA 
1 Idempotent C5 
2 Associative OI 
3 Commutative OI 
4 Distributive J2 
5 Identity A2 
6     “ C3 
7b Complement J1 
8a     “ C1 
8b     “ A2 
9 De Morgan’s Transcriptional triviality 
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Table A-1 shows the correspondence between Lipschutz’s (1964: 195) “Laws of the Alge-
bra of Propositions” and BA. Each Law is actually a dual pair, 8a and 8b excepted; 8a is 
self-dual. Corresponding to each law is a law for the algebra of sets (p. 104). When LoF 
was written, Lipschutz was a standard elementary treatment of set theory and sentential 
logic. Only two basic BA notions are missing from Table A-1: A1, a trivial consequence 
of 5 and 6, and C2. 
 
A.7.  More on C2. 
First a quick TVA proof. Given (ba)a = (b)a, let: 
• b=⊥:  Simply erase b. The lhs becomes (a)a [J0] = (), and the rhs becomes ()a [C3] = (). 
• b=():  The lhs becomes (()a)a [C3] = (())a, the rhs, (())a. 
Invoke T7 twice to complete the proof. ? 
Equivalents of C2 include Johnson’s (1892: 342) Law of Exclusion, the third consequence 
proved in his system, Th. 7 in Byrne (1946), (48) in Rosser (1953: 113), T8-6.j4 in Carnap 
(1958), T12 in Stoll (1963: 257), and exercise 3.12.a in Hohn (1966). C2 is a trivial corollary 
of (b→a)↔[(b∨a)↔a], *4.72 in PM, T73 in Kalish et al (1980: §II.11), and (38) in Cori and 
Lascar (2000: 32). C2 also follows trivially from (31) in Suppes (1957: 204), once it is un-
derstood that a~b (Suppes) ⇔ (a′b). C2 can be obtained from [(a→b)∧ (c→b)]↔[(a∨c)→b], 
*4.77 in PM, (18) in Stoll (1974: 85), and (57) in Cori and Lascar (2000: 33), via b/c and 
noting that [(a→b)∧(b→b)]↔(a→b). 
One half of C2, viewed as a biconditional, is C2′, (a→b)→[(a∨b)→b]. C2′ is (22) in Grass-
mann (1966: Be-13), *2.621 in PM (the other half is *2.67), Zeman (1973: 2.20), and 
Leblanc and Wisdom (1976: 99, Example 21). Zeman shows that C2′ is merely a substitu-
tion instance of a tautology equivalent to modus ponens. The converse of C2′ is likewise a 
substitution instance of his 2.12. Zeman derives C2′ from that part of the implicational 
calculus intuitionists accept. C2′ is also an axiom in a system Hilbert set out in 1922 (sys-
tem 1.3) and in four other CTV axiom systems set out in Epstein (1995: 408-9). A trivial 
substitution turns Reichenbach’s (1947: 39) (8h)95, ((b∨c)→a)→(b→a), into the converse of 
C2′. Even though C2′ is a substitution instance of Mendelson’s (1997: 35) axiom A3, his 
proof of the converse (Th. 1.11.g) requires 43 lines and the Deduction Theorem! C2′ can 
even be viewed as an analogue to the special case φ=Δ of the “left” version of Bostock’s 
(1997: §2.5) structural rule THIN. 
Another related tautology is C2″, (b→a)→[(b∨c)→(a∨c)], axiom *1.6 of PM (Prior 6.11). 
Hence C2″ is included in the PM axiom system as modified by Lukasiewicz and Bernays 
(Table 6-2; Prior 6.11 net of (4)) and commonly used since (e.g., Carnap 1958: 86, P1-P4; 
Kneebone 1963: 43; Mendelson 1997: 45, system L1; Halmos and Givant 1998: 22, T1-T4). 
To obtain C2′, substitute a for c in C2″ and note that this axiom system trivially implies 
(a∨a)↔a, C5 in the pa. As best as I can determine, however, the only proof in the sources 
I cite that invoke any of C2, C2′, or the converse of C2′ is Zeman’s proof of his 2.21. I 
conclude that extant expositions of the CTV are unnecessarily complicated. 
 
A.8. From Any Contradiction, Anything Can Be Proved. 
Proof. By C2, b(ba)=b(a) for any a,b. Now let b be any pa formula whatsoever, and let a be 
a formula such that both a=() and a=⊥ are demonstrable by hypothesis. The lhs of C2 
                                                          
95. Cal. ((b∨c)→a)→(b→a) ⇔ ((bc)a)b′a [C2] = ((bc))b′a [C1; OI] = b′bac [J0] = (). ? 
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evaluates as b(ba) [let a=()] = b(b()) [C3] = b(()) [C4a] = b. The rhs of C2 evaluates as b(a) 
[let a=⊥] = b(⊥) [C4a] = b() [C3] = (). Hence b=(), the desired absurd result. ? 
 
A.9.  Proof of Theorem 4.1.3. 
The proof is by induction on formula length, a standard technique well-explained in 
Bostock (1997: §2.8). The proof follows Bostock closely, except for notation. 
Definition: Given a formula α, its length l(α) = number of variables in α less 1, plus the 
number of left parentheses and primes in α. If l(β) < l(α), then β is shorter than α. 
Notation:  Given the pa formula 1α α ,..., nx x= 〈 〉 , its contradual is 1α α ,..., .nx x′ ′= 〈 〉df  
Lemma: α (α)D = . 
Proof. The hypothesis of strong induction is: 
For all formulae β such that l(β) < l(α), β (β)D = . 
There are three cases to consider. 
α is atomic:  α αD =  [C1] = ((α)) [Def. of overbar] = (α) . 
α is enclosed:  α = (β). 
α (β)D D=   Substitute (β) for α [R1] 
      = (β )D   Def. of duality 
      = ((β))   Inductive hypothesis 
      = ((β))   Def. of overbar 
      = (α)   Substitute α for (β) [R1]. 
α is a concatenate:  α = βχ for some formula χ. 
 [βχ]D Dα =   Substitute βχ for α [R1] 
       = ((β )(χ ))D D  Def. of duality 
       = (((β))((χ)))  Inductive hypothesis 
       = (βχ)   C1, 2x 
       = (βχ)   Def. of overbar 
       =  (α)   Substitute α for βχ [R1]. ? 
Theorem 4.1.3:  α φ=  ↔ α φD D= . 
Proof.  If α=φ , then α=φ  [R2], so that (α)=(φ) . Hence α =φD D  by the lemma above. ? 
 
The lemma [4.1.3] is Bostock’s (1997: §2.10) First [Third] Duality Theorem and Quine’s 
(1982: §12) second [5th] law of duality. 
 
A.10.  The pa metatheorems. 
T10. J2 extends to any finite number n of divisions (2.1.7) of the subspace of depth 1. 
Proof (LoF, pp. 38-39). T10 with n=0 is simply C3. T10 with n=1 yields ((a))r [C1] = ar [C1] 
= ((ar)). The following demonstration verifies the case n=3. 
Dem. r( 1a′ 2a′ 3a′ ) [C1,2x] = r( 1a′ (( 2a′ (( 3a′ ))))) [J2] = ((ra1)(r( 2a′ (( 3a′ ))))) [J2] = 
((ra1)(((ra2)(r( 3a′ ))))) [C1,2x] = ((a1r)(a2r)( a3r)). 
It should be evident that the case n=3 generalizes to any finite n, if each instance of ‘2x’ 
in the preceding demonstration is replaced by ‘(n-1)x’. ? 
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T14. Let *dα >2 for some formula α. Then α can be transformed, by taking steps, into an 
equivalent formula β such that *dβ =2. 
Proof. (The repeated use of C7 is from LoF; the proof is otherwise new.)  α can be seen as 
an ordered tree, one or more of whose branches terminate at some maximal depth *dα . Let 
*dα >2, and let β, χ, and φ be subformulae appearing at depths *dα , *dα −1, and *dα −2, res-
pectively, of any longest branch of α. Let γ denote all of α not accounted for by β, χ, and 
φ, so that α=(((β)χ)φ)γ. By C7, (((β)χ)φ)γ=(βφ)(χ′φ)γ. The maximum depth of (βφ)(χ′φ)γ is 1 
less than that of (((β)χ)φ)γ. This depth-reducing procedure based on C7 can be repeated, 
each time suitably redefining β, χ, φ, and γ. When one branch of α is exhausted, switch to 
the longest remaining branch. Continue until no branch of α has depth>2. ? 
Remark: Each application of C7 to the terminus of any branch of α reduces that branch’s 
depth by 1. This fact enables the following, perhaps simpler, algorithm. Beginning at the 
terminus of any branch, apply C7 repeatedly until a node is encountered, then switch to 
the terminus of any other branch. Continue until no further applications of C7 are 
possible, at which time no branch will have depth>2. For more on ordered trees, see 
Smullyan (1968: §§I.0-1). Ordered trees are also models of bounded semilattices. 
T15.  Let the pa formula α〈v〉 contain more than 2 instances of the variable v. Then α can 
be transformed, by taking steps, into an equivalent formula β〈v〉, such that β〈v〉 contains 
at most 2 instances of v. 
Proof (Adapted from LoF).  By C1 and T14, there exist a subformula f〉v〈, and the sequen-
ces of subformulae, ai, pi, and xj, such that 
α〈v〉 (( ) )... ( )...i i iva p f vx=  
 (( ) )... ( )...i i iv a p f vx′ ′= ( )( )  Apply C1 twice for each value of i. 
 ( )( )... ( )...i iv a f vx′ ′= i ip p  Apply J2 and C1 once for each value of i. 
( )...( )... ( )...i i i iv p a p f vx′ ′=  By OI, the disjuncts ( )iv p′ can grouped together, to the 
  left of the ( )i ia p′ . 
 ( )... ( )...i jv p g vx′=   Let ( )...i ig a p f′= . 
 ( )... ( )...i jv p vx g′= (( ))(( ))  C1, 2x; OI g. 
 (( ...) )(( ...) )i jp v x v g′ ′ ′=   T10, 2x. ? 
T16. Let the variable v appear in at least one of the formulae α and β. Let v ∈B be a 
possible value of v, and α〈 v 〉 be α〈v〉 with v set to v . Then if [ ]υ α υ β υ∀ 〈 〉 = 〈 〉 , then α=β. 
Proof (Adapted from LoF, pp. 47-49). Let v vary between ⊥ and (). Now consider the fol-
lowing two mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases: 
1. Variation in v either alters or does not alter both α〈v〉 and β〈v〉. If α〈v〉=β〈v〉 after a 
change in v, then α〈v〉=β〈v〉 must have been the case before the change. Hence α=β in this 
case. 
2. Variation in v causes the value of one of α〈v〉 or β〈v〉 to change, but not both. If both 
were to change, there would exist a v  such that α〈 v 〉≠β〈 v 〉, contrary to hypothesis. 
Hence if varying the value of v causes one of α〈v〉 or β〈v〉 to change, the other must 
change as well, so that the reasoning of case 1 applies. 
Hence α〈v〉 and β〈v〉 are equivalent in all cases of v, so that α=β in any case. ? 
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Remark. If only one of α〈v〉 and β〈v〉 is the case, then variation in v cannot affect the value 
of the formula in which it appears. 
 
T17.  The pa is complete. 
Proof (adapted from LoF, pp. 50-52). Let αk, βk be formulae each containing some variable 
v. Let k-1 be the number of distinct variables other than v appearing in either αk or βk. 
The proof proceeds by strong induction on k, with the inductive hypothesis being ∀k<n 
[αk=βk] for some integer n>0. T15 assures us that there exist formulae *nα  and *nβ , with v 
appearing at most twice in each, such that *n nα α=  and *n nβ β= . Moreover, T14 assures 
us that the depths of *nα  and *nβ  need not exceed 2. Since *nα  and *nβ  are the normal 
forms of αn and βn, they can be written as: 
(E1) *nα  = (v′a1)(va2)a3  (E2) *nβ  = (v′b1)(vb2)b3 , 
where ai and bi, i=1,2,3, are suitable sub-formulae whose depth do not exceed 1. 
Now let v=() and v=⊥ in turn, with each case resulting in formulae for * 1nα −  and * 1nβ − : 
v=():   * 1nα −  = ((())a1)(()a2)a3 = (a1)a3 ;   * 1nβ −  = ((())b1)(()b2)b3 = (b1)b3. 
v=⊥:   * 1nα −  = ((⊥)a1)(⊥a2)a3 = (()a1)(a2)a3 = (a2)a3 ; * 1nβ −  = ((⊥)b1)(⊥b2)b3 = (b2)b3. 
The inductive hypothesis asserts that * 1nα − = * 1nβ −  can be proved. Hence: 
(E3) * 1nα −  = * 1nβ −  → (a1)a3 = (b1)b3, and 
(E4)  * 1nα −  = * 1nβ −  → (a2)a3 = (b2)b3, 
are provable. I now demonstate that *nα = *nβ .   N.B. C9: ((A′R′)(B′R)) = (AR′)(BR). 
 (v′a1)(va2)a3 E1, transcription of *nα . 
 ((v′(a1))(v(a2)))a3 C9, a1/A, a2/B, v/R 
 ((v′(a1)a3)(v(a2)a3)) J2, a3/R 
 ((v′(b1)b3)(v(b2)b3)) E3, E4 
 ((v′(b1))(v(b2)))b3 J2, b3/R 
 (v′b1)(vb2)b3 C9, b1/A, b2/B, v/R 
 *nβ  E2. 
All that remains to be shown is that there exists a value of n for which the inductive 
hypothesis, αk=βk ∀k<n, holds. Suppose that n to be 1, in which case only k=0 need be 
considered. Now if k=0, then α0 and β0 are PA formulae. α0=β0 can be proved in the pa if 
A1 and A2 are pa consequences, which I proceed to show: A1 is C5, ()/A. A2 is C1, ⊥/A, 
and Dem. ⊥⊥ [C5, ⊥/A] = ⊥; (⊥) [A2] = ((())) [C1, ()/A] = (); ⊥()= ()⊥ [C3, ⊥/A] =(). ? 
T17. Alternate Proof (following Kneebone 1963: 48). 
I take completeness to mean: all tautologies are demonstrable from the pa initials. By T14, 
any formula α has an NF representation β= *( ...) ...ai j . Keep in mind that for some j, i 
may equal 1. Every step in the derivation of β from α is justified by invoking one of C7, 
C1, or C2, all initials or consequences derivable from the initials. Hence if β is derivable 
from the initials, then so is α. Also if β is a tautology, α is as well, because β=α by T14. 
To demonstrate that β is a tautology, it suffices to consider two cases: 
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Case 1. ∀j *( ...)ai j =⊥. If every disjunct contains some variable in both primed and un-
primed form, then each disjunct (and hence β as well) simplifies to ⊥ by J1. 
Case 2. ∃j *( ...)ai j =(). This is demonstrable if there exists a variable x such that one dis-
junct is simply (x) and another is ((x)). Then β=() by J0. 
J0, J1, C1, C2, and C7 are either initials, or can be derived from the initials. Hence if α is a 
tautology, the initials suffice to verify that fact. ? 
 
T18.  The initials J1 and J2 are independent. ({J1, J2} is an independent basis.) 
Proof.  (Adapted from LoF).  J1: (a′a) = ⊥.   J2:  ((ar)(br)) = (a′b′)r. 
In J1, no variable instance crosses a boundary. In J2, r moves from depth 2 to depth 0. 
Hence J2 cannot be proved using J1 alone. Meanwhile, J1 creates or eliminates the varia-
ble a. J2 does not create or eliminate any variable. Hence J1 cannot be proved using J2 
alone. ? 
T18a.  {J0, C2, OI} and {C6, OI} each form an independent basis. 
Proof.  J0 [C6] creates or eliminates a variable; C2 and OI do not. C2 creates or eliminates 
some but not all instances of a variable. J0 [C6] creates and destroys all instances of a 
variable; C2 and OI do not. OI has no boundary while J0 and C2 [C6] each have 1 [2] 
boundaries. Hence J0, C2, [C6] and OI are mutually independent. ? 
 
A Précis of Mathematical Logic. 
I now review some notions from that combination of the CTV and the CQI known as 
First Order Logic (FOL). For a masterly précis of FOL and its extension to axiomatic set 
theory, see Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel, and Levy (1973: §V.2). For more leisurely expositions, 
consult the references cited under “Quantifier Logic” in the Bibliographic Postscript es-
pecially Bostock (1997), the Encyclopedia Britannica articles “Logic” and “Metalogic.” For 
a treatment more sophisticated than the one below, see http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
entries/logic-classical/ . 
A string consists of a single symbol, or of concatenated symbols. Absent semiotic the-
ory, symbol is undefined. B={T,F} is the set of possible truth or primitive values. 
Calculus of Truth Values, CTV. A statement (sentence, proposition) is a string that can 
be assigned a truth value. Statements include formulae, i.e., strings that satisfy a forma-
tion rule. The definitions of subformula and atomic formula in 2.1.3 carry over to CQI in 
the obvious way. A statement letter (sentential variable) stands for any member of some set 
of statements. (Truth) functor, connective, and operator are defined in 3.1.2; these relate to 
mappings from Bn onto B, n∈N. The constants T and F are 0-ary functors by assumption. 
Common functors include the prefix ~ “not”, and the infix connectives ∧ “and”, ∨ “or”, 
→ “if”, ↔ “iff”, | “NAND”. 
An atomic valuation (i) assigns an element of B to every atomic formula, and (ii) com-
pletely describes the mapping fk: Bn→B for every n-ary operator k. A statement con-
sisting of m∈N statement variables (arguments) and constants, linked by connectives, is a 
truth function from Bm onto B. The truth value of a statement is the image of its truth 
function under some atomic valuation. If the image is T [F], the statement is valid [in-
valid]. If a statement is valid under [all/some] atomic valuations, the statement is 
[tautologous/satisfiable]. If a statement is not valid under any atomic valuation, its denial 
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is a tautology. If all atomic valuations satisfying α also satisfy β, and vice versa, α and β 
are tautologically equivalent, denoted α↔β. 
Proof (adapted from Halmos and Givant 1998: §13). An axiom is a statement asserted 
true without proof. The rule of detachment is: If α and α→β are both tautologies, then β is 
also a tautology. Let i,j,k,n ∈Ν. A formal proof (demonstration in LoF-speak, or simply 
proof) is an ordered sequence of n statements with typical statement αk 1≤k≤n<∞. A step 
transforms αk into αk+1. For each αk, i,j<k, αk is either (i) a substitution instance of some 
definition, axiom, or already proved consequence, resulting from the application, often 
tacit, of R1 and R2 (§3.1), or (ii) the result of applying detachment to some pair αi and αj. 
(i) alone suffices for equational logics (e.g., boundary logic), for which detachment is just 
a special case of propositional consequence (§5.3). If there exists a proof whose last state-
ment is αn, αn is provable and a theorem. 
CTV is sound (all provable formulae are valid), complete (all valid formulae are 
provable), and decidable (there exist algorithms, e.g. TVA, for determining whether any 
finite formula is valid). The primitive basis (DeLong 1971: 91) of a formal system consists 
of its primitive symbols, defined constants, rules of formula formation, axioms and rules 
of inference, and a truth definition. A model is an interpretation of a formal system under 
which its formulae all come out true; see Suppes (1957: §4.2) or Mendelson (1997: §2.2). 
Calculus of Quantified Individuals, CQI. An variable stands for any member of a 
nonempty collection (domain [of interpretation]) of physical or abstract individuals, each 
having a name. A term, denoted by a lower case letter, is a name, variable, or a function 
thereof. The uniform replacement of a term letter by another is permitted. Predicate let-
ters are upper case. Associated with each predicate and function letter is a nonnegative 
integer called its arity. A predicate [function] letter with an arity of 0 is a statement vari-
able [constant]. An atomic formula (aka predicate) consists of a predicate letter followed 
by arity terms. An atomic formula with [more than] one term is [polyadic] monadic. ∀ [∃] 
is the universal [existential] quantifier. A quantifier operates on the variable that immedi-
ately follows it; ∀x [∃x] translates as “for all [for some] x”. A CQI formula consists of 
quantifiers, and atomic formulae linked by truth functors. 
Let α,β be arbitrary CQI formulae. ∃xα =df  ~∀x[~α], so that there is in fact only one 
quantifier. Let x and y be vectors of variables, of unspecified dimension. Let Qi be one of ∀ or ∃, and let Q(x) be a string of the form 1 1 2 2...Q x Q x  known as a prefix. Let a matrix 
M(x,y) consist of atomic formulae and truth functors but no quantifiers, with each xi and 
yi appearing at least once. Qi binds xi, and xi is a bound variable; the yi are free. An atomic 
formula has a truth value only if its variables are all bound. If y has dimension 0 (≥0), 
then α is closed (open). CTV formulae are the special case when both x and y have dimen-
sion 0. The prenex form of α is then Q(x)M(x,y), The scope of Qxi is M(x) by default, or 
overridden by parentheses. If x has dimension 1, and if α is closed and does not lie with-
in the scope of another quantifier, then α is an elementary quantification. Writing 1 2 ...y y∀ ∀  
to the left of an open formula results in its universal closure. α is valid (is a “law of logic”) 
if it evaluates to T for all nonempty domains. 
CQI requires three axioms in addition to any basis sufficient for the CTV: UI, ∀xα〈x〉 
→α〈a/x〉, α〉x〈→∀xα〉x〈, and ∀x[α→β]→(∀xα→∀xβ) (Bostock 1997: 236). Fitch devised 
these axioms and Quine 1951 popularized them; they enable dispensing with the rule of 
generalization. ‘α〉x〈’ means that any appearances of x in α are bound. CQI with identity 
includes a primitive dyadic predicate, denoted by infix ‘=’, which is reflexive (x=x), and 
obeys the axiom schema (x=y)→(F〈x〉↔F〈y//x〉), where F is any atomic formula. 
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CQI is provably sound (Hunter 1971: §42), complete (§46), and undecidable. Some 
necessary conditions for a CQI formula to be undecidable include a domain with infin-
itely many individuals, a prefix with at least one ∃ preceding one or more ∀, and a ma-
trix that is not a substitution instance of a monadic formula. The necessary and sufficient 
conditions for decidability are not known. 
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